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CHAPI'ER I 
PERSONALITY: ITS MEANING AND HISTORY 
The term "personality" like every other good thing is over-worked. It 
is of common use in the vocabularies of psychologists, theologians, philos-
ophers, educators, play-writers, actors, reporters, columnists, dispensers 
of 'popular' psychology, phrenologists, ocultists, spiritualists, religion-
ists of all brands, lawyers, beauty culturalists and popular authors. 
It would be quite impossible to ferret out and unnecessary for the 
problem of this paper to classify the many various meanings of the above 
uses of the term "personality." Professor Allport in his most admirable, 
interesting and comprehensive book, Personality, has made a thorough 
analysis of the derivation, history and present meaning of the term begin-
ning with the original Latin term "persona" meaning 11mask11 and tracing the 
development and changing usage from the popular, theological, philosophical, 
juristic, sociological, bio-sooial and psychological standpoints. In 
dealing with the present problem we are concerned primarily with the philo- . 
sophical meaning of the term and its relation and significance in the 
philosophy of Professor Ralph Barton Perry. 
It might be assumed by the layman devoid of a knowledge of philosophica 
history that when all other fields are eliminated and the attention is 
focused upon philosophy that there could easily be found a common meaning 
for the term "personality" as used by professional philosophers. Surely 
skilled artisans of thought will have a common agreement on this very im-
portant and often used word. Hmvever, such is not the case. Merrington in 
the Foreword of his Problems of Personality speaks of its being ''ovorth-
2 
while to seek to clarify our ideas regarding the somewhat vague concept of 
Personality111 and again he refers to ~e same unclearness in his Introduc-
tion~ when he says~ "The concept of Personality is so vague and undefined. 11 2 
Professo~ Allport reiterates the same feeling when he writes, "Personality 
is one of the most abstract words in our language. "3 There are as many 
different definitions of "personality" as there are schools of philosophical 
thought and even within fairly well-defined schools of thought there are 
different conceptions of the meaning and content of the term. 
Usually by resorting to dictionaries or encyclopedias one is helped to 
a clearer understanding of a term but such is not the case with the word, 
"personality." The New International Encyclopedia makes no attempt to defin 
"personality" but evasively refers one to 11 individuality11 and "self," the 
inference being that either "personality," "self," and "individuality" are 
synonymous or that "individuality" and "self" are subsidiaries of the 
greater term 11personali ty. 11 The New Standard Encyclopedia and !!::! 
Encyclopedia .Americana follciw the example of the New International and do 
not so much as list the term. The Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology 
ventures slightly into this controversial field with the following definitio 
under the dual heading "Person" and "Personality:" 
An individual --- and individuality considered 
as having the higher, reflective, intellectual and moral 
attributes of man. 
Immediately after the above attempted definition the reader is advised to 
1. Merrington, PP, p. v. 
2. Ibid., l. 
3. Allport~ PER, 25. 
---·------------
3 
seek further illumination under the headings, "self, 11 "personal identity" 
and "individuality." The New Century Dictionary defines "person" as, "a 
self-conscious or rational being; the actual self or individual personality.'~ / 
"Personality" is defined as, "existence as a self-conscious being; personal ~~ 
identity." The Oxford English Dictionary defines 11person11 as, "a self- I 
I 
conscious or rational being, '1 and "personality" as, "the quality, character, i 
or fact of being a person as distinct from a thing." The Century Diotionazx l 
and Encyclopedia defines "personality" as, 
The essential character of' a person as distinguished 
from a thing; self-consoiousness; existence as a self-
conscious being; also personal qualities or endowments 
oonsidered collectively; a person. As a philosophical 
term personality commonly implies personal identity. 
Webster's New International Dictionary defines "personality" as, 
That which constitutes distinction of person; 
distinctive personal character; individuality. 
Personality implies complex being or character having 
distinctive and persistent traits, among which reason, 
self-consciousness, self-activity are usually reckoned 
as essential. 
1. 
II 
Hasting's Encyolopedia of Religion and Ethics contains a splendid article on 
"Personality" by MaoTaggart in which he regards "self" as equivalent to 
"personality." The Encyclopedia Bri tannioa has little of a constructive and 
clarifying nature to offer but does throw out a very suggestive thought 
I 
I 
which is important particularly in the light of Perry's General Theory of I 
Values and our particular problem when the question is asked, "What is new \\ 
in the philosophioaJ. treatment of Personality?" and answers by saying that, ~~ 
I 
I 
"the new is the recognition of the supreme place of Personality in the 
interpretation of values."l 
l. Enc. Brit., 1!{_1919 612. ____ _ 
--
Aveling in his Personality and Will says, 
It is a distinguishing mark, indeed the distinguish-
ing mark of human beings that they are self-conscious; 
and in more than one system of philosophy this mark has 
been taken to b! the chief characteristic and indication 
of personality. 
--
4 
The above was the definition submitted at the beginning of his treatise on 
"personality" and the following is the concluding definition: 
Personality may now be defined not merely as the 
organization of all so-called mental contents, traits, 
capacities, and reaction tendencies but as that final 
perfection which virtually includes in itself all the 
principles of human activity and constitutes a unitary, 
self-conscious, and (to2some extent at least) self-determining individual. 
The above definitions include in their conceptions of "personality" 
such characteristics as, "individuality," "personal identity," "intellectual 
attributes, 11 "moral attributes, 11 "self-consciousness, 11 "rationality," 
"quality of being distinct from a thing," "reason," "self-activity" and 
"self-hood." Allport f'elt it necessary to begin his monumental work, 
Personality, with the sentence, "The outstanding characteristic of' man is 
his individuality."3 Practically all who attempt a definition of' "person-
ality" include some aspect of' "individuality," irrespective of what is 
omitted or debated regarding other suggested attributes. Rashdall4 
contends that there are five necessary elements of personality: (1) oon-
sciousness, (2) permanence, (3) a self-distinguishing identity, 
. I 
5 
{4) individuality and (5) activity. Dr. Buckham in his analysis of person-
ality needs only four necessary factors, (1) self-consciousness, (2) unity, 
(3) freedom and (4) worth. Dean Knudson1 differs slightly from Buokham 
listing the following fundamental elements in personality: (1) individual-
ity, which includes unity and identity, (2) self-consciousness, (3) free 
activity and (4) dignity or worth. 
Personality is no doubt the top ter.m used in reference to a human being. 
Philosophers differ in its meaning but when it is used irrespective of its 
content it always refers, in a philosophical manner, to the highest and 
best that can be said about a human being. Terms such as, mind, conscious-
ness, activity, self, individual, organism, will, reason, judgment, emotions, 
autonomic or central nervous system never mean, taken alone, more than the 
term "personality." Some philosophers may consider some of these terms 
synonymous with "personality" but none consider any of them greater than 
personality, neither do ~ thinkers of any school consider personality 
eligible for sub-summing under ~ of the above terms. For. practically all 
types of thought personality connotes the best; highest and most meaningful 
expressions which philosophers have attributed to man. Leighton makes an 
interesting gradation of the terms, "self," "individual" and 11person. 11 For 
him "individual" stands under the other two, meaning, "any being that is an 
indivisible unity of diverse parts or aspects and, hence, in which the unity 
and the diversity are interdependent." The "self" is higher than an "in-
dividual" in Leighton's scheme in that a self is an individual but is more, 
being limited to "conscious individuals." 11Persontt is at the apex, meaning, 
1. Knudson, PP, 83. 
----------======--=----------=--=-===-========== 
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"a well-organized and reflective or rational individual; that realizes its 
life, and knows itself as such as a thinking and self-active self, a 
responsible center of thought, valuation and choice. 111 Leighton has a very 
high regard for personality which is embodied in his general definition in 
most beautiful language and to which most idealistic thinkers would find 
themselves in agreement as follows: · 
Among empirical existents human personality is the 
richest monad, the microcosm. It is a vortex in the 
universal flux. All the forces of the universe flow 
through it. It is subject to all the winds and tides 
of cosndc weather: it is bestial and Godlike, co~ 
pounded of clay and fire. It rises from the slime and 
ooze of the primal world stuff to the contemplation of 
the stars, to love stronger than death, to creative 
imaginings of an ideal vrorld. It visions values which, 
could they be realized in society, would make of mankind 
a Godlike cormnuni ty. It is racked by pain and driven by 
hunger and lust. But it can live and die for loved 
ones, for a count~, for a cause, for an illusion. It 
is moved by consuming greed and can give, asking nothing 
in return. It lives by bread but not by bread alone; 
it can make the earth a shambles or a garden of peace, 
justice and friendship. .All the counter currents and 
conflicts of the universe live in intensified individua-
tion in t he soul of man •••••••••• In man, the most complex 
and contradictory individuation of the universal forces, 
lives the best key to the ·interpretation of the meaning 
of the whole; the best key, since all other keys are 
manmade, and man himself is the final clew to all the 
partial clews he makes or finds.l 
Let us now turn our attention to the history of philosophy and 
endeavor to catch a view of personality as expounded by various thinkers 
and schools of philosophical speculation. In this brief survey it will be 
the purpose of the writer to select primarily doctrines which relate to 
personality. To do so it will be necessary to inject some theories which · 
l. Leighton, MC, 289. 
Professor Perry is predominantly an epistemologist it will be helpful and 
of great benefit later to incorporate epistemological doctrines in this 
survey of the history of thought in order to show later their bearing on a 
doctrine of personality. 
The history of philosophy proper begins with the Greeks approximately 
600 B.C. The Grecian period of philosophy extends nearly three centuries 
to 322 B.C., the date of the death of Aristotle. This three hundred year 
period is sometimes considered under three subdivisions, (a) cosmological, 
(b) anthropological and (c) systematic. Weber and Perry make only two 
periods, i.e., (a) First--Philosophy of Nature and (b) Second--Study of 
Man, while Rogers divides the material into, (a) The Scientific Period, 
·I (b) Study of Man, (c) The Systematic Philosophers, (d) Later Ethical Period 
I 
. 1 and (e) The Religious Period. Irrespective of the division schemes whether 
l 
the first period is called Philosophy of Nature, Cosmological or Scientific 
the important item of interest in this search for personality concepts is 
that man and his constituent nature played a very minor and insignificant 
r6'1e. Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes of the Miles ian Schoo11 were 
concerned primarily with the original ground of all things and found the 
1. Rogers, HP, 12-15. 
Thi1ly, HP, 16-19. 
Weber and Perry, HP, 9-11. 
Winde1band, TIP, 27-31. 
Leighton, FP, 32-35. 
Turner, HP, 34-38. 
Haven, HP, 4-19. 
Ueberweg, f~, 29-38. 
il 
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) / 
answer in water, the Inf'ini te ( ~7/ f: Lpo v ) and air, respectively. They were 
concerned with cosmological speculations of a materialistic natt~e. There i 
is little evidence to support a claim that the Milesians had any conception 
1 
I 
I 
I of mind, consciousness or personality as these terms are used today. II 
1. Heraclitus had much in conunon with the Milesians in that he found one I! 
! substance, Fire, as the cosmological ground of everything. In the philos- 11 
I ::::.0:x::::::::u:: :: ::::a:::u:•:::-::::.::.·::::·::1:~ on~yt::tt::u:::•• i 
that we can rise above the realm of changing appearance and attain true 
reality. Knowledge is due to the response betvreen the inner Fire which 
! constitutes our rational nature, or Soul, and the outer Fire, which is the 
reality of the world. Here we have the first intimation of epistemological 
dualism as well as an inference that the reason is something other than the 
body~ not in the sense of being utterly different in quality, still being 
fire, but mind-fire~ which is of' a higher, drier, purer flame than the 
body-fire or the fire of' the objective reality of the world. Ethics also 
appears in Heraclitean thought in which morality means respect for law, 
self-discipline, control of passions and the governing of oneself by 
rational principles. 
1. Thilly, HP, 22-27. 
-------· 
Roger, EP, 14-20. 
Windelband, HP, 20-27. 
Haven, HP, 19-27. 
Ueberweg, HP, 18-31. 
Weber and Perry, HP~ 18-31. 
Leighton, FP, 35, 45, 48. 
Turner, HP, 53-58. 
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The Eleatic School1 like the Milesian was concerned with cosmology 
almost entirely. Its three exponents, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Zeno were 
interested primarily in the problem of change. They concluded that, "Being 
is everything; Becoming is an illusion." Xenophanes was more of' a specu-
lative theologian than a philosopher and as such conceived of Deity as the 
one, eternal being, self-existent, self-equal, always the same, without 
begill1ling, without end and without change. Xenophanes here seems to 
believe in one, supreme God regarded after the conception of a person but 
upon careful study of his metaphysics with an attempt to reconcile it with 
his theology we find an identification of' God with Nature resulting in a 
/I 
I 
form of pantheism which would deny what we commonly conceive as personality. ,! 
Parmenides of£ered nothing now regarding the unique status of man's mind I] 
making the seat of the soul to be in the stomach and the difference in 
- - '!I 
intelligence to be due to the variation of heat and cold in the body. Zeno 
1 
confined himself to the problem of change and motion offering nothing 
regarding man's constituent nature except that the s ou1 is a compound of 
the four elements, the war.m, the cold, the dry, and the moist. 
The Mediators,2 Empedocles and Anaxagoras, were primarily concerned 
with cosmology but did go a step beyond that of any of the preceding 
l. Rogers, SHP, 20~25. 
Weber and Perry, HP, 11-18. 
Thilly, HP, 26-30. 
Windelband, HP, 31-45. 
Turner, HP, 44-51. 
Ueberweg, HP, 49-66. 
Haven, RAMP, 44-64. 
2. Rogers, SHP, 24-35. 
Weber and Perry, HP, 27-35. 
Thil1y, HP, 39-36. 
Haven, HP, 64-65. 
---_ --------=---=-=-------=-=== 
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thinkers with regard to the imm.a.terial part of man. Empedocles agreed with 
the Eleatics by denying Becoming and agreed with the Milesians by positing 
as the "ground of all things" four substances; air, earth., fire and water. II 
The moving force which produces combinations of these elements he speaks of 
1 as Love and Hatred. He vaguely detaches motion from matter. Epistemolog-
ioally, he contends that the reason we can know everything is because we 
ourselves are compounded of everything. All of the four elements enter 
into our makeup; air, the vital breath; water, the liquid; earth, to form 
the solid parts, and fire, the soul. Vfe perceive any thing because we are 
1
. 
that thing; like is known by like. Ana.xagoras went beyond Empedooles and 
II 
II reduced matter not to a single substance nor even to four. He proposed 
what has been called, "qualitative atomism.," contending that there are an I 
infinite number of qualitatively different., uncreated, indestructible., 
unchangeable atoms. Change is possible only in the different groupings of 
I 
by Mind Jl these elements. Motion he explains not by Love and Hatred but 
( Vov .s ) , the moving power which formed the world. The 0/J.r is distinguishe 
from other things because, (1) it is simple, (2) it is self-ruled, (3) it 
has all knowledge about everything and, (4) it has supreme power over all j 
things. Episte.mologioally, Anaxagoras differs from Empedocles in that like I 
is not known by like but by unlike. The senses are weak but they are not 
deceitful. The faculty of true knowledge is the V~vs , the principle of 
understanding. Thus .Anaxagoras makes the greatest advance thus far with 
regard to knowledge and man but fails to systematize his work so that we 
I 
I 
are left in doubt as to the relation of the individual vov s to the world j 
whether they are distinct or whether the individual soul is part of the li 
--+!--universal world force. Some historians of philosophy interprat Ana=gora•-l=---
ii 
theory of the Vovs materialistically, as for example, Windelband, 
Far from being an immaterial principle, the 
'spirit' is to Anaxagoras corporeal matter, but 
indeed in a state of exceeding refinement ••••••• 
It is the lightest, the most mobile, the only matter 
that moves itself. It represents the ?'.1("5 , both 
in the macrocosm and in the miorocosm. 1 
At any rate we find in Anaxagoras, anticipati0ns of later theories of 
mind, theory of the Logos and world reason, etc. For the Atomists,2 
11 
Democritus and Leuoippus, the soul is nothing but corporeality oanposed 
of the finest, most nearly perfect atoms. Soul is the noblest part of 
man not that it is different in kind f rom the body but in finer quality 
of like corporeality. · The Pythagoreans 3 t aught nothing about the Soul 
being concerned with a cosmological study of .the universe and the appli-
cation of their theory of number as the essence and basis of all things. 
In the brief survey of tha_Cosmological period of Greek philosophy 
we have seen that the primary -empP,asis' has been upon the study of nature 
and the secondary interest in man and his constituent nature. We now 
1. Windelband, HAP, 82 •. 
2. Thilly, HP, 36-41. 
Weber and Perry, HP, 35-40. 
Rogers, SHP, 13-33. 
Windelband, HP, 53-55. 
Cunningham, PP, 162-164. 
Turner, HP, 65-70. 
3. Rogers, SHP, 33-37. 
Thilly, HP, 21-27. 
Windelband, HP, 55-57. 
Ueberweg, HP, 38-44. 
Haven, HP, 37 ~44. 
Turner, HP, 38-44. 
Weber and Perry, HP, 21-27. 
'I 
I 
I 
I 
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witness a shift of emphasis as we enter the Anthropological period# a 
period in which man assumes the primary H~le. 
The Anthropological Period is usually introduced by Sophisml which 
flourished immediately prior to and contemporaneously with Socrates; 
its two leading exponents being, Protagoras and Gorgias. With regard 
to the problem of this paper it is sufficient to point out that the 
Sophists were the first to call attention to the subjective phase of 
being and as Windelband indicates# ~that an independent psychology first 
came into being. n2 Because they denied the existence of sure and 
universal kr1owledge as well as objective standards of value, and further 
because of their forensic ability, it was natural that a subjective 
study of the thinking process should result. v'Vhereas in the Cosmolog-
ical Period# Nature had been the primary concern, now man held the stage 
and particularly with the Sophists the center of the stage which is 
exemplified by the famous sophistic statement of Protagoras, "Man is 
the measure of all things. 11 The Sophists' preoccupation with episte-
mology led to soeptioism. Windelband points out that, 11Protagoras made 
the eternal flux of Heraclitus his point of departure in order to 
establish his skeptical belief about human k:nowledge. 113 The only source 
l. Thilly# HP, 4Q-50. 
Weber and Perry, HP, 40-44. 
Rogers, SHP, 37-49. 
2. Windelband, HP# 66-76. 
Leighton, FP, 47-58. 
Turner, HP, 70-76. 
Haven, HP, 64-72. 
Ueberweg, HP, 71-80. 
3. Windelband, HAP, 117. 
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of knowledge was sense perception. Everything for each percipient is 
just what it appears to be. "There is no truth for man except what he 
perceives, feels, and experiences."~ Sophism produced relativism and 
soepticis.m, preparing the way .for Soorates 2 whose system rests on the 
13 
assumption that every man has within the possibility of knowledge. The 
type of knowledge believed possible is best summed up byWeber when he 
says, 
he believes that there is something in the 
universe that can be known, and lmown absolutely; 
this, as the words inscribed on the tem~le of 
Delphi, Know thyself, indicate, is man. 
For Socrates the soul of man is the seat of moral ideas. As with the 
Sophists man is the center but he overcomes the sophistic relativism by 
his belief that by the process of education complex and superficial 
layers· of gathered prejudices will be removed and reveal in all men the 
same ideas ~~d the same aspirations toward goodness, beauty, justice and 
truth. Socrates', "knowledge is virtue," and "happiness is the highest 
1. Weber and Perry, HP, 41. 
2. Rogers, HP, 49-59. 
Thi1ly, HP, 50-58. 
Weber and Perry, HP, 44-50. 
Windelband, HP, 94-99. 
Durant, SP, 11-19~ 
Turner, HP, 76-84. 
Ueberweg, HP, 80-88. 
Bakewell, SBAP, 86-148. 
Leighton, FP, 58-67. 
Cunningham, PP, 62-63, 435-437. 
Dewulf, ElW, 3-19. 
Pater, PP, 75-99. 
Haven, ll.AMP, 74-93. 
3. Weber and Perry, HP, 45. I, 
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good, 11 are meaningless apart from man, the center of his entire philo-
sophioal system. It is probable that Socrates believed in immortal~ty. 
The two schools which sprang up immediately following Socrates claimed 
Socratic fatherhood each connecting itself to him by means of the phrase, 
"Knowledge is virtue; 11 the Cynics asking, "Virtue for what?" and answer-
ing, "For virtue;" while the Cyrenaica answered, "Virtue for happiness." 
Man plays the leading part in both systems of thought. In the one 
(Cyrenaio) he makes his ovm personal pleasure the sole good while in the 
other (Cynic) he makes his m~ self-denial or elimination of his wants 
and desires supreme. In Cyrenaicism the emotions, passions and senses 
are given full sway while in Cyncism reason seeks the control of the 
individual subduing and directing other constituent elements of the 
person. 
Plato'sl conception of man and his analysis of his constituent parts 
is important for our discussion of personality. It is quite conclusive 
that Plato made a marked distinction between immateriality and 
corporeality. 2 In his treatment of pleasure he makes a distinction 
1. Rogers, HP, 67-101. 
Thilly, HP, 58-75. 
Weber and Perry, HP, 54-77. 
Windelband, HP, 116-132~ 
Cunningham, PP, 163-165, 438-441. 
Dewulf, HMP, 16-29. 
Leighton, FP, 67-98. 
Ryan, IP, 18-21, 63. 
Bakewell, SBAP, 148-217. 
Pater, PP. 
Turner, HP, 93-121 . 
2. Windelband, HP, 79. 
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between bodily pleasures and pleasures of the mind contending that the 
life of reason on the whole is the most pleasurable. For him man ha.x 
the power and duty choice which should follow t he lines of wisdom and 
justice. His Psychology of Soul calls for three divisions which 
correspond to this three divisions within the State; (1) the lowest part 
(appetitive) (farmers-artisans), (2) next highest (executive) (warriors), 
and (3) the highest part (noetic) (rulers). #1 refers to appetites, 
~ to will and # 3 to mind. Each part of the soul as well as each class 
of worker in the State has a. virtue or highest peculiar ·to its station, 
as (1) appetitive (artisans-fa.rmers)--temperance or self-control, (2) 
thoracic (warriors)--courage, (3) noetic (rulers)--wisdo.m. The harmon-
ious highest good of the entire organism as well as of the State is 
justice which is defined in Platonic language as "everyone or part doing 
his own task" or in modern parlance, "Minding one's own business." V\'hen 
every part does its task the soul is healthy. There is no friction, 
discord, strife or soul-disease. Epistemologically, Plat.o offers an 
entirely new contribution to the history of thought up to this time. 
Truth is not fleeting and changeable but rather it exists, is steadfast 
and abiding. There is a. distinct realm of ideas. It is only as we 
apprehend a.n idea. clearly that we have true knowledge. In order to 
solve the problem of apperception Plato proposes the theory of Recollec-
tion which in essence means that in a pre-existence each person existed 
in the pure, clear, light of true ideas. This present life is cumbered 
;rith the senses, passions, matter, etc. It is only as we transcend 
--
---
16 
knowledge, as illustrated by the well-known figure of the cave. From 
this brief survey it seems expositionally correct to conclude that Plato 
gave man the place of importance, reason the supreme position in the 
hierarchy of roan's powers, believed in pre-existence of the soul and in 
its immortality. As for the Supreme Personality it is interesting to 
note Turner's observation supporting belief in such a person, "Plato, 
it must be understood, did not deny the personality of God. Indeed, he 
often speaks of God as a person."1 
Aristotle, 2 the disciple of Plato, _reacted to the dualism of his 
teacher who had made a clear-out distinction between the world of idea 
and the world of matter. Aristotle endeavored to show the impossibility 
of setting up ideas apart from things and advanced the position that 
ideas exist only in the world and in things, not outside of and apart 
from them. Reality becomes a process of growth and development. True 
existence is not something apart from the phenomenal world but is 
realized in it; it is possibility made real; the potential, actualized; 
Aristotle's entelchy. Step by step the process moves forward and upward 
1. Turner, HP, 105. 
2. Rogers, HP, 101-119. 
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Thilly, HP, 75-94. 
Weber and Perry, HP, 77-101. 
Windelband, HP, 132-159. 
Leighton, FP, 99-111. 
Bakewell, SBAP, 217-269. 
Taylor, .AHP. 
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from the mechanical to the chemical; to organic life; to vegetative 
life; to animal soul capable of sensation and motion; and fram animal 
soul to man; from sensation to reason. The function of man is an 
activity of soul in accordance with reason. Virtue consists in the 
realization of the rational nature and with this comes its complement, 
happiness. Weber points out that Aristotle's conception of intellect 
has a mortal and an immortal part, 
The mortal part comprises the sum of our ideas 
in so far as these are determined by bodily impres-
sions, that is whatever the intellect receives 
suffers, and does not create or bring forth. The / 
entire passive side of the intelligence (vO),s 7T<t6flrr/(()..J ) 
shares the fate of. the body without which it cannot be 
conceived. Only the active intelligence (vdi>s 7TtJ'I;TII(/s ) 
the pure reason, which conceives the universal p-d 
the divine enjoys the privilege of immortality. 
With the Platonic and Aristotelian background it was natural that 
the ethical question should arise and maintain a place of prominence. 
The Epicurean School2 made pleasure their highest good while the school 
of the Stoics2 said that the thing of most worth is character. Man 
plays the central rGl.e in both systems. The self has by some been 
1. Weber and Perry, HP, 96-97. 
2. Rogers, HP, 122-160 
Thilly, HP, 94-116. 
Windelband, HP, 165-179~ 
Bakewell, SBAP, 290~305. 
Weber and Perry, HP, 101-112. 
Turner, HP, 164-181. · 
Leighton, FP, 42, 114. 
Hyde, FEC, 66-110. -
Dewulf, HMP, 53-64. 
Lowber, TR, 27-29. 
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divided into three faculties~ the emotions, the will and the intellect. 
The Epicureans sought to build a philosophy on the one phase of the 
individual, the emotions, while the Stoics constructed their system 
on the intellect backed up by the will. For the Epicureans, mind is 
dependent on the body; immortality is denied and the world is purpose-
less. The Stoics regarded reality as an organic whole of which man is 
a significant part. Man is a thinking being. The world is a moral 
order, the ~xpression of immanent reason. For Epicureans everything 
was corporeal including the soul which dies with the body. The Stoics 
emphasized the unity and independence of the individual soul which for 
the first time provides a contrast between it and its states and 
activities. Intellectual knowledge arises from sense-perception whioh 
becomes representation as soon as it rises into oonsciousness.l 
During the process of sense-·perception the 
soul remains passive, the object reducing its 
image on the mind, just as a seal produces its 
impression on wax. VVhen the object of knowledge 
is removed from the presence of the senses we 
retain a memory of it, arid a lar2e number of 
memori~s constitutes experience. 
Following this process concepts are formed by the "reflex activity of 
the mind." Weber adds, 11 In the real being, mind is the active element; 
matter, the passive element."3 The Stoics emphasized ethical freedom 
even though it seems apparent that their metaphysics drove them to a 
determinism. 
1. Thilly, HP, 101. 
2. Turner, HP, 165. 
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The School of the Sceptics, represented primarily by Pyrrho, 
Aenesidemu_s, lu-cesilaus and Carneades, add little to our quest for 
personality attributes. Espiste.mologically they denied the accessi-
bility of real things to human knowledge. Philo, 1 the Alexandrian Jew, 
made a contribution to personality concepts and for them we pause a 
moment before passing on to Nee-Platonism. His unique contribution was 
the Doctrine of the Logos which forces attention on the personality of 
Jesus who was considered to be a revelation of the divine world reason.2 
God for Philo is called the One, Unbegotten, Unchangeable, Free, 
Independent of all things. n3 The Stoics taught that the world is God 
but Philo makes it to be the work of God. In his Anthropology he dis-
tinguishes the ideal man made in the image of God, and the man of our 
experience. 4 In his Epistemology three faculties of cognition are 
differentiated as follows: 
1. 
2. 
' I .6 1. c:t tu f/1 a"'Lj which has for its object the concrete 
and sensible. 
, 
2. )y () yd s which is the reasoning faculty. 
3. Vov s which is the faculty of immediate contempla-
tion of intellectual truths. 
Rogers, HP, 168-169. 
Weber and Perry, HP, 124-128. 
Thilly, HP, 119. 
DeWulf, Ill~, 63-67. 
Turner, HP, 201-204. 
Windelband, HP, 240-242. 
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The body is constantly inclining the soul toward sin. It is man's duty 
to free his soul from the trammels of the body and rise from reason to 
contemplation. This doctrine of Philo no doubt paved the way for Neo-
Platonism and Plotinus. With the arr~val of Neo-Platonis.m came a new 
appreciation for and emphasis on the plaoe of· personality. Plotinus 
starts with the conception of God as Goo~ rather than ·as Being or Mind. 
He transcends all Being. The first emanation from the One is that of 
the v'ov s , which in turn gives rise to individual souls; these in turn 
give rise to matter.l Man is a compound of matter and the human soul. 
The soul is immaterial and will survive the body although it may become 
incarnate again after death in another body. The highest end of man is 
to become absorbed in the One by the power of the intellect through 
contemplation. 
An outstanding contribution of Christianity was the conception of 
the inestimable value of the human person or soul. Dean Knudson states 
this fact when he says, 
That the personality of God and the sacredness 
of human personality express the true genius of the 
Christian religion, whatever may be said of its 
theology, is hardly open to question.2 
The greatest Christian philosopher and systematizer of Christian doctrine 
was St. Augustine.3 In his epistemology he follows Plato to the extent 
1. Turner, HP, 206. 
2. Knudson, PP, 80. 
3. Rogers, liP, 192-19.7. 
Weber and Perry, HP, 145-154. 
Thilly, HP, 147-155. 
Windelband, HP, 276-287. 
Fisher~ HCC, 101-142. 
Turner, HP, 234-246. 
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of establishing a realm of ideas although differing from Plato in making 
these ideas to be produced by God while Plato made them to be inde-
pendent of God. St. Augustine believed that true knowledge or certitude 
was possible. Our own mental states are beyond the region of doubt. 
You cannot doubt that ~ou think. This argument rather presupposes 
Descartes', "Cogito, ergo sum." Man arrives at a lmowledge of intel-
ligible objects in two ways: (1) by rising from the data of sense to 
an understanding of the hidden causes of things, to knowledge of Him \Vho 
is the Highest Cause, and (2) by introspection. The purer the heart the 
( 
more perfectly will mind mirror truth for then it will reveal Him who 
is the source of all truth. The soul is simple, immaterial and spiritual. 
It is the soul that percei vas all impressions made on the body. "It is 
essentially individual. nl It is also immortal. St. Augustine expatiates 
at length in his discussion of the relation of body and soul which he 
claims form one substance, -- man. The soul gives being and species to 
the body. It acts on the body. The body, however, has no independent 
power of acting on the soul. The following may be of special interest 
to us when we come to consider Perry's theories: 
Between soul and body is interposed a subtle 
element, partaking at the same time of the material 
nature of the body and of the spiritual nature of the 
soul: it is analogous to light and air. The 
function of this element is to mediate between the 
soul and the organs of the body, and to unite, in ~orne 
mysterious manner, soul and body in one substance. 
1. Turner, HP, 231. 
2. Ibid., 233. 
The faculties of the soul are classified by St. Augustine as follows: 
Appetite Sensus communis 
Faculties of sense External senses 
Knowledge Imagination 
Internal senses 
Sensuous memory 
Will--Voluntas, Liberum Arbutrim 
Intuitive--Mens. 
Faculties of the 
soul as spirit Intelligence 
Knowledge Discursive-Ratio 
Intellectual memory 
St. Augustine rises above his predecessors by his assertion that the 
soul is truly the "living whole of _£ersonalit~> whose life is a unity, 
and which, by its self-consciousness, is certain of its own reality as 
the surest truth. ttl It is also interesting to observe that in St. 
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Augustine's system it is the will that is primary and of utmost importanc 
determining the motives of cognition and furnishing the dynamic for 
aotion in ethical matters. 
John Scotus Erigena2 was the first of the great scholastic philoso-
phers. He was a Platonist holding that class terms are real. His 
1. Windelba.nd, HP, 278. 
2. Weber and Perry, HP, 158-164. 
Rogers, HP, 205-209. 
Windelba.nd, HP; 287-293. 
Thi1ly, HP~ 164-166. 
Turner, HP, 246-257. 
DeWulf, IDft.P, 101-173. 
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metaphysical, speculative material is interesting particularly when 
proposing five ways in which a thing may be said not to be.l Also his 
division of Nature into four categories is unique, (1) that which is 
uncreated and creates, (2) that which is created and creates, (3) that 
which is created and does not create, and (4) that which is unoreated 
and does not create. He divides the cognitive powers of the mind into 
sensible and supersible. The sense-faculty is one, the so-called five 
--
senses being merely the different organs which the sense employs. The 
23 
higher faculties are three-fold, (l) intellect (vt~'P..:;) by which the 
/ 
mind contemplates God, ( 2) reason ( )] ~>' )'11 ~ ) by which the mind contemplates 
the primordial causes in the Word, and (3) internal sen~e ( 6u/v()ca_ ) by 
which the mind attains a knowledge of the world of phenomena. Turner 
adds this interesting observation concerning Erigena, 'With regard to 
self-knowledge, the soul can know its own existence but not its essence."2 l 
St. Anselm apart from his Ontological Argument for God and the . I 
Satisfaction Theory of the Atonement offers little that is unique. His 
view of the existence of God is based on the Platonic conception that 
universals have an existence independent of particular objects. For him 
God was a person demanding obedience. 
The great thinker of this period of thought is St. Thomas Aquinas.3 
1. Turner, HP, 249. 
2. Ibid., 255. 
3. Rogers, HP, 215-217. 
Thilly, HP, 191•203. 
Weber and Perry, HP, 190-195. 
Windelband, HP, 321-334. 
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All knowledge begins with sense-knowledge. He is an advocate of presenta-
tive, or immediate, as opposed to representative, or mediate, perception.l 
The senses are in immediate contact with t he object, as far as conscious-
ness is concerned, although he holds that between the senses and the 
object there are certain media of communication which do not appear in 
direct consciousness. 2 A judgment is fanned by virtue of an innate 
power of the mind. The central teaching of St. Thomas concerning man is 
t he substantial union of body and soul. It is by virtue of the soul 
that man is a rationalizing being, a substance, a being and it is by 
virtue also of the soul that the body has whatever it possesses. But the 
soul requires a body for its natural being and operation. More explicitly 
in his epistemology Thomas takes his stand on the empirical principles 
of consciousness, 
by blending what in modern psychology would 
be called self and not-self, and by refusing to 
look upon subject and object as separated by that 
chasm which every epistemologist since the days of 
Descartes has strived in vain to span.s 
The soul is one, unextended, immaterial. The faculties of the soul are, 
(l) locomotive, (2) vegetative, (3) sensitive (cognitive), (4) intel-
lectual (cognitive), (5) appetitive. The soul is immortal. 
John Duns Sootus held to the primacy of the will over against the 
intellect. This applies both to God and man. The will is free and in 
1. Turner, HP, 354. 
2. Ibid., 354, 355. 
' 3. Ibid., 35& 
fact determines the development of the intellect. With the exception 
of the above his psychology is much like that of Thomas Aquinas. 
We are introduced to the period of Modern Philosophy by Giordano 
Brunol and Tommaso Campanella. 1 Not much is offered by either in our 
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search for philosophical conceptions regarding personality. Bruno gave 
us somewhat of a new conception of nature as hylozoistic which rather 
in a limited way anticipated the monadology of Leibniz. Campanella 
built his metaphysics upon epistemology. Knowledge sprang from two 
sources, (1) sensible experience and (2) reasoning. The veracity of the 
external senses rests on the testimony of the inner sense. On this inner 
sense rests also the belief in my own existence and the existence of God. 
Francis Bacon2 was decidedly dissatisfied with the state of learn-
ing and philosophy in the day in which he lived. He set out with the 
intention of ridding the mind of all pre-conceived ideas, prejudices and 
fallacious concepts. Man faces an impossible task by endeavoring to 
build a mansion of true thought upon the accumulated intellect rubbish 
of years. To clear off the premises, clean out the rooms of the mind, 
and start afresh was Bacon's worthy aim. The ill success of the past 
he claimed was due in a great measure to the lack of a true method. He 
1. Rogers, HP, 227-231. 
Thi1ly, HP, 238-241. 
Winde1band~ HP, 366-372. 
Turner, HP, 429-431. 
2. Weber and Perry, HP, 235-239. 
Rogers, HP, 231-242. 
Thilly, HP, 255-263. 
Turner, HP, 435-442. 
Windelband, HP, 383-389. 
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opposed the a priori syllogistic reasoning of the Scholastics. First, 
get rid of the Idols of the Tribe, Cave, Market-place and Theater and 
then begin with particular facts making generalizations by a gradual and 
careful process. This is the method of induction. True induction he 
claims will not, (a) generalize too hastily, (b) will specialize but be 
universal and (c) will not run after utility. Bacon attempted much but 
accomplished little. He is most known not for his philosophical system 
but for his beautiful, meaningful, epigrann'n.atic statement&. He did, 
however, give new impetus to the method of induction which is a signifi-
cant contribution to th& ~ of philosophical speculation even though 
he discovered little content. Although we discover little in Bacon in 
our survey of the history of thought concerning personality it is im-
portant to refresh our memories with regard to his philosophical method 
because later in this dissertation we vnll discover that epistemology 
and method vdll play a great part in Perry's conception of personality. 
Thomas Hobbes was the forerunner of Materialism and Positivism. 
He repudiated the spiritualistic notion of the soul. Like Bacon he 
was an empiricist in his theory of the origin of knowledge. His 
Materialism makes it difficult to reconcile his empiricism with his 
apparent rationalism at times. He offers a materialistic theory of per-
ception. "Inner perception is merely our feeling of brain action. 11 1 To 
think is to feel. Knowledge consists in the addition of our sensations. 
Soul or spirit Hobbes defines as brain action, sometimes as nervous 
1. Weber and Perry, HP, 240. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
\! 
1\ 
substance. Probably the most outstanding thing that can be said for 
Hobbes is that he is the father of modern associational psychology. 
"The only real advantage man has over brutes is speech. 111 Man is not 
endowed with free will and is not immortal. 
We now come to Descartes2 the first of the great and influential 
modern thinkers. Descartes' method is very similar to that of Bacon 
at the outset of his work. His method is similar to that of Perry~ 
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analysis. He advocates that we get rid of all opinions and start ~ !I 
novo. His rules of procedure are~ (1) never receive anything as truth I 
which you do not clearly know to be such~ (2) divide every difficulty 
into as many parts as possible1 (3) think orderly beginning with the 
simplest and proceed to more complex~ and (4) make enumerations as com-
plate as possible. His method is the rationalistic which advocates that 
-analysis be followed until some basic~ axiomatic truths are found and 
then to proceed to build upon them the super-structure. Descartes' 
first distinctive contribution was his famous, "Cogito, ergo sum." 
Senses may deceive, I may be subject to illusions and '! may dream1 I 
may doubt and be in error but it is "I" who am thip.king, dreaming, doubt-
ing and making errors. The very nature of the self is to think. From 
1. Weber and Perry, HP1 242. 
2. Thilly, HPI 272-287. 
Veitch's translation of the Meditation. 
Descartes, Discourse on Method. 
Turner, HP, 447-462. 
Rogers, HP, 257-_278. 
Weber and Percy, HP1 243-258. 
Windelband, HP, 390-397. 
Cunningham, PP, 66~ 179, 289. 
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this he proceeds to his argument for the existence of God which is a 
modified and reconstructed Anselmic ontological one. All ideas have 
their origin from two sources, (1) from within--self-created, (2) from 
without. I find within myself an idea of God, a perfect, omnipotent, 
omniscient, good being. This idea is too great for me to have con-
structed with the limited intellectual tools at my disposal. Therefore, 
it must have come from without, from someone great enough to construct 
such a magnificent concept. No human being could do so, therefore it 
must have been created and implanted by God. Descartes then proceeds 
to his third postulate, the existence of the external world. God is the 
creator of the world and it must exist or else God is perpetrating a 
fraud on mankind which has ide!l.S_ of such an external world. God vouch-
safes the reality of my ideas. In brief, Descartes has given us these 
three conceptions, (1) God is the infinite substance on which everything 
depends, (2) the soul is a substance that thinks and (3) the body is an 
extended substance. Descartes was a dualist positing mind and matter. 
Extension is the only quality attributable to matter. Outside of 
matter there is motion or force and with these two conceptions the entire 
natural world is to be explained as a necessary and mechanical system. 
Descartes made a feeble effort to explain the apparent interaction of 
mind and body by means o£ the pineal gland which because it was not known ~~ 
to have any other function he assumed must be the seat of the interaction II 
between mind and body. Vfindelband says that the fundamental truth of ·J 
Descartes' system is, "the certainty of the Being or existence of 
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oonsoiousness."l 
For Spinoza2 the;e was but one Substance possessing two attributes, 
extension and thought, or matter and mind. Each attribute is expressed 
by two modes, i.e., extension; by motion and rest and thought; by 
intellect and vnll. As far as human personality is concerned Spinoza 
denied its unique, individual existence. Everything is part of God, in 
fact, is God. Freedom is denied and there is no personal immortality 
for all things and all per~ons are parts of the One Substance. On the 
finite plane Spinoza does advocate a doctrine of salvation which appears 
to confer a measure of freedom to the individual. The senses hamper us 
and we are confused. We are never fully active until we think truly and 
see things as they are in God. Human freedom means the overcoming of 
false ideas and effect of passions and seeing everything as a necessary 
fact. The final stage is the conception of a mystical union with God,--
the intellectual love of God. Spinoza solves the Cartesian duali"sm at 
least to his own satisfaction by making mind and body manifestations of 
a common principle. 
1. Windelband, HP, 291. 
2. Rogers, HP, 278-305 
Turner, HP, 466-486. 
Bri tan, PDPS,.. 
Robinson's translation of Spinoza's 
God, Man and Human Welfare. 
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Leibniz1 began his system with the position that matter is 
essentially resistance and resistance means activity. The essence of 
corporeality is not extension, as Descartes held, but force. Nature can 
be explained only by a metaphysical notion that is higher than a purely 
mathematical and mechanical notion. This higher notion is the idea of 
Force. Force constitutes the essence of matter; hence, matter is really 
immaterial in its essence. This reasoning of Leibniz is much like the 
scientific theory of electrons which reduces all matter to centers of 
energy. For Leibniz body is a plurality of simple forces. These simple 
forces are called monads which have no extension, are independent, dif-
ferent from all other monads and "have no windows by which anything can 
enter or pass." These monads maintain their systematic relationship 
and unity because of the mind of God who pre-destined and pre-established 
that they should function as they do through this temporal existence. 
This is Leibniz 1 famous Doctrine of Pre--Established Harmony. God is the 
Monad of Monads. He is an individual and is a person. Leibniz' 
epistemology rests on metaphysical presuppositions. Knowledge cannot 
come from without to the monad so must spring from within. All knowledge 
is implicit in the mind. He would not maintain that ideas are innate or 
1. Rogers, HP, 305-322. 
Montgomery's translation of Leibniz' 
Discourse on Metaphysic~. 
Leighton, FP, 208-212. 
Windelband, HP, 421-425. 
Cunningham, PP, 208-212. 
Thilly, HP~ 364-382. 
Turner, HP, 506-513~ 
Weber and Perry, HP, 275-297. 
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that they pre-exist actually; they exist in the mind virtually. The 
human soul is a monad, self-active, self-sufficient and immortal. 
Probably, in the light of later thought, the enduring contribution of 
Leibniz is his emphasis on individuality and activity. 
John Locke1 gave philosophy the famous illustration of the blank 
tablet which illustrates his epist emology. The mind is blank at birth 
minus innate ideas or any other i tam of content. All human knowledge 
is from experience. In Locke's analysis of ideas he finds that they 
come from four sources, (l) one sense, (2) more than one sense, (3) 
reflection and (4) reflection and sensation combined. Qualities are 
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divided into primary and secondary. All complex ideas are combinations 
of ideas under three headings, (a) modes, (b) substances, (c) relations. 
Knowledge seems to be nothing but the perception of the connection and 
agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas. We may have real 
knowledge of (l) our own existence by intuition, (2) God, by demonstra-
tion and (3) material things through experience. The . soul is real for 
Locke. Thinking is an activity. Soul and body interact but he offered 
no explanation or theory of this relationship. 
Locke had made a distinction between primary and secondary qualities 
1. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ECHU. 
Rqgers, HP, 322-346. 
Thilly, HP, 306-329. 
Weber and Perry, HP, 297-316. 
Turner, HP, 486-494. 
Windelband~ HP, 466-487. 
Cunningham, PP, 166-167. 
Calkins, Locke's Essays. 
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contending that primary qualities are inherent in the object while 
secondary qualities are those attributed by mind. Berkeleyl sought now 
to efface this distinction and make all qualities secondary. He begins 
with the thesis that "unthinking matter does not exist." The perceiving, 
active being is what he calls Mind, Spirit, Soul or Myself. Reality 
consists in being perceived; to be is to be perceived,---esse est percipi. 
The world is a cos.mos from which ideas come but these ideas are not 
created by me therefore, 11God must be the cause of rrry ideas, 11 i'lhich is 
the second Berkeleyan principle. Matter does not exist but only spirit. 
For Berkeley, God exists as a person and finite beings are unique and 
individual. In the real world exist three things, God, Ideas and finite 
beings. Finite beings have the power to know ideas and also have the 
power of willing, imagining, reasoning and remembering. We do not know 
just what Berkeley considered as the noumenal nature of mind or spirit, 
probably some vague spiritual substance, or as some hold, activity. 
David Hume2 apparently accepts the conclusions of Locke and Berkeley 
1. Berkeley, .ATCPHK. 
Rogers, HP, 346-365~ 
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Thilly, HP, 385-445. 
Weber and Perry, HP, 316-322. 
Windelband, HP, 452-469. 
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that we can kncrw only our own ideas. If all we can know is what we per-
ceive and if reality is only that which can be perceived then there can 
be no self for we cannot find a perception of it, so Hume claimed. He 
says, 
'When I enter most intimately into what I call 
myself, I always stumble on some particular perception 
or other, of heat, cold, right or Shade, love or 
hatred, pain or pleasure. 
He adds, "I can never find myself at any time without a perception and 
can observe nothing but the perception. 111 He concludes, ''Were all my 
perceptions removed by death, I should be entirely annihilated."! 
Therefore, Hume denied the existence of a self and in fact denied all 
metaphysical lalowledge. Someone has observed that Hume in his analysis 
of mind or self is as one coming home who looks in each of the five 
windows of his house {senses) to ascertainwhether or not he is home and 
after peering in each window and seeing no one decided that there is 
nobody home~ he himself is not existing. Hume looking for his self 
looks in each window of the body at the point of perception and finds 
no one. This trend of thought leads later to a distinction between the 
empirical self and the transcendental self. Hume defines mind as 
nothing but a heap or collection of different 
perceptions united together by certain relations, and 
supposed, though falsely~ to be endowed with perfect 
simplicity and identity. 
''Mind is its contents. 11 2 Hume gave much impetus to the psychology of 
1. Rogers, HP, 365-386. 
2. Turner, HP, 519. 
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associationism which received its start from Hobbes. 
Immanuel Kant~ 1 set as his aim to discover tl~t which is certain 
I 
and logically sure. His system of thought may be summarized as follows 
and is very important fromthe standpoint of epistemology and the status 
and function of mind and personality: 
lj' 
all science and all real knowledge I 
have to do with sense world, phenomena, world of experience. But ex-
perience is possible only because the mind constructs it, builds it up, 
according to principles not derived from experience. To be clearer, all 
consciousness involves form and content. The formal element in experience 
has a universal validity which cannot be based on any mere experience. 
These formal elements in knowledge are universals, necessary, a priori~ 
transcendental (type of method to discover a priori elements). To deny 
these elements is to deny the possibility of experience. 
The a priori is due not to the object or to experience but to the 
rationalizing power of the mind itself. These principles are the forms 
of the sensibility (space and time) and the categories of the under-
standing (quantity, quality, relation and modality). These laws when 
worked fully give us experience. 
Real knowledge is of experience according to form of categories. 
These have no transcendent application. We know only possible experience 
1. Kant, CPK. 
Rogers, HP, 412~440. 
Weber and Perry, PP, 352-407. 
Turner, HP~ 528-548. 
Thilly, HP, 391-426~ 
Durant, SP~ 276-317. 
Winde1band, HP, 485-486, 532-568. 
Cunningham, PP, 63-64, 112-113, 261-262, 
271-272, 373-374, 440-441. 
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Of things-in-themselves to which the forms and categories have no appli-
cation we must always be in ignorance so far as knowledge is concerned. 
The reason it is true tends to for.m certain ideas of the soul, world and 
God. But these ideas lead to contradictions which are known as 
paralogisms and antinomies. And yet in spite of this impossibility of 
knowing things-in-themselves in speculative fashion our moral life 
reveals to us something ultimate, not a matter of sense experience, which 
compels us to postulate God, Freedom, and Immortality. 
The mind for Kant has three powers as follows: 
1. Sensibility--power of the mind to be affected by objects 
outside itself'. 
Forms-~space and time 
(Transcendental Aesthetic) 
2. Understanding--power of' the :inind to take the data of 
Sensibility and organize it. 
Categories 
Quantity 
~uality 
Relation 
Modality 
(Transcendental Analytic) 
3. Reason--power of mind to give unity and totality. 
Ideas 
Self 
World 
God 
Self-knowledge is impossible for Kant because the self is a thing-
in-itself (ding an sioh). Only the phonemenal self can be known • . The 
self is a vital factor in his philosophy referr~ng to it sometimes as 
"the synthetic unity of apperception." Kant gave peculiar emphasis and 
importance to a doctrine which since his time has been used greatly, 
i.e., the creative activity of thought. Personality plays a superior 
===~F=========================================~-=-=-==~~=============================#========== -
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place in all of Kant 1 s teaching. Moral worth is true worth. The 
"cagego,rical imperative" and its complementary doctrine, "only a good 
will is truly valuable," give indices of the importance of personality 
in his philosophy. Kant's second maxim, "So act as to treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in that of any other, in every case as an 
end and never as merely a means," is an illustration of the importance 
of personality as an end. In fact it is the end and never should be 
prostituted by making it a means only. There is little disagreement as 
to the practical place man played in Kant's system but there is much con-
troversy over just what he meant in his analysis of mind and nature. 
Practically all schools of philosophical thought will claim Kantian 
fatherhood for some doctrine which they espouse. From the standpoint of 
the problem of this paper it is essential to note that one of Kant's 
very important contributions was his view of mind as active and creative. 
Dean Knudson points this out effectively in his Philosophy of Personalism, 
especially on page 72, where he says, 
By an exhaustive and penetrating analysis of 
human reason he (Kant) showed that the mind does not 
passively receive its knowledge fram without. It is 
creative; it builds its world for itself.l 
Fichte's contribution to our research is the idea that will, or 
ego, is not a thing among things, but free, self-determining activity. 
The real reality is the Good, active Reason, Pure Will, the Moral Ego. 
Consciousness can be explained only by itself. The individual self 
operates under the necessary laws of sense-perception and thought and 
1. Knudson, PP, 72. 
-==~====================================================~======= 
37 
under the control of the universal purpose. Freedom for Fichte is 
intellectual with the choice to accept the universal purpose as one's 
own. When we choose to do this we become morally, completely determined 
by the universal- purpose.l 
The Hegelian system2 is an organic whole and suffers from any ex-
position of its parts only. The system has no presupposition unless it 
is that the "real must be the rational." The Hegelian method is that of 
the dialectic in which there is a progression of thought from thesis to 
an antithesis to a synthesis which in turn becomes a thesis. It is dif-
ficult to give an exposition of Hegel's conception of personality without 
much detail material. By risking a statement or two for the sake of 
brevity we recognize the fact that the statements possibility should be 
amplified and further qualified. For Hegel every proposition is 
regarded as a definition of the Absolute. The Absolute is a process; it 
is the great architect; the living Mind whose nature is to think; to 
bring to self-consciousness what it is, and at the same time to raise 
itself to a higher stage of its own being. Every individual being is 
some aspect of the Idea. The Absolute is the universal idea. The Idea 
may be called Reason. It is the subject-object; the unity of the Ideal 
l. Thilly, HP, 68. 
2. Weber and Perry, HP, 405-439. 
Rogers# HP; 445-467. 
Thilly, HP, 462-478. 
Turner~ BP, 560-583. 
Durant, SP, 317-326. 
Windelband, HP, 609-615. 
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and the real; the unity of the finite and the infinite; of soul and 
body. It is the eternal vision of itself in the other. For Hegel 
philosophy is subdivided into three parts, (1) Logic, the science of 
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the Idea in and for itself, (2) The Philosophy of Nature, the science of 
the Idea in its otherness, and (3) The Philosophy of Mind, the science 
of the Idea come back to itself. Spirit is divided into three manifesta-
tions, (1) Subjective, (2) Objective and (3) Absolute. Subjective Spirit 
is primarily a study of Hegel's psychology. Objective Spirit is primaril~ 
a study of Hegel's psychology. Objective Spirit is primarily a consider-
ation of Ethics and Political Philosophy. Absolute Spirit deals with 
the Philosophy of Art and .Religion. Absolute Spirit is the unity of 
Subjective and Objective Spirit. And it is here that Spirit at last 
becomes absolutely free and infinite. Finite personality is probably 
lost in the boundlessness of the Absolute. Persons may maintain some 
measure of freedom and individuality in this present time process but 
they do not possess metaphysical uniqueness. At least such is the 
interpretation of Hegel by the writer of this paper. 
Herbartl took up the realistic elements of Kant's philosophy and 
combined them with Leibnizian monadism. Being is not one but many. 
These many are "reals, 11 and correspond somewhat with the monads of 
Leibniz. However they are devoid of all perception, consciousness and 
activity except the power of self-preservation. The soul he conceives 
as a simple essence. 
1. Turner, HP, 584. 
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Schopenhauer held will to be the essence of reality. The will may 
be said to create the body. Will is active, organizing, preserving and 
sustaining. It is will that endows animals with weapons of defense and 
man with intellec~. Intellect is the servant of the will. Lotze be-
lieved in the existence of soul which was supersensible, indivisible and 
distinct from the body. The universe is a system of spiritual realities 
in reciprocal relation with one another. God is a divine personality.! 
Knudson says, 11He (Lotze) combined the idea of reality with that of 
consciousness, or rather in terms of self-consciousness."2 Consciousness 
must of necessity have a subject and activity must have an agent. The 
Positivists, such as Comte, denied the existence of mind or soul in the 
metaphysical sense. Observable personality is behavior and psychic 
states are functions of the brain. 3 John Stuart Mill followed his 
predecessors of the empirical school in holding that our ideas are all 
reducible to sensations, and that these are given to us severally, being 
united by association. 4 lulls persisted in attempting to reduce both 
the mind and the external world to these terms. Matter, interpreted in 
terms of actual experience, means nothing but constant uniformities or 
npermanent possibilities of sensation." Mind is a set of possibilities 
of another order, differing in their arrangement, in their inclusion of 
- --------
1. Thilly, HP, 496. 
2. Knudson, PP, 74. 
3. Thilly, HP, 508. 
4. Weber and Perry, HP, 512. 
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thoughts, emotions, and volitions as well as sensations, and in their 
being possibilities for one individual alone.1 
We have now, in a very brief and fragmentary manner, made a survey 
of the history of philosophy from the early Greeks up to the latter part 
of the nineteenth century searching for any information which would give 
us clues to personality. We are able to see that the problem is one with 
many aspects and numerous possibilities for different beliefs. Are mind 
and body one? Is mind an epiphenomenon of the body? or is it a distinct 
entity? Is its primary characteristic willing, knowing or feeling? Is 
the mind other than its states? Is the mind creative or selective? Is 
it passive or active? Haw do mind and body interact? What is the dis-
tinction between self, mind, soul and spirit, if any? In what sense is 
man free? Is freedom ethical or psychological? Closely allied with 
many of these problems is the problem of epistemology as well as 
metaphysical implications. What is the relation of the human person to 
the Divine person? Is man immortal? Is the Universe purposeful? Are 
persons carriers of value? Are there objective, eternal values which 
the person should strive for, fight to keep and strive to conserve? 
The latter part of the nineteenth century and thus far in the 
twentieth century have witnessed much thought and research by philos-
ophers in all the major schools of thought, Pragmatimn, Critical Reali~, 
Nee-Realism, Idealism (absolute and personal) dealing with this problem 
of personality. Just what is a person and what is the function or place 
1. Weber and Perry, HP, 503. 
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of mind in a true view of the universe. These questions cannot be 
answered singly but must be viewed in their relation to other doctrines 
of the school of thought raising them. Epistemological and metaphysical 
positions will have a bearing on a theory of mind and vice versa. Any 
doctrine must not only be consistent and minus contradictions within 
itself but that doctrine must also dove-tail in with other doctrines 
of a particular school of philosophy. The study of mind or personality 
may cause one to revamp other related doctrines. We now turn to the 
particular problem of this paper, i.e., the place of personality in the 
philosophy of Professor Ralph Barton Perry. Does Perry consider mind as 
a substance, or as a process, or as a relat.ion, or as an intentional act, 
or as a substantive, or as a function, or as an activity or as something 
(( 
other than anything herebefore listed? Is personality for Perry a I 
superior term than mind, self, consciousness, agent, organism or brain? I 
First we shall give some attention to Perry's general philosophical 
method and then show the relation of his conception of personality to 
his epistemology,then his metaphysics and finally to his axiology. 
Following this rather extensive tour into his philosophical mansion we 
shall inquire into the relation of finite personality to a Supreme 
Personality, relate personality to moral and religious values and con-
elude with the question, Is Perry's "person" to survive death? 
CHAPTER II 
~ CRITICAL CONSIDERAXION OF PERRY'S PHILOSOPHICAL 
:METHOD AND ns RELATION TO TEE DOCTRINE 
OF PER SO NALI1'Y 
In presenting the problem of this chapter we shall divide the 
material into the follavving four sections: 
I. Philosophy: its Definition and Objective for Nee-Realism. 
II. The Nee-Realistic Method with Criticisms. 
III. Further Considerations of the Analytic Method as Employed 
by Perry and his Colleagues. 
rl. Critical Evaluation of the Method of .Analysis showing its 
Limitations and Effect on a Doctrine of Personality. 
I. Philosophy: its Definition and Objective for Nee-Realism. 
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Perry refers to Philosophy as, "that branch of knowledge which I 
attempts to get to the bottom of things, and to embrace the whole of 
things; nl It seeks to l.alow some aspect of truth; "2 "it is the function of 
philosophy to define and appraise the generating problem of science;" 
11it aims to determine the value assignable to natural laws in the whole 
system of knowledge, n3 or 11to correct the partiality of particular 
points of view by means of a point of view that shall comprehend their 
1. Perry, DP, 17. 
2. Ibid., 10. 
3. Perry, Jour. Phil., 1(1904), 169. 
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relations or such transformation as shall enable them to constitute a 
universe,"1 "philosophy seeks to push to the boundaries of the universe."2 
Perry in referring to the philosopher observes, "He is a philosopher in 
so far as the detail of his appreciation finds fundamental justification 
in a world-view. 113 Elsewhere he adds that philosophy is, "profound and 
comprehensive, 114 and "philosophy is essentially unitary and systematic. 115 
Philosophy "determines for society what every individual must practically 
determine upon for himself, the most reasonable plan of reality as a 
whole which the data and reflection of an epooh can afford. 116 Further 
he says, "It is the function of philosophy to interpret knowledge for 
the sake of a sober and wise belief."7 "The philosopher is the true 
prophet, appearing before men in behalf of that which is finally the 
truth. n8 He is "the spokesman of the most consid.erate and comprehensive 
reflection possible at any stage in the development of human thought."9 
Perry, like Plato, Spinoza, and Hegel, emphasizes the necessity of 
seeing the whole of the universe in its totality as the major concern of 
1. Perry, .AP, 33 • 
2. Perry, DP, 16. 
3. Perry, .A:P, 41 • 
4. Perry, DP, 17. 
5. Perry, .AP, 396. 
6. Ibid., 144. 
7. Ibid ., 145. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Ibid. 
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philosophy. The v;isdom of the philosopher "is the knowledge of each 
through the lmowledge of all."1 Philosophy is "thought about the universe 
in its totality, or in its deepest and essential character. 11 2 In the 
quest for ideals Perry utters the same thought, "the selection of our 
ideals shall be determined by the largest possible knowledge of the facts 1 
pertaining to life. That type of knowledge is the knowledge that compre-
hends the universe in its totality. tt3 Perry incorporates the following 
I 
I 
I I 
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philosophy. The wisdom of the philosopher "is the knowledge of each 
through the knowledge of all. 111 Philosophy is "thought about the uni~ 
in its totality~ or in its deepest and essential character."2 In the 
quest for ideals Perry utters the same thought, "the selection of our 
II 
ideals shall be determined by the largest possible knowledge of the facts 1 
pertaining to life. That type of knowledge is the knowledge that compre-
hends the universe in its totality. 11 3 Perr.f incorporates the following 
very significant statement first in his article in the Philosophical 
Review4 and later repeats it identically in his !pproach to Philosophy: 
"The most adequate knowledge of which any generation of men is capable, 
will always be that which is conceived by the most synthetic and 
vigorously metaphysical min~s •115 Although the philosopher may be looked 
upon as a speculator~ dreamer, as impractical~ Perry has hope and some 
degree of faith that, "The quality, orderliness, and inclusiveness of 
knowledge finally determine its value; and the philosopher, premature as 
his synthesis may be, may some day prove to be the wisest of his own 
generation. 116 
1. Perry, }.P, 48. 
2. Ibid., 22 
3. Ibid., 19. 
4. Perry, Phil. Rev., 11(1902), 581. 
5. Perry, .A:P, 33 • 
6. Ibid., 146. 
Italics mine. 
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These definitions of the scope, task and objective of philosophy 
as submitted by Perry are similar in thought and objective to those of 
practically all philosophers of all kinds of schools of thought. In 
particular his definitions are very similar to the following: Philos-
ophy is the search for a comprehensive view of nature, an attempt at a 
universal explanation of things, ttl "philosophy or metaphysics is the 
endeavor after a comprehensive synthesis, 11 2 and uphilosophy may be 
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defined as the attempt to think truly about human experience as a whole; 
or to make our whole experience intelligible."3 
The position of the writer of this paper is that a satisfactory 
philosophy will include all methods, all consistent criteria and sources 
of truth; will seek for truth on all fronts. It will include analysis, 
synthesis and synopsis, rationalism and empiricism, intuition and feel-
ing, desire and interest, aspirations and ideals, this world and any 
other that may be accessible. It will accept the facts of science and 
seek to interpret their values: it will experiment with phenomena and 
endeavor to find an explanation for noumena; it will record the facts of 
specialized inquiry and seek to be all-inclusive. It will recognize 
no inherent hostility between science and itself but will show how the 
former furnishes the data for philosophical interpretation. Windelband 
expresses the relationship splendidly when he says, "The sciences, 
1. Windelband, HP, 1. 
2. Leighton, MC, 12. 
3. Brightman, IP, 4. 
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without philosophy, are an aggregate without unity~ a body without a 
soul; philosophy ;vithout the sciences~ is a soul without a body, diff er-
ing in nothing from poetry and its dreams.nl 
Perry in further elaboration of the objectives of philosophy says 
that the "philosophical point of view is that from which the universe is 
comprehended in its totality. The wisdom of the philosopher is the 
knowledge of each through the knowledge of all. 112 This definition is 
not only inclusive and comprehensive but seems to imply that the ''whole" 
is more important than the "parts" .which is a problem to be discussed 
later when the relative value of analysis is compared with synopsis. 
Perry lays peculiar stress on totality by saying, first in an article in 
the Philosophical Review3 and later incorporated in his Approach to 
Philosoph~> "Philosophy makes a distinct and peculiar contribution to 
human knowledge by its heroic effort to measure all knowledge and ideals 
by the standard of totality."4 
Synthesis and analysis are complementary. Synthesis is post-
analytic,--merely puts the parts together again after analysis. It is 
a debatable question whether the post-analytic synthesis adds anything 
to the pre-analytic~ immediate perception of the object (whole). Of 
course information concerning the parts is added to one's fund of 
1. Windel band~ HP, 1. 
2. Perry, Phil. Rev., 11(1902), 589. 
3. Ibid., 581. 
4. Perry, AP, 33. 
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knowledge through analysis but does the specific process of synthesis 
itself ·add anything not already known? 
Perry and other Nee-Realists frequently give expression to state-
ments 'Which are certainly similar to the criterion of coherence if not 
the method of synopsis. ·Perry says, "thought is called upon for its 
greatest comprehensiveness, penetration and self-consisteney,nl and 
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"we are commonly so absorbed in some particular flower or fruit tl).at we 
forget the roots and the design of the wholE!,, 112 and 11we must think all 
consistently together. "3 He seems to speak the language of the 
idealist and synoptist in the foregoing statement as well as the follow-
ing: "Strictly speaking there is only one internal principle of progress, 
namely, rationality, 114 "as respects the consistency of completeness of 
truth,"5 and "the effort to complete knowledge is the indispensable test 
of the adequacy of prevailing conceptions. "6 But the following state-
ment is the strongest made, 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
That which lends philosophical quality to any 
reflection is a steadfast adherence to the ideals of 
inclusiveness and consistency. Perspective is his 
most indispensable requisite, and he has solved no 
problem finally until he has provided for the 
solution of all.7 
Perry, liP, 20. 
Ibid .~ 11. 
Perry, Phil. Rev., 11(1902), 590. 
Perry, ME, 134. 
Perry, liP, 144. 
Perry, Phil. Rev., 11( 1902) 1 501. 
Perry, }.P, 149. 
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In his Defense of Philosophy Perry amplifies this principle of 
philosophy using the old stock illustration of synoptists concerniv~ the 
elephant, pointing out that one of the blind men felt the tail, another 
a leg, another the trunk, and another part of the body each giving his 
conclusion as to what he had perceived, all different. Perry draws 
this conclusion, "None of them apprehended the elephant for lacking of 
apprehending the whole."1 He applies this principle to philosophy when 
he observes, "until you know all of a thing you cannot be sure that you 
know it at all. nl 1'he problem before us then is, Can one reach these 
I 
I 
desired objectives of philosophy with the method of Perry and Neo-Realists 
. I in general? 
II. The Neo-Realistio Method with Criticisms. 
Nee-Realism is characterized by its method. Perry says 
But the dif'f'erence betvreen Naturalism and 
Idealism, like that between science and religion, 
which they are respectively correlate, lies not 
so much in the disagreement of theory as in 
opposition of attitude and method. The exponent 
of Naturalism is governed by that reserve and 
apathywhich belong to the scientist's code of 
honor; the Idealist carries into his philosophy 
all the importunity and high aspiration of life. 
For him 'the teleological standpoint, what o£ 
inner meaning or significance,' is 'the stand-
point of philosophy'.2 
Although this takes an unfair, if not unfriendly, stroke at Idealism, 
yet it does point out that, for Perry as with Naturalism, the method 
adopted by each is the important thing. Both claim to be scientific 
1. Perry, DP, 28. 
2. Perry, PPT, 38. 
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while the inference made is that Idealism is the child of subjective 
"wish thinking." In further defining philosophy, and particularly its 
method, Perry states, 11Philosophy is the deliberate attempt to deal 
scientifically; that is, explicitly and descriptiv·ely, with just such 
practical convictions, and the mere appeal to them does no more than to 
designate a field for analysis. 111 He says also that, "the objects of 
philosophy are the fruit of analysis, its task is the correction of the 
categories of common sense. 11 2 
Analysis is as fundamental to the Nee-Realists• entire system as 
synopsis is for Idealism. But does this method make possible the 
11 embraoe of the whole of things 11 or to "constitute the universe" as 
Perry indicates is the objective of philosophy? Let us ex~ine this 
method from the statements of Perry himself and other leading Nee-
Realists. 
The term "analysis" properly refers 11not to the special method of 
any branch of knowledge, but to the method of exact knowledge in general, 
and to that method of procedure in which the problematic is discovered 
to be a complex of simples. "3 It is further claimed for the method that 
it 11 is careful, systematic, and exhaustive" in the treatment of any 
topic of discourse. It asserts that "there is no difficulty in providing 
a place for such values {psychological and moral) within the 
--------------·------------
1. Perry, Jour. Phil., 5(1908), 698. 
2. Perry, Phil. Rev., 19(1910), 684. 
3. Holt, NR, 24. 
psychological or moral systems to which they belong."l 
The Neo-Realist "champions analysis as an ultimate method of re-
search,112 "it results in exact lalowledge, 11 3 "it recognizes no ultimate 
immediacies nor non-relational nor indefinite entities, except simples 
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in which analysis terminates. u4 The method of analysis is 11to understand 
the universe through its parts and not through its wholes."5 Analysis 
uses description which means "the reporting of things as they are found. 
The gradual substitution, in the procedure of Science of description 
for •explanation• means simply that Science has grown more rigorously 
empirical. 116 Perry charges that there are rather ulterior or non-
scientific reasons in the minds of those who will not accept the 
descriptive method, for he says, 
In the background of every mind that hes-
itates to aooept the descriptive method as valid 
and adequate, will be found one or both of the 
notions of explanation which science has gradually 
abandoned, the notion of 'power' or the notion 
of 'good'. 7 
The part-whole relation is important in the method of analysis and 
the direction significant as Perry points out, "we must work from the 
1. Holt, NR, 24. 
2. Marvin, Jour. Phil., 9(1910), 316. 
3. Holt, NR, 24. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Perry, PPT, 95. 
7. Ibid., 99. 
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part to the whole. 111 Spaulding makes a similar statement when he says, 
"Analysis means t ·o discover that an entity is in some sense formed or 
composed of parts."2 Holt adds, "For the Nee-Realist the philosophical 
enterprise begins and ends in analysis,-----the very objects of philos-
ophy are the fruits of analysis. 113 The same author adds that "one of 
the major purposes of the Neo-Realist is to justify and to extend the 
method of logic (analysis)."4 The great faith that the Nee-Realists 
have in their method is revealed by Holt when he says, "It (analysis 
is a method which has full ontological validity. 115 
Nee-Realists recognize two .types of analysis, (1) formal, and (2) 
experimental or material. That which is analyzed is a whole. "Analysis 
is the discovery, or, possibly, the invention of parts--the parts of the 
whole analyzed. Which of these analysis is--discovery or invention,--
revelation or falsification--is in reality the central question at issue.' 
Experimental analysis is that type of analysis which is made in the 
case of chemical compounds and the like. This type of method deals with 
the physical, biological and perhaps psychological. Formal analysis 
deals with typical wholes "as the motion of a projectile, the flow of 
1. Perry, PCI, 374. 
2. Spaulding, NR, 158. 
3. Holt, NR, 21. 
4. Ibid., 26. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Spaulding, NR, 155. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I II 
I 
I 
II 
an electrical current, the continuity of time, etc., where the parts 
are distinguished and discovered, but nevertheless left in situ. 111 
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Nee-Realists divide wholes into four categories, (l) aggregates or 
collections of any number. of objects in aDY order, in numerical con-
junction, e.g., a chair, table, pen, etc., (2) classes formed or composed 
of parts which are not classes, but which may be either organic wholes, 
or individuals, or simples, or collections, e.g., the atoms of carbon, 
all electrons, the even integers, etc., (3) classes formed or composed 
of subordinate classes, e.g., element, number, integer, etc., (4) unities 
or organic wholes, e.g., any specific individual chemical existing at 
some particular place and time, any organism, any one individual molecule 
or atam. Spaulding goes at length into a detailed discussion of each 
of these classifications of wholes which will not be necessary to 
summarize for the purpose of this study but suffice to say that he 
maintains that analysis is sufficient to account for all the knowledge 
possible about any of the types of wholes categorized. 
Analysis not only reveals parts of any whole but, "it also reveals 
the relations which relate and so organize these parts into some kind 
of whole. n2 The author also contends that ·"analysis reveals properties 
which, in some oases, the whole, as a whole, may have different from 
those of the parts. "3 Here is a point which will be discussed later, 
1. Spaulding, NR, 156. 
2. Ibid., 161. 
3. Ibid. 
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namely, just what is revealed and how is it revealed, over and above its 
-
parts and relations? If the whole is more than its parts and relations, 
what is the "over-plus" or 11residum.?" Spaulding's definition of the 
whole is, "the parts ~ their properties ~ the relations relating the 
parts and possibly specific properties of the whole."l The realistic 
plot thickens, for we had supposed that analysis revealed only two 
possible categories of entities and now we have four, (1) parts, (2) 
their properties, (3) relations and (4) specific properties of the 
whole. Earlier we understood that parts were "simple" and now they 
have properties. If so, the analyst needs to analyze further. The Neo-
Realist might answer that by "part" Spaulding means only the division 
of a large whole and that this part is there-fore in need of further 
analysis. In other words, the "part" in question is not "simple" and 
stands in need of a further analytic operation. But would not this 
specific part then become for the analyst a new 11whole 11 and within 
itself have parts, properties, relations and specific properties of the 
whole? 
What is a relation? Is it different from a part? Does it exist 
or subsist? Does it possess ontological reality? Is it subject to 
analysis or is it simple? The Doctrine of External Relations is one of 
the most important doctrines of Neo-Realism. In an address in Paris 
in 1922, Perry states the importance of this doctrine. "Le n6o-r~alisme 
s'est recemment adjoint une these qui siappelle le pluralisme. Cette 
1. Spaulding, NR, 161. 
--------================= 
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these affirme, au sens logique, que toutes les relations ~l~mentaires 
sont exb6rieures c'est-'a-dire qu'elles se d~composent en termes dis-
tincts et separables."l This doctrine will be discussed at length 
later but at this point in our analysis of the nee-realistic method let 
us see if we can find a definition for this important term "relation. 11 
Spaulding says that, "Modern analysis tends to show, however, that 
'relation' is an indefinable."2 "Term" can be defined as "any entity 
which can stand in any relation, and terms can be classified as physical 
and mental entities, complexes and simples, existents and subsistents, 
classes, individuals and relations. n3 Without submitting a definition 
of "relations" yet the author is able to give several classifications 
of that which he cannot define. 4 
The general theories of the status of relations are (1) external 
and (2) internal. Perry places the doctrine of "external relations" as 
the most general argument for Realism when he explicitly says, "the 
most general argument for realism is an application of the theory of 
the external or extrinsic character of relations."5 This doctrine 
explains that "terms acquire from their new relations an added character, 
I 
I· 
I 
I 
I 
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which does not either condition or necessarily alter, the character which 1 
1. Perry, PMM, 145. 
2. Spaulding, NR, 175. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Perry, PPT, 319. 
~~--------------
they already possess."1 Spaulding gives an exposition of the opposing 
doctrine, i.e., "internal relations" when he says, 
According to the other aspect of the 'internal' 
theory' the mutual dependence of two related terms 
implies a unity# but this unity cannot exist, or 
subsist, as identical vnth the terms, for they are 
two. Therefore the unity exist~, or subsists as 
an-underlying or transcendent entity, whose function 
it is to mediate the relation. ----this unity can 
be made all inclusive and yet One. n2 
Spaulding's theory of the analysis of organic wholes is pertinent 
to our problem of personality which will be critically considered 
later. He admits that in chemical and physical analyses at times, 
"there would seem to be something in the whole which is not in the 
parts, and conversely. n3 If this admission is true then the whole may 
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possess something which is not discovered by analyzing the parts. This 
would s eem to admit that analysis does not give all the truth of an 
object. He further adds, "if an experimental analysis be made of the 
whole, then the whole is also found to have properties which the parts 
do not have."4 Spaulding believes that analysis, although it has not 
revealed specifically the new something of the whole yet analysis has 
revealed "these properties 'in relief'." They are a "residuum" 
characteristic of the whole. This residuum is evidently found by 
synthesis. First, analysis divides an object into its parts, then the 
1. Perry, PPT, 319. 
2. Spaulding, NR, 166. 
3. Ibid., 237. 
4. Ibid. I 238. 
II 
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experimenter synthesizes and finds that the synthesis reveals something 
over and above the sum-total of the parts. Now what can analysis say 
about this "residuum?" Must it not be interpreted in the light of 
synopsis? Analysis really has not given us any meaning for this 
"residuum" except to say there it is but as far as saying anything mean-
ingful about it analysis reveals nothing. The 11residuum" is a part of 
the whole which analysis does not touch. 
Spaulding goes a step further in saying, "that in actual synthesis, 
artificial, or natural and developmental, or existential wholes out of 
parts, ~ properties or new values appear, is a matter of great im-
portance. 111 To consider this statement fully would take us into meta-
physical consideration such as evolution with all of its ramifications 
plus the specific contributions of Lloyd Morgan with his "emergent 
evolution" and Henri Bergson with "creative evolution" and all theories 
of creationism which deal with the arrival of the new. Where did these 
novel properties, of which Spaulding speaks, come from? Are they 
potentially existing within the parts? Are they pre-existing outside of 
parts and suddenly affixed themselves to certain specific parts creating 
larger wholes? .Are they created? These questions are all interesting 
but beside the point for our present definite problem except that it is 
important to note that the Nee-Realist does admit that wholes do possess 
some properties which the parts do not possess and which seem to be 
outside the field and scope of analysis. 
1. Spaulding, NR, 238. 
'I 
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But in some unsatisfactorily explained manner the Nee-Realist 
··-. 
accounts for these novel properties by the combination of syntheS~fl and 
analysis. ".Analysis and synthesis are. then, complementary processes. 
Each also is a natural process. Both create."l How this is done is 
not explained unless it be attributed to the "non-rational element in 
nature. 11 
Both hypotheses, however, recognize a non-
rational element in nature.-- at least in so far as 
our present knowledge goes. The time may come when 
the new properties of the whole can be deduced from 
those of the parts, but at present this deduction 
is impossible, and it is an open question as to 
whether this impossibility is due to the structure 
of existence or to our ignorance.2 
This seems to me a frarik confession of the weakness of the nee-realistic 
method of analysis which might be satisfactorily explained in a "synoptic 
view of the universe as a ·whole. 11 
The analysis of an organism reveals cells, colloidal particles in 
solution, molecules, atoms and electrons. "At each level as we go upward 
synthetically, new properties appear. tt3 He adds, "By all, the organism 
is conceded to be this kind of whole. The question at issue, however, 
is, is it more?"4 This means, e.g., is the human organism more tha.11 a 
physico-chemical complex? Spaulding attacks vitalistic theories, 
particularly those of Driesch, which hold that there exists in the 
1. Spaulding, NR, 241. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 243. 
4. Ibid. 
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organism a vital force or energy. "But this entity has never been dis-
covered experimentally," and further, "if it did exist it would not 
make the organism non-mechanistic. ttl Why? 11For energy is subject to 
mechanical principles. 112 
Now the above appears to the writer of this paper to be another 
circular argument. The same theory can be used and is used against the 
interaction solution of the mind-body problem. It is held that mental 
activity violates the physical law of the conservation of energy. The 
unanimous opinion of scientists seems to be that the a..m.ount of energy 
in the universe suffers neither diminution nor increase: it is a constan 
quantity. One kind of energy may be transformed into another, but the 
sum-total of energy, kinetic and potential, of the universe never 
varies; it always remains the same. We have no quarrel with the 
scientist up to this point but rather are in hearty agreement. But the 
opponent to the theory of the activ~ty of mind on the body argues: 
now the mind either transforms physical energy into acts which we call 
11 
acts of thought and will, and it is, therefore, material; or H produces i I 
these acts without using any of the energy in the universe, and there- I 
fore increases the amount of energy in the universe, which we know I 
can not be increased. In either case, the mind is material. In answer I 
to the above, it has been suggested that the gains or losses would be 
relatively small and thus would in the end offset each other. However, 
-----------------~·-------
1. Spaulding, NR, 243. 
2. Ibid. 
it is better to adopt another method in reply. The law of the conserva-
tion of Energy is, like all physical laws, intended for application to 
an abstract and ideal physical system. The universe as a whole, we 
contend, is more than a physical system; it includes mind, and physics 
has nothing to say about minds, per se. Therefore the law of the con-
servation of energy, is only an abstract physical law applicable to the 
physical universe alone. It all goes back to method and presuppositions 
and hypotheses. But to say that all in the universe is mechanical-
physical and because you cannot find spi rit or mind by the method of 
analysis of mechanical-physical things and therefore conclude that there 
is no such thing as spirit or mind is certainly reasoning in a very 
limited and restricted circle. When the vitalist or any other thinker 
suggests that there _is something more than the mechanical-physical, to 
deny such existence because you can't find it in the only thing your 
method of analysis will pennit you to use is to be a victim of a method 
which is too limited and contracted. 
Spaulding concludes his fruitless attack by saying, "Those vi talis-
tic theories which by definition do mean something different from 
mechanism are not confirmed."1 Not confirmed by analysis. If they were 
true how could you discover them if beforehand you contend that all 
there is in the world is the physico-chemical and if you further insist 
that the only method by which you can have knowledge is by the analysis 
of this very physico-chemical stuff? There is nothing spiritual because 
1. Spaulding, NR, 247. 
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it is not physico-chemical and nothing can exist but physico-chemical. 
All that analysis oan reveal is physico-chemical material therefore the 
spiritual does not exist because analysis cannot find it in the physico-
ohemioal. It seems to me that such reasoning is manifestly circumscrib-
ing possibilities by arbitrary apriori limitations and onesided method. 
III. Further Considerations of the Analytic Method as Employed by 
Perry and Colleagues. 
Perry in attacking Bergson and other so-called "anti-
intellectualists 11 says that they "betray a misapprehension of the 
analytical method. Ill fhis method he says, "means simply the discriJnin-
ation and specification of the detail of experience."2 He accuses 
Bergson of making such terms as, 11continuity, 11 11 aotivi ty, 11 "duration'' 
and 1'life11 to be simple while he., Perry, insists that they are complex 
and therefore in need of analysis. This is true not only of Berson and 
his school of thought but also, Perry indicates, this obtains with 
schools holding to belief in "self," "substance" and 11activity. 11 IIA 
philosophy which rejects analysis cannot avoid the s~e conclusion. 
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lhereas, the devotees of analysis regard, flself," ilaotivity," "substance, 11 II 
I. 
etc., as complexes, this philosophy declares them to be indivisible."3 !I 
Anti-intellectualism is guilty of the fallacy of "pseudo-simplicity" II 
which means, "the claim to the innnediate apprehension of a fused and 
1. Perry, Jour. Phil., 8(1911), 678. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Perry, NR, 127. 
inarticulate unity."l This error consists in projecting a verbal or 
subjective simplicity into the object, e.g., the single word 11life 11 is 
used to refer to the complex thing, life. Now we come to an important 
position taken by Perry when he says, 
Now there are two ways of unifying experience. 
One way is to carry analysis through, and discover 
·!;he connections of the parts and the articulate 
structure of the whole. The other is to reverse 
the operation, to carry it back to its vanishing 
point---to the bare word or the bare feeling of 
attention. 2 
When this is done Perry claims there is a "perfect; simplicity, 11 "an 
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ineffable unity" but results in the loss of the object altogether. When 
this happens, he insists, "knowledge has ceased and the experience is 
of no cognitive signifioance."3 Here, it seems to me, we come to one of 
the places where Perry's epistemological monism is used to prove his 
experience is to carry analysis through and discover the connections of 
the parts and the articulate structure of the whole. 114 I agree that 
analysis will give knowledge that is not received by either synthesis or 
- -------· -·------
1. Perry, Jour. Phil., 8(1911), 678. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 679. 
4. Ibid., 678. 
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synopsis alone but to say that the met hod of' analysis is the only way lj 
11to unify the experience" is fallacious. ,And that is precisely what he 
is saying, i.e., that analysis is the method. Any other method leads to 
ineffable nothingless and those who pursue any other are victims of the 
fallacy of being too simple, "pseudo-simplicity." I agree with Perry 
that many times we do generalize too hastily, read into the whole, b,y 
the power of' the imagination or personal desire, more than is truly 
inherent in it and neglect the method of analysis but when he says that 
analysis is the only method I take issue with him for reasons which will 
be presented laterl in addi·t'ion to the arguments already submitted. 
Professor Corrine Stephenson in reviewing Perry's article, "Realism 
as a Polemic and Program, n2 says, "In the fallacy of pseudo-simplicity 
the method of analysis is in question. 113 This corroborates what has 
been mentioned above. Perry makes his analytic method the means by 
which "the objects of philosophy" may yield fruit. Professor Stephenson 
continues, 
Exact procedure refuses to accept the simplicity 
of any concept until after analysis and these so-called 
simple concepts, self-consciousness, will, activity, 
are found to require a complex existence in order to 
account for what is known about them.4 
In other words, unless a thing is simple you can know nothing about it. 
It is nothing but the sum-total of analytical simples. It is nothing 
l. Page 70 FF . 
2. Per~y, Jour. Phil.~ 7(1910), 337-353, 14(1910), 365-379. 
3. Stephenson, Phil. Rev., 19(1910), 683-685. 
4. Ibid., 683. 
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more than its parts. Its unity means nothing more. The parts give the 
whole account of its meaning. In the case of the "self~" is it the self 
that gives meaning to its component or constituent parts or do the parts 
reveal all there is to know concerning the self as a whole? Perry 
anBlll'ers, "I can explain their procedure by attributing it to a willing-
ness~ exhibited by modern thinkers in general, and by Idealists in 
particular, to abandon analysis .and rigor of thought when consciousness 
is in question. ttl Yes, this is in part. true, not because the Idealist 
objects to analysis but objects to the Neo-Realist contention that 11self 11 
or 11 consciousness 11 can be fully known by analysis. Idealists refuse 
to allow the self to be pulled to pieces with the resultant conclusion 
that such a method reveals all the truth of the self or destroys its 
unity and being altogether. It appears to me that the method of analysis 
pulls out the petals of the whole one by one and concludes that there 
is no rose as an object which is more than the sum-total of the petals, 
stem, etc. The rose gives the petals significance. The rose itself 
means more to me in its unity than it can ever mean in its parts. 
But this priority of the parts over the whole is one of the main 
principles of Nee-Realism. Perry in delivering bis Paris address 
expounding his philosophy said, 
Il y a deux principes realistes qui determinant 
largement les tendances pratique avec lesquelles 
oette philosophie se trouvera en sympathie. Ce sont: 
1. Perry, PPT, 158. ,I 
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premierement l'objectivite des voleurs comme faits 
d'experience; deuxiement, la priorite de la partie 
sur le tout.l 
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In the same address in discussing the political and moral applications of 
his system he adds, "Les applications politiques du neo-realisme derivent 
de notre deuxieme principe, le principe de la priorit~ de la partie sur 
le tout. n2 
In Perry's analytical method how is one to know when he has reached 
the "simple" unit? Cannot every unit be further divided? Is it not 
our limitations of skill and the possession of inadequate instruments 
that cause us to stop at what we think is the bottom analysis? 
I.f one did know the "simple" units how does one unite them to give 
increased meaning? What is the universalizing agency? Relations? 
Laws? Immediate unity of perception? If the answer is "relations" are 
these relations causal? Do they con.fer meaning on objects? For instance, , 
let us take simple object A and simple object B. They are related to 
I each other by relation C, i.e., relation C gives some meaning to A 
which it does not possess in its loneliness. For Perry relations are 
"external" not "internal." (This will be discussed at length in a later 
chapter but here only in connection with "method. 11 ) To illustrate 
A 
(simple term) 
c 
(relation) 
B 
(simple term) 
Does relation C exist? No, it subsists the same as B and C and, in 
fact, all "neutral entities" which for Perry are all "simple." But does 1 
1. Perry, PMM, 149. 
2. Ibid., 152. 
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C have the same type of subsistence that A and B have? My point is this: 
are relations in any sense different than simple objects or are they 
also simple objects7 If relation C is different than the objects or 
terms A and B then it must be a little more complex than A or B, i.e., 
it must have something more than simplicity for it subsists in its own 
right plus having the power to relate, i.e., give added meaning to A 
and B, therefore it is itself in need of further analysis. On the other 
hand, if it is the same as simple objects A and B then one would need 
a relation c1 to explain relation C to the term A or B and then a 
relation c2 to explain that relation C and so on ad infinitum. 
A c 1 B 
B 
I£ it is Law and not relation that gives meaning to simple objects 
what is th~ ontological status of Law? Is it inherent in the parts? 
Does it exist between or apart from parts or is it a part of the 
universe as a whole? Perry says, 
I conclude, in other words, that in adopting 
the descriptive method, science has exchanged a naive 
·.and hasty notion of cause for a refi ned and rigorous 
notion. In the sense of the term that is most 
intelligible the cause is the law.l 
He further elaborates, 
he will find what empirical analysis finds 
everywhere, a manifold of terms in relation. And 
· when one proceeds to explain such a manifold, one 
will be led, as science in its field has been lead, 
t o the discovery of descript ive laws.2 
1. Perry, PPT, 100. 
2. Ibid. 
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but "descriptive laws," and these 11 laws 11 are causes. .Are these 11 laws 11 
simple? If not they need to be further analyzed. If analysis does have 
need for "laws" then they must either be simple or else complexes 
grasped immediately as wholes. Either is contrary to previous positions 
taken by Nee-Realists. Perry in his. Moral Economy speaks of the "proper 
laws of things."l 
If it is the immediate power of t he uni t y of perception that. re-
lates parts then it seems to me that the categories (that which give 
meaning to sense data) are internal ro1d inherent in the subject of the 
knowing process or internal to the One, or both? Perry says, "the 
synthetic act of consciousness brings into existence complexes which 
otherwise would not exist at all. •2 If so do we not then face Perry's 
original criticism raised against anti-intellectualists concerning un-
analyzed complex things which are taken as simple entities? In concluding! 
this section of the chapter it seems to me that true knowledge, genuine 
meaning, must; be possible through categories of the subjective mind plus 
external laws governing objects which belong to the universe as a whole. 
In other words,, the whole explains the actiyity and meaning of the parts 
intelligently while the parts can never give meaning withot~ the help of 
something external to themselves. 
Following this line of criticism let us consider the following 
statements f'rom three of Perry's works: 
1. Perry, ME, 36. 
2. ·Perry, Amer. Jour. 'fheo., 19(1915), 3. 
I 
II 
I, 
I. 
According to the empirical method~ we are not to 
start vdth a category and then find instances of it, 
we must proceed in the reverse direction, first col-
lecting instances and then analyzing out their common 
characteristics.l 
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This of course is induction. Observe particulars and then generalize on 
the 11cormnon characteristics." In his Paris address, Perry says, "La 
seconde these speciale qui distingue le neo-realis~~ est son acceptation 
des mathematiques et de la logique comma sciences vraies revelants le 
domaine des universals et la structure bien ordonnee de la nature.n2 
This seems to indicate that universals are revealed in nature. "Truth 
and being attach primarily to the completed whole of knowledge, and to 
the parts or approximations only in so far as these participate in the 
whole·. n3 It is therefore the whole that gives significance to "truth" 
and "being • 11 
In the Journal of Philosophy Perry says, "The analytical method 
does imply that reality consists of terms and relations. It does ~~ 
I 
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however~ imply that the bare ter~and-relation--character is all there I 
is to it. 114 In carefully examining the remainder of this article as II 
well as his other writings, I cannot ascertain what there is other than 
terms and relations. What could there be more than these as long as he 
restricts his philosophical system to his analytical method? Laws 
1. Perry, GTV, 22. 
2. Perry, PMivl , 142. 
3. Perry, NR, ll6. 
+= 
4. Perry, Jour. Phil., 8(1911), 677. 
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categories, selves, the Absolute? Strange indeed is the following state-
ment, "whereas, as a matter of fact, the formula as a whole represents 
or describes a complex other than itself,"l 
It seems that for Perry relations· are just as distinct from the 
perceiving organism as terms. In replying to cri ticism he says, "as 
though analysis discovered terms, and then conferred relations of its 
own. tt2 Neither relations nor terms are conferred by analysis or by the 
mind but both are discovered existing in their own right. 
In an article in the Journal of Philosophy, Perry accuses. the 
Idealist of the "assumption that consciousness can be known only intro-
spectively, and that thus approached it is a simple datum."3 Then he 
adds, "That which is really at stake here is nothing less than the 
method of analysis itself • 114 The next statement seems to reveal circular 
thinking when he maintains that 11 in exact procedure it is not parmi tted 
to assert the simplicity of any concept until af'ter analysis. 115 He 
might as well have said, "The analytic method does not permit the 
assertion of the simplicity of any concept until after the analytic 
method has announced its simplicity." It appears to me that all the 
Idealist is attempting to say is that it is the unity of the self that 
1. Perry, Jour. Phil., 8(1911), 676. 
2. Ibi-d., 677. 
3. Perry, Jour. Phil., 7(1910), 431. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Perry, Jour. Phil., 8(1910), 341. 
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makes the analysis of objects possible. I agree with Perry tha h is 
system is "at stake" with his method. He will permit a 11whola 11 (mind) 
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to analyze an object but seems unwi lling t o admit t hat an object can be, 
as a whole , more than its parts, much less a~ree that the "mi nd" or 
"self" is an entity or unity which possesses something unique in addition 
t o its parts as discoverable by analysis. 
IV. Critical Evaluation of the Method of Analysis showing its Limitations 
and Effect on a Doctrine of Personality. 
A. Summarized Criticisms of the Method of Analysis. 
1. Pitk1n confessed the i nadequacy of analysis to account for all 
the func t ions of the organism. 1 
2. Neo -Realism contends for the bro~d applicabili t y of analysis 
but its universal efficacy i s not demonstrat ed. 
3. Analysis fails to give an adequate account of wholes. Spauld-
ing suggests a "non-rational" element in nature which analysis cannot touch 
Vfuat is philosophy t o do , t hen , give up the entire enterprise in the search 
for truth? MUs t not al l possible parts of the universe be subject to in-
terpreta t ion? If a nalysis co nfessedly will not or rather can not satisfac-
torily account for all the facts of life might it not be that another 
method would find a place in the whole for th is "non-rational 11 element 1 
4. Neo-Realism fails to account for the "novel a nd unique proper-
tiesn of the whole which it admits the whole possess es but which analysis 
1. Pitkin, NR, 377 - 465. Particularly 404- 407. 
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does not explain. 
'I 
5. A mathematical-scientific method is insufficient to account for 
or to interpret life as a whole. 
6. Nee-Realism attempts to explain wholes in terms of the parts and 
fails to find significant parts to account for some important properties 
of wholes. 
7. We have noted that some statements of Nee-Realists indicate that 
there are other methods: than analysis which may be used to ascertain 
knowledge. If . so, in case of conflicting evidence, which method is to 
be considered the "highest court of appeal?" 
8. Different types of analysis will yield different results. The 
I 
analysis of the physicist will differ from that of the psychologist or I 
I 
biologist. It becomes necessary, therefore, to have some coordinator I 
or synthesizer to interpret the various results, give them value and 
relate them to the whole of life and existence. 
9. What significance do the nsimples•' have after analysis has 
obtained them? They are defined as, "non-relational," "indefinable," 
and "exceedingly abstract." .Are they not subject to the same criticism \ 
so frequently expressed by Nee-Realists against the meaninglessness of 
the simple concepts of Idealists and Anti-Intellectualists, e.g., 
"consciousness," 11 life," "impetus, 11 "duration" and "self?" 
10. The problem of how simples become parts of wholes is not clearly 
demonstrated. 'l'heir principle of action (causa agendi) is not given. 
11. How can change enter in a world of neutral entities? llhat 
explains the various combinations of these entities? If the Nee-Realist 
! 
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Cli.APrER III 
PERRY'S THEORY OF NE1Y£RAL ENTITIES WI1'H PARTICULAR 
IDlP.HASIS ON EPISTEMOLOGY 
Having made a survey of personality from a historical standpoint 
in Chapter One and having offered a critical estimate of Perry's philo-
sophical method in Chapter Two we now turn to his Epistemology. In a 
later chapter we shall consider the metaphysical implications of 
Perry's Ne.o-Realism. Philosophers are aware of the fact that it is dif-
ficult to place epistemology in a "water-tight compartment" and consider 
it by itself without any regard to the relationship it might have to 
physics. One of the criticisms Perry makes of Idealism is that its 
"cardinal principle is a theory of knowledge, 111 and that Idealists 
contend that "Knowledge is an originating or creative prooess. 112 He 
adds, "Idealism's claims can be substantiated only provided it is true 
that to know is to generate t he reality knawn."3* 
Nee-Realism claims to separate completely Epistemology from 
1. Perry, PPl', 119. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
* It is questionable whether Idealists of any school claim that 
11my k:nowing 11 creates objective reality. Perry repeatedly makes such 
charges. To what Idealist or school of Idealism is he referring? It 
may be true that the only reality that I can have knowledge of is what 
my mind generates but that is quite different from the allegation that 
my knowing of it creates it. 
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,Metaphysics. It claims that~ "the nature of reality cannot be inferred 
merely from the nature of knowledge~" 1 The neo-realistio emancipation 
of 1~taphysics from Epistemology is covered at length in Professor 
Marvin's section of Nee-Realism. It may be suwnarized briefly as 
follows# and I believe that the positions set forth here ¥nll be taken 
by Perry and the other members of the school• 
1. The theory of knowledge is not logically fundamental. 
2. The theory of knowledge does not enable us to show~ 
except indictively and empirically~ either what 
knowledge is possible or how it is possible. 
3. That no light is thrown by the theory of kno·w'ledge 
upon the nature of the existent world or upon 
the fundamental postulates and generalizations of 
science, except in as far as the knowledge o£ one 
natural event or object enables us sometimes to I 
draw inferences regarding certain others. 
4. Epistemology does not give us a theory of reality, !
11 on the contrary, it assumes one. 
5. Epistemology neither solves metaphysical problems 1 
nor is it the chief source of such problems.2 
The above clearly points out what Epistemology does not do and it 
is fair to ask just what it~ do or what its specific task is from 
· the nee-realistic point of view which is an5Wered by Marvin as follm7s: 
1. The theory of knowledge is one of the special sciences, 
that it studies knowledge as a natural event and 
in virtually the same way and by the same way 
and by the same methods as biology studies life 
or physics light. 
2. · 'l:hat as such a science it assumes the fo~ulae of 
logic and the results of several special sciences, 
such as physics and biology. 
3. Logic, metaphysics# and some existential sciences 
are logically prior to the theory of knowledge.3 
1. Marvin, NR, 474. 
2. Ibid., 49-50. 
3. Ibid., 50. 
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liith the above preliminary statements we shall proceed confining 
ourselves~ as far as possible, to Epistemology holding metaphysical I . 
implications for a chapter following which vdll be primarily concerned 
with metaphysical positions held by Perry. Of course it will be 
necessary in order to understand clearly the epistemological theory, in 
some instances, to make metaphysical references but the reader is urged 
to keep in mind that it is Epistemology and not Metaphysics in which 
the present chapter is primarily interested. 
I. An Exposition of Perry's Neo-Realism. 
A. The Realistic Theory of Mind. 
Before presenting his positive contribution Professor Perry 
spends much time in discussing Naturalism, Pragmatism, and Idealism. 
In each of these schools of thought he finds points which he can accept 
but he is particularly interested in indicating errors which he will 
attempt to correct by Neo-Realism. In the opinion of the writer of this 
paper, Professor Perry is not so much concerned with Pragmatism as he 
is with Idealism. I believe that he thinks that Pragmatism can be re-
duced very easily to Realism, but with Idealism, such is not the case. 
He must annihilate it if possible and in so doing he thinks that he 
has automatically established Realism. Why he thinks this vre shall 
discuss later. However, in passing, I might say that, in my judgment, 
more is needed to establish Realism than this negative argument, for if 
Idealism should ~e completely disproved i~ does not necessarily follow 
that Realism must be the only alternative left, although, to be sure, 
79 
it would have many strong claims for acceptance. In speaking of this 
negative argument of Perry, Professor Schiller says essentially what I 
have indicated when he writes, "To prove Professor Perry's Realism some-
thing more is wanted than a proof of the failure of Idealism. nl 
Particularly in Present Philosophical ~endencies Professor Perry spends 
three-fourths of his time in analyzing and attacking other philosophical 
systems. We shall now turn to his positive contribution and endeavor to 
ascertain just what he offers to substantiate the claims of Nee-Realism. 
In constructing a positive, systematic philosophy or theology there 
are three popular starting points, e.g., man, God and the world. · Perry 
starts with man by presenting his "theory of mind" as a foundation and 
background for his theory of knowledge. He frankly admits that every-
thing up to this point in his works has been a polemic against other 
systems. He conveniently sum:marizes this polemic in terms of what he 
calls the "general errors 11 of which he finds rival systems guilty. 
1. Perry's List of "Fallacies." 
Professor Perry's general method is rather geometrical. 
He offers axioms and initial theorems labelling them "fallacies." Just 
as geometry will proceed from these beginnings and later prove complex 
and difficult theorems by referring to axiom M and Theorem N, so Perry 
builds his complex philosophical superstructure by the constant reference 
to these fallacies. When later in the midst of a deep and complicated 
problem he will say that this argument or that argument is the fallacy 
1. Schiller, Mind, 22(1913). 
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of so and so, and therefore must be discarded without further consider-
ation. In the light of this it seems desirable and necessary to keep 
in mind and to lmow just what Perry means by each fallacy. 
(a). The Fallacy of the Ego-centric Predicament. 
Probably Perry is as well known for the phrase, "the ego-centric 
predicament" as anything he has written. It consists "in the impossi-
bility of finding 'anything that is not lmown. nl It is a predicament 
rather than a discovery because it refers to a difficulty of procedure, 
rather than to a character of things. It is impossible to eliminate 
the knower without stopping the observation. Thereupon Perry notes that 
when propositions are formulated concerning things the result is either 
11the redundant inference that all lalown things are lmown or the false 
inference that all things are known." 2 Idealists have been accused of 
the fallacy of making all things lmowable and if they can not be lmown 
they do not exist. The Nee-Realists hold to extramental entities and 
accuse Idealists of being guilty of the fallacy of the "ego-centric 
predicament." Just because the mind is necessary for the observation 
of anything, they claim, it is not necessary that everything be mind or 
consciousness. 
(b). The Fallacy of Pseudo-simplicity. 
We had occasion to meet this fallacy in our consideration of the 
method of analysis. It simply means the disposition in philosophy as 
l. Holt, NR, 11. 
2. Ibid., 12. 
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well as in common sense to "assume the simplicity of that which is only 
familiar or stereotyped."! V'ihen a philosopher refers to 11 self, 11 "con-
sciousness," "life," 11duration," 11activity, 11 11will," or "vital impetus" 
he is accused of the fallacy of "pseudo-simplicity." Nee-Realism claims 
that everything is complex and in need of analysis except, of course, 
simple entities. 
(c). The Fallacy of Exclusive Particularity. 
Here it is assumed that a particular term of any system belongs to 
such a system exclusively. In other words, that an identical term can 
figure in only ~ relationship. t his error appears in all exclusive 
philosophies, such as dualism of ma·~ter and mind. Realism claims that 
a term may have more than one relationship. 
(d). The Fallacy of Definition by Initial Predication. 
This means the assumption of the priority of a familiar or acciden-
tal relationship • . It is built really upon the more fundamental error of 
"exclusive particularity." A subject of discourse is viewed initially 
under one of its aspects as a term in some specific complex or re-
lational manifold. Then it is claimed, awing to the error of exclusive 
particularity, it is assumed that this subject of discourse can have no 
other aspect or belong to no other relational manifold. The initial 
characterization becomes definitive and final. 
(e). The Fallacy of the Speculative Dogma. 
The assumption of an all-general, all-sufficient first principle 
constitutes this fallacy and is particularly applicable to "absolutism." 
1. Holt, NR, 13. 
termines or explains everything. 
(f). The Error of Verbal Suggestion or Equivocation. 
fhe means through Which the real fruitlessness of the other errors 
may be concealed, and the philosophy employing them given a "meretricious 
plausibility and popular vogue is called the error of verbal sug-
gestion. nl It means that words which have a vague or confused meaning 
but have a rhetorical value are used to propound some theory which has no 
cognitive or philosophical value. i:iuch stands in the way of genuine 
knowledge. This error is nothing more or less than Bacon's famous idols 
of the forum. 
(g). The Fallacy of Illicit Importance. 
'l'his, Perry says, is 11 one of the most insidious errors which has 
ever been foisted upon mankind and it is the Idealist who has popularized 
it."2 It consists in referring that, because a proposition is self-
evident or unchallengeable, therefore, it is important. 
Vith these seven fallacies defined, Perry goes forth to the philo-
sophical wars pointing out that Pragmatism is guilty of some, Idealists 
of many and Naturalism of others. One wonders whether or not the list 
of fallacies is complete and if N'eo-Realism is free from committing any 
of them. I presmne that Idealists could draw up and beautifully name a 
list of fallacies which point out disagreements with Realists and then 
turn around and accuse them of being the victims of fallacy A. For 
1. Perry, PPT, 271. 
2. Perry, ~1R. 19. 
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instance why not charge the Realist with the fallacy of "unnecessary 
limitation, 11 or the fallacy of "undefined objects'' or the fallacy of 
''meaningless, static, blind, chaotic stuff" the former referring to 
analysis and the latter to extra-mental entities? It would be interest-
ing and possibly profitable to list all points of difference and then 
attach nice sounding labels and name them all fallacies and then in later 
argument with the Realist merely say, 111'his is a fallacy of A, which we 
discussed earlier." 
Before proceeding further we would call attention that in spite of 
serious differences Realism is nevertheless, 
in agreement with Naturalism, Idealism and 
Pragmatism respecting many important doctrines. Vfi th 
Naturalism for example, it maintains the unimpeach-
able truth of the accredited results of science, 
and the independence of physical nature of knowledge; 
with Idealism it maintains the validity and irre-
ducibility of logical and moral science; and with 
Pragmatism, the practical and empirical character 
of the knowledge process, and the presumptively 
pluralistic constitution of the universe.! 
In the light of the above it is significant to note that Perry de-
rives his doctrine of the independence of the object from Naturalism and 
by object he means the physical object of Natural Science. This becomes 
the bulwark of realistic doctrine. From Prag~Atism he gets his pluralism 
and from Idealism his logic and moral science. It seems that Perry has 
made a survey of the entire field of philosophy, has discarded what he 
considers to be erroneous, has taken the important and essential features 
1. Perry, PPT, 272. 
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of Naturalism, Idealism and Pragmatism and with a few unique contributions 
of his own has fused them together into what he calls the New Realism. 
Following the polemic, Perry proceeds to state that the crucial 
problem for contemporary philosophy is the problem of knowledge. With 
this I am in essential agreement for it seems to me that the various 
schools divide radically over Epistemology and are constructed mainly in 
the light of their conclusions on this problem. I am also in agreement 
with t he author when he says, n'I'he problem of knovtledge reduces, in the 
.last analysis, to the problem of the relation betvreen a mind and that 
which is related to a mind as its object."l 
The author advances his argument by calling attention to the fact 
that accounts of mind differ characterically according as they are based 
on the observation of mind in nature and society, or on introspection. 
Some schools of philosophy and psychology have contended that the only 
way to study mind is, objectively, as it is in the field of experience, 
while others have insisted that the study of mind must be based on self-
consciousness. The resul·ts of these two modes of inquiry have differed 
so strikingly that it has been said that it cannot be mind that is 
apprehended in both cases. It has been assumed that one's own mind, or, 
the mind at home, must be preferred to the mind abroad. This assumption 
leads to a renunciation of the latter as mind at all and so Perry says, 
We reach the popular view that mind is encased 
in a non-mental and impenetrable shell, within which 
1. Perry, PP£, 273. 
it may cherish the secret of its own existence 
without ever being disturbed by inquisitive in-
truders.! 
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Perry seeing both views endeavors to synthesize them in a v i mv which 
becomes peculiar to himself and eventually leads to his universe of 
neutral entities. He maintains that we shall observe two minds 1 the mind 
within and the mind without~ and he will prove them to be, in reality, 
one. But to unite them it is necessary to replace them by the whole mind . 
in which th;ey will appear as parts. Further elaborating on this he says, 
The traditional shield looks concave on the one 
side and convex on t he other. That this should be 
so is entirely intelligible in view of the nature 
of the several ways in which it may be approached. 
The whole shield may be known from either side when 
the initial bias is overcome. Similarly, I propose 
to describe the mind within and t he mind without as 
parts of mind, either of which may assume prominence 
according to the cognitive starting-point; the whole 
mi nd by implication lying in the general field of 
experience where every initial one-sidedness IDAY be 
overcome. 2 
The above gives a clue to what will be Perry's entire position. The mind 
within and the mind v..'i thout are only two views of the same mind. 
In studying mind Perry also calls attention to another distinct ion 
that must be made, namely, that between t he action and the content of 
consciousness. He maintains that every type of consciousness exhibits 
this duali -L-y. There is 11thinking 11 and "thought, 11 "perceiving" and 
"perception, 11 "remembering" and "memory.'' Having now established this 
~. Perry, PP'I' , 274. 
2. Ibid. 
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belief .in duality he proceeds to discuss, first, the method of intro-
spection and then the method of observation, the first dealing with the 
contents of mind and the second, with the action of mind. 
B. 1'he Method of Introspection. II 
Perry affirms what he calls a nwell-knovm fact, 11 that the mos-c II 
convenient method of discovering what is in~ mind is to consult me. The l 
method of introspection is particularly convenient and fruitful in col- I 
lecting my past experiences. I have been keeping a record of my 
1 
experiences and by the process of recollection I can recover them a-c will 
and recognize them to have been my experiences. At this juncture Perry 
makes a point of divergence by calling the attention of the reader to the 
fact that it is not true that facts which are in my memory are entirely 
lost to knowledge if I am unable to recall them. In other words, the 
same facts may be the property of other minds. l'l[ithout elaboration I 
merely mention this point here for it is an approach to Perry's later 
theory. He says, 11It is doubtless true that a record of the contents of 
a mind is most conveniently obtained by introspection."! He adds, 11It 
may easily be that while introspection is the best method of collecting 
oases of mental content, it is the poorest method of defining their 
nature .n2 
From hare Perry advances a step in his argument to state that when 
he attempts to discover the generic character of the contents revealed 
1. Perry, PPT, 276. 
2. Ibid., 277. 
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by introspection he finds that these contents coincide 'rith other 
manifold such as nature, history, and t he contents of other minds. In 
other words, he concludes that the contents of my mind exhibit no generic 
character. He says, "In other words, the elements of the introspective 
manifold are in t hemselves neither peculiarly mental nor peculiarly 
mine,; they are neutral and interchangeable. 111 Following up this position 
he makes a very significant statement for his system, "It is only with 
respect t o this grouping and interrelations that the elements of mental 
content exhibi-t any peculiarity. "2 In line with this thought Perry 
quotes Professor Woodbridge and seems to be in agreement with him when 
he says, 
In consciousness we have simply an inst~~ce 
of the existence of different things together, 
consciousness is only a form of connec t ion of 
objects, a relation betvleen them.3 
The above really is the 11 relational theory of consciousness, 11 which 
.maintains that the mental content is distinguished, not by the stuff 
or elements of which it is composed, but by the way in which these 
elements are composed; in other words, by the composing relation. At 
this point Perry summons James to his assistance by the use of the 
following quotation, 11Consciousness connotes a kind of external relation, 
and does not denote a special stuff or way of being. 114 Perry also at 
1. Perry, PY.L', 277 • ·I 
2. Ibid. 
3. i"foodbridge, Jour. Phil., 2(1905), 120. 
4. Ja~es, Jour. Phil., 1(1904), 486. 
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this stage of his argument inserts a point as to the immediacy of knowl-
edge which will be necessary for his system as it is for all episte-
mological monistic systems. Here he again quotes James to substantiate 
his theory of immediacy when he says, 11,And James himself explicitly 
recognizes the possibiiity of immediately experiencing, without the 
mediation of ideas at all. nl 
We seem to have reached a point where it is contended that the con-
tents of mind coincide distributively, or element for element, with parts 
of nature. It is important now, then, to shmv how parts of nature become 
contents of mind. What constitutes being in mind? 
In order to answer the above question and arrive at the information 
desired, Perry now feels it necessary to abandon the method of introspect-
ing as evidenced by the following statement, 
We shall find that it is impossible to find 
the common bond of things mental, until we abandon 
the introspective method and view mind as it 
operates in the open field of nature and history. 2 
Before the abandotunent he considers two alternatives, both of which he 
finally rejects. The first, is that it is admitted that it is impossible 
to find a unique quality in mental contents, or even a unique interrela-
tion among them. It is maintained by this view that things derive their 
mental character from that which acts on them. In other words, my con-
tents are the passive objects of my active perceiving, thinking or 
willing. This action of mind is not itself content, but is the common 
1. Perry, PPT, 278. 
2. Ibid., 279. 
89 
and unifying correlate of all content. Up to this point Perry agrees 
that this theory is substruttially correct. But this view goes further and 
asserts that the action of 1nind is introspectively accessible in a 
peculiar way. The action of the mind is revealed to the agent himself in 
an inunediate intuition. ·rhis was the view of Berkeley which Perry says 
was refuted in a 11classic fashion by Hume" when he claims he s howed that, 
in the most exhaustive introspective analysis no such creative power is 
revealed but only a manifold and nexus of contents. Perry adds that when 
the so-called experience of mental activity is analyzed, no activity-
element is found. Again he refers to his famous exposition on 11 connnon 
errors" by saying, "In other words, the intuitionist theory of mental 
activity is an instance of the fallacy of 'pseudo-simplicity'."1 Perry's 
charge here is that philosophy is liable to this fallacy in the case of 
self-lmowledge, because of the extraordinary familiarity of "self. 11 His 
contention is, that this familiarity is likely to make us feel that such 
I am confident that the nature of mental action 
is discoverable neither by an analysis of mental 
contents nor by self-intuition; that it is necessary, 
in short, to abandon the method of self-knowledge 
altogether, and substitute that of general observa-
tion.2 
Perry next pauses to examine what he thinks might be a reasonable 1 
compromise, namely, the view that mental action is a peculiar introspective,! 
1. Perry, PPT, 280. 
2. Ibid., 283. Italics mine. 
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complex. 'l'here is according to this view a sort of activity process, 
composed of sensations, feelings, and the like. Perry objects to this 
view on the ground that the feeling of action belongs to the content of 
the mind, and therefore cannot be that general action by virtue of which 
things become content. Again he says that there is evident confusion in 
this view in regarding feeling of action as itself action. 
We now arrive at; Perry's final conclusion as far as the method of 
introspection is concerned when he says, 
The true solution of the matter lies near at 
hand. If instead of defining mental action in terms 
of t he feeling of bodily activities, he (Ja~s) had 
defined it in terms of bodily action itself, as he 
sometimes appears to do, these difficulties would 
have been obviated. But this would have required the 
abandonment of the introspective method.l 
Having now concluded the discussion of the method of introspection 
and rejected it, Perry now turns to another method, namely, the method 
of general observation. 
C. The Method of General Observat ion. 
At t he outset of the discussion of this method Perry says that 
most philosophers assume that it is essentially characteristic of a mind 
to be accessible only to itself and adds that such an assumption is 
rarely supported by evidence. At this point, as we delve deeper into 
Perry's theory, we begin to get into real debatable territo~J but we shall 
content ourselves by merely presenting his position reserving critical 
and argumentative material for a later section of this chapter. 
1. Perry, PPT, 285. 
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Again Perry flies to the haven of security, which he created in 
building his "common errors," when he says, "The notion of the privacy 
of mental contents rests mainly upon the fallacy of 'exclusive particu-
larity' ."1 He claims we reason thus: my idea is mine and in some sense, 
then, it falls within my mind. From this it is hastily concluded that 
it is therefore exclusively mind. Here Perry makes what I consider a 
very important statement as far as his system is concerned, 
Now it is clear that my idea cannot be alienated 
from my mind, without contradiction. It must not be 
attributed to the not-my-mind which is the other term 
of disjunctive dichotomy. But it does not fol~ow that 
my idea may not also be your idea.2 
Having presented this position Perry now asks, How are we to explain the 
widespread disposition to regard minds as exclusive? He answers as 
follows: (1) We readily extend to our minds the group relation which 
holds in the case of our bodies. Just as we think of things in relation 
to our bodies as within and without so we have come to think of things 
in relation to our minds as within and without. (2) Various motives, 
methodological, religious, and social have so emphasized the difference 
be~veen mind and mind, or between the individual mind and the outer world, 
that this difference tends to be transformed into a relation of mutual 
exclusiveness. Perry's contention seems to be this: that we are in error 
in supposing that we cannot know what is i.n the mind of another. He 
points out several indices which seem to indicate that we can know what 
1. Perry, PPr, 286. 
2. Ibid., 287. 
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is in the other mind. First, he shows that under favorable circumstances 
we have no difficulty i n following another mind particularly when we are 
II :~aJ.  nt·he says. tt:o·uhma.y r~adily :o:l·:w :y :J.··nd thr·t:ug: my verbal report.''l 'Ill :: 1n ercours~w 10 1nvo vas a o 1 y ea 1ng w1 p ysioal objects. 
The point that Perry desires to establish is that we do have ideas in 
common. 
Following a lengthy description of bodily act ion and particularly 
proprio-ceptive sensations, Perry again takes up the matter of the acces-
sibility of my mental contents to your observation and says, 
As respects the accessibility of my mental 
contents to your observation, the mos t important 
general fact is this; that your observation will 
be baffled just in so far as my deali~s with the 
content of pY mind are not peripheral . · 
Vii th this background of argument Perry is now ready to state the 
advantages of observation over introspec t ion which he does as follows: 
'\'Vhen mental content is thus arrived at by 
general observation rather than by introspection, 
the action which is correlative to it, which in-
vests it with a new status and bring s it together 
in a new way, is revealed at the same time. You 
observe the contents of my mind by following my 
glance or my words; so that at the same time that 
you observe the contents, you may also observe the 
action, namely, my visual or verbal response to these 
contents. 3 
Perry quickly discusses the common objection to this theory of ob-
serving mental action and just as quickly throws the objection out of 
1. Perry, PPT, 290. 
2. Ibid ., 295. 
3. Ibid., 297. 
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court on the ground of another of his "common errors, 11 namely, the error 
of "exclusive particularity." He contends that this objection assumes 
that what is active cannot also be passive, or that what is subject can-
not also be object • 
.After this long, involved route of thought we have arrived at a 
point where Perry can now present a statement of the nature of mental 
action in terms of general observation which he does as follows; "Mental 
action is a property of the physical organism,"1 and "elements become 
mental content when reacted to in the specific manner characteristic of 
the central nervous system. 11 2 In summarizing his theory of mind Perry 
present s the following three ideas: (1) A mind is a complex so organized 
as to act desideratively or interestedly. He uses the term interest in 
its biological rather than its psychological sense. (2) But such processe 
II 
I 
I 
interested in their general form, possess characteristic instrumental- ,1 
I 
ities, notably a bodily nervous systemwhich localizes the interest and 
conditions the refinement and range of its intercourse with its environ-
ment. (3) A mind embraces certain contents or parts of the environment, 
with which it deals through its instrumentalities and in behalf of its 
interest. Perry further says, "The natural mind,_ as here and now exist-
ing, is thus an organization possessing as distinguishable, but comple-
mentary, aspects, interest, nervous system, and contents. 11 3 
1. Perry, PPT, 298. 
2. Ibid., 299. 
3. Ibid., 304. 
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With this brief exposition of Perry's theory of mind in the knowledge 
process we now turn to the realistic theory of knowledge itself. 
II. The Realistic theory of Knowledge. 
A. Analysis of the Problem of Knowledge. 
As indioated .above metaphysical considerations are left as far 
as possible for the next chapter. We shall try to agree with Perry for 
the moment when he says, "It is necessary as it is proper to assume that 
we can use our minds without introducting them into the discussion. nl In 
this chapter we are interested promarily in the problem of knowledge. 
Professor Perry in an article appearing in the Journal of Philosophy in 
1909 entitled, "Discussion of the Problem of Epis t emology,"2 divides the 
material into four parts as follows: (1) The Person who knows, (2) '£he 
Knowledge which the person has, ( 3) The 'fhing of which something is known 
and (4) The Something known. It seems to the writer of this paper that 
#1 and # 3 are primarily metaphysical matters while H2 and f4 are purely 
epistemological items. Of course it seems essential that there be a 
"subject" who lmows 1 but what that "subject" is an sich is a metaphysical 
problem. vVhether a distinction should be made between 1f3 and :ff4 11the 
Thing of which something is known, 11 and 11the Something known" is both a 
metaphysical and epistemological question. Division ~ is strictly 
epistemological. We shall consider Perry's own solution of the problem 
of epistemology 'M1ich will include the four points mentioned above under 
1. Perry, Jour. Phil.~ 13(1916)~ 505. 
2. Ibid., 6(1909) 1 711. 
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two general headings, (1) 1'he 'l'heory of Immanence and (2) The Theory 
of Independence. 
B. The '.i'heory of Irmnanence. 
Professor Perry frankly states at the outset that Nee-Realism 
is a revival of what has been referred to as the, nantiquated metaphysics, 
which talks about existence per se, out of all relation to minds. nl 
Hume regarded things not only as possessing being independent of the mind, 
but also as identical with perceptions when present to the mind. The 
Scot tish School of Reid and Hamilton differed from Hume and propounded 
what they called "natural realism" which held that both were distinct 
from the ideas that suggest them. This is the distinction today, epis-
temologically between "critical" realism and "neo" realism. Perry says, 
Modern Realism (I think he means Nee-Realism) 
is closer to the monistic realism of 'ideas, ' sug-
gested by Hume, than to the dualistic realism of mind 
and matter, propounded by the Scottish School; and 
this in spite of the fact that the Scottish philosophy 
was primarily a polemic, in the name of 'realism, 1 
against Hume as the last and . most outrageous of the 
idealists. 2 
Perry further states that the Nee-Realism, while it insists, as all 
realism~s must, that things are independent, asserts that when things are 
known, they ~ ideas of the mind. fhis is extremely important and be-
comes the crux of the battle between Idealism and Realism. f he following 
makes the conflict more acute: 
1. Perry, PP£, 306. Quoting from Howison, LE, 21. 
2. Ibid., 308. 
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They (things) may enter direc~ly into the mind; 
and when they do, they become what are called 'ideas.' 
So that ideas are only things in a certain relation; 
or, things, in respect of being known, are ideas.l 
The realistic theory of knowledge has ~ro component parts, each of 
great importance. First, the theory of i rrunanence and (2) the theory of 
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independence. The ~L'heory of Immanence is really epistemological monism. 
It means that when a given object A is known, that A itself enters into 
a relation which constitutes it the idea or conter~ of a mind. I have 
stated this in the terminology of Perry, but what it really means is that 
the object and the idea are one. The Theory of Independence means that 
although "A" may thus enter into :mind, and assume the status of content, 
it is not dependent on this status for its being, or nature. 
is claimed, makes it possible to escape tvro varieties of dualism; the 
dualism betvveen mind and body, and the dualism be~veen thought and things. 
How is this accomplished? Merely by the simple process of substituting 
the notion of relation in place of the notion of substance. 
The dualism between nlind and body received its classic formulation 
in the philosophy of Descartes. Mind and body were conceived as tvro 
. self-contained and mutually exclusive spheres characterized by the ~7o 
attributes, 11thought 11 and "extension.n This dualism gave rise to very 
baffling perplexities. Commenting at this point Perry makes a statement 
which is a substantial part of his theory as follows: 
If mind and body be disjoined by definition, 
how explain the empirical fact of their union? 
1. Perry, PY.r, 308 . 
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For those facts which are so prominently in evidence in 
philosophy, namely, the processes of perception and of 
voluntary action, are ~either exclusively mental nor 
exclusively bodily, but a blend of the two.l 
Here we find Perry's initial suggestion that we have something which is 
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neither mental nor physical but something composed of both~ but neither,-- j· 
a neutral composition. 
Perry cites many illustrations of dualities or over-lappings. The 
residents of the United States are divided into sexes, political parties, 
races, ages, etc. These overlap and intersect. The difference between 
one group and another is not a difference in members but a difference of 
principle of organization. Following his list of illustrations, Perry 
says, 11 In respect of one relation the members constitute one group, and 
in respect of another relation the same members constitute another 
group. 112 
'the theory of immanence applies this type of difference to the 
duality of mind and body. It is maintained that mind and 'body are both 
complexes capable of being analyzed into more primitive terms. Neither 
mind nor body is really simple. It is further contended that as the 
analysis is carried on it appears that the more primitive terms of which 
they ru·e composed are, in many cases at least, interchangeable. There are 
sensible qualities and logical categories common to both. Perry further 
adds, 11 Indeed it is impossible to find ground for asserting that there 
1. Perry, PPT, 309. 
2. Ibid.~ 310. 
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is any term of the bodily complex that is disqualified from entering 
the mental complex. nl 
I believe that there is little doubt but what Perry was influenced 
in this theory by Ernest Mach in his book, Die Analyse der Empfin~ungen, 
of relationship, such as the relation of color to the source of light, 
psychology studies its peculiar relation to the retina or nervous system 
of a sentient organism. Jr he color itself is neither physical nor 
psychical. 
I do not believe that Perry would go quite as far as :Mach, because 
Mach is extremely positivistic and naturalistic, but Perry would insist 
on what he calls, the logical aspect of knowledge. He says, 
Physical and psychical complexes have in common 
not only sensible qualities, but also certain more 
fundamental formal relationships, such as implication, 
order, causation, time and the like.2 
In other words, Perry's theory of iwnanence is fully recognized only when 
it is seen that the same elements compose both mind and body; and 'that 
these common elements embrace both sense qualia and also logical ab-
stractions. Reality is thus conceived as a field of "interpenetrating 
relationships." 
'J:he second dualism mentioned above between lmowledge and things is 
based on the alleged 11 self-transcendence 11 of knowledge. It would appear 
1. Perry, PPT, 310. 
2. Ibid. 
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that knowledge is "about" things other than itself. This has given rise 
to the notion of the "thing-in-itself. 11 It is claimed by Perry that the 
theory of iwruanence rectifies this dualism by asserting that the dif-
ference between knowledge and things, like that between mind and body, is 
a relational and functional difference, and not a difference of content. 
The theory of immanence would hold that the thing thought about and the 
thought, are both experienced. 'Ihis is expressed, 
I have not resorted to a general and vague 
insistence that true knowledge must 'correspond' to 
its object. Experience seems to me to reveal the 
identity of true knowledge and its object. ~he 
object with what is true of it, and knowledge when 
true for the thinker, are one and the same thing.l 
The theory of inun.anence recognizes two sorts of transcendence, (1) a 
thing's transcendence of the cognitive relation by virtue of its possessio 
i 
II 
I 
I 
II I. 
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of an intrinsic quality of its own, or by virtue of its possession of I 
other relations, suoh for example, as physical relations and ( 2) a thing • s ~~ 
transcendence of its representation, ;vithin the field of cognition itself. 
'rhe above discussion has led us to the second component part of Perry's 
epistemology, i.e., the theory of independence. 
C. The Theory of Independence. 
In beginning the consideration of the theory of independence it 
is well to note that Perry recognizes ·the fact that the theory of 
immanence fails to establish realism and in fact the theory appears even 
to disprove it by bringing the transcendence directly into the mind as 
noted in the conclusion of the discussion on the theory of immanence. The 
1. Perry, Jour. Phil., 4(1907} 374. Italics mine. 
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problem now before Perry is to show that the immanent may at the same 
time be independent. He says, "It would not, I think, be far from the 
truth to say t hat t he cardinal principle of nee-realism is the inde-
pendence of the immanent. "1 
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Before progressing further, Perry finds i t necessary to dispose of 
two theories which approach the above principle so closely as to be 
frequently confused with i t . The first is t he theory promulgated by 
objective and absolute idealists to the effect that reality is independent 
of fini t e knowledge. This view is non-realistic for t\'lo reasons, (1) it 
accept s no being but that which is given in the idea--it moves entirely 
within the limits of experience; and (2) it sets over against the judging 
subject as an object to which it must conform, only an ought, whi ch can 
have no meaning apart from t he activity of thought. For this theory 
t hings are dependent on eiperience and experience on thought; and either 
form of dependence would be fatal to realism. Thus, Professor Perry 
disposes of Absolute Idealism in qui t e a fair manner, I think, although 
personally, I would be inclined to accept the independence t heory of the 
Absolute Idealist in preference to that of the Neo-Realist because it 
appears that the independent object of the Neo-Realist, if it has meta-
physical existence at all, is not more than a blind, chaot ic, unintel-
ligent stuff while the Absolute Idealist could all~; for i n telligence and 
personality. 
The second theory, which is an approximation to the theory of 
1. Perry, PPr , 313 . 
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pendence not only of thought but of any variety whatsoever of experience, 
whether it be perception, feeling, or even the instinctive response of 
the organism to its environment. 
Having cleared the field, presumably, he is now ready to make a 
final statement of the theory of independence. The theory of independence 
means that, "things may be, and are, directly experienced without owing 
either their being or their nature to that circumstance. ul Much hinges 
on the use of the term, "experience." I can best give Perry's definition 
by quoting directly from him, 
According to Realism, experience may be expressed 
as (a)Re, where a is that which is experienced, Re the 
eA~erience-relation; and where a is independent of Re. 
Now the term 'experience' may be used loosely to mean 
either a, Re, or (a)Re. But if we are to regard ex-
perience as t he most comprehensive manifold# it is of 
crucial importance to distinguish these uses of the 
term. To use it in either of the last two senses, in 
which it embraces Re, _is to arrive at a phenomenalism 
or panpsychism, in which the ultimate components of 
reality are experiences. To use it in the former sense, 
to ·mean what is or may be experienced, but which need 
not be experienced, will lead to realism.2 
''i\'1 th the above in mind, Perry comes to the conclusion that it will be 
II better to reject the term 11 experienoe 11 altogether on the ground that it 
gives a disproportionate emphasis to an accidental feature of things. 
He says, 
1. Perry, PPf, 315. 
2. Ibid. 
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Thus :Wir. Joachim is correct in supposing that 
according to Realism, 'the facts• and 'experiencing' 
are or may be related; and that the relation, when, 
or as, it obtains leaves each (factor) precisely what 
it was, viz., absolutely in itself and independent.l 
.And again he says, "But it (Realism) maintains that these elements, 
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processes, and systems are independent of being experienced. 112 He further 1
1 
I presses this point when he remarks, "The ultimate terms of experience are 
at any rate independent whatever may turn out to be the case with certain 
complexes of these terms. 11 3 
And now we come to the very heart of the whole matter, for Perry 
proceeds to say, that. since Re is not necessary to things, there is no 
reason for limiting 11things 11 even to what can be experienced. Here he 
crosses swords with Idealism and says, 
And if the Idealists' polemic against Realism 
is successful, we are left to conclude that experiencing 
does 'IDB1:e a difference' to facts. This is truly the 
central contention of Idealism as the contrary is the 
central contention of Realism.4 
Professor Montague has suggested that the term "pan-objectivism" be 
used to designate Perry's personal, peculiar and unique theory as ex-
pressed in the follmr.ing passage: 
The expression 'neutral entities,' vdll perhaps 
serve better to emphasize the difference of the terms 
of experience, not only to their subjective relations, 
but to their physical relations as well. We need some 
such expressions with which to refer to the alphabet 
1. Perry, NR, 114. 
2. Ibid., 104. 
3. Ibid., 128. 
4. Ibid., 105. Italics mine. 
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of being, as distinguished from any and all of the 
familiar groupings which its elements compose.l 
,After stating his thesis Perry now sets out to prove the cardinal 
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principle of Nee-Realism, namely, the theory of independence. Strangely 
enough, as mentioned above,Professor Perry uses the negative method, 
that of endeavoring to refute Idealism. The reason for this is that he 
believes that the opposite thesis to that of :Nee-Realism is, that cognitive 
consciousness conditions being, which is the cardinal principle of Idealism [ 
I 
II 
Therefore, if he can show that cognitive consciousness does not condition 
being then he reasons that it foll~•s that being is not dependent upon 
consciousness and concludes that it is self-conditioned and independent. 
In his Paris address, Perry said, 
Le r~aliste accorde qu'il est impossible de 
conna~re l'objet sans le mettre en rapport avec 
l'esprit, car ceci n'est au fond rien .de plus qu'un 
pleonasme une tautologie. Ceci equivaudrait a dire 
qu'on ne peut pas connaftre un objet sans le conna1tre. 
Mais le realiste refuse d'y ~oir d'une mani~re 
guelconque la preuve que o'objet a besoin d'etre 
connu pour exister.Z 
Perry's first argument against Idealism is that Idealism has not 
proved its case. It has depended for proof, he contends, upon fallacious 
forms of procedure such as the "argument from the ego-centric predicament, 11 
and "definition by initial predication. 11 1'he second argument is that 
Idealism is beset >rith its m~ invention----the difficulty of subjectivism 
or solipsism. His argument in brief is this: if consciousness is 
1. Perry, PPT, 316. 
2. Perry, R@M, 139. 
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construed as owning its objects, so t hat they arise and perish with its 
several acts or states, then the knowledge of the same thing by different 
knowers or by the same know·er at different times becomes impossible. 
Confident that he has laid Ide_alism ulow, 11 Professor Perry considers 
the more positive arguments for Realism. He maintains that the most 
general argmnent is an application of the theory of external or extrinsic 
character of relations. According to this theory terms acquire from 
their new relations an added character, which does not either condition, 
or necessarily alter, the character which they already possess. This 
theory shows that the nature of things is prior to the relations which 
II 
I 
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they enter, and that the nature of these relations, whether of dependence I 
or not, is an extrinsic fact. 
The empirical argument for realism, Perry contends, turns upon the 
nature of mind, and the ~pacific relationship which the mind's objects 
sustain to it. He further states that we must assume that consciousness 
is a relationship and is a selective response to a pre-existing and 
independently existing environment. 
In the following chapter we vnll turn our attention to an evaluation and 
criticism of his main epistemological theses. 
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A CRI1' IC.AL .ANALYSIS AND :E.'VALUATION OF 'l'HE ESSENTIAL II I 
THESES . IN PERRY'S EPISTEMOLOGY ANTI THEIR BEARING 
ON A DOCTRINE OF PERSONALITY. I 
It appears to me that the major problems raised by the discussion of jl 
the previous chapter could well be summarized as follows: 
1. V~at is the significance of Perry's accusation that idealists are 
victims of the "ego-centric predicament?" 
2. Is Perry justified in discarding introspection as a method of 
studying consciousness? 
3. Does consciousness have any metaphysical validity? 
4. Perry claims that knowledge is immediate. Is any item of 
knowledge immediate or is it all mediated? 
5. Are relations external or mental? Does not a world of independent 
objects make lcnowledge impossible if relations are external to terms? 
6. If all knowledge is immediate how is it possible to explain what 
seems ·to be a common experience of man, i.e., error? 
7. Can all reality be explained in terms of physical science? 
8. What is the metaphysical status of 11neutral entities?" 
I 
I 
9. The independence of extra-mental entities needs further explana-
II 
tion. 
10. Is the self private or can my idea also be the idea of another 
self? 
11. iVhat is the place of substance in Nee-Realism? 
I 
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12. Would the successful annihilation of Idealism make Realism the 
only other alternative? 
13. Is the mind creative or selective? 
14. Are categories laws of the mind, laws of the universe or simple 
relations? 
Some of the above problems are distinctly metaphysical in nature and 
will be referred to the next chapter for consideration and criticism but 
we shall now proceed to deal critically vnth those problems which are 
essentially epistemological. 
I. The Problem of Error with Observations by Professor W. P. Montague. 
Professor Montague in his article, "The New Realism and the 
Old, 111 makes some enlightening connnents on Neo-Realism which will assist 
us in getting a better understanding of its doctrines. He calls attention 
to the facts that Epistemology is itself concerned with tvvo fairly dis-
tinct ·types of problems. First, the functional problem of the criteria 
of truth and the way of attaining it. From speculations on this problem 
we have the systems of Mysticism, Rationalism, Empiricism and Pragmatism. 
Secondly, the structural problem of the nature of knowledge and the 
relation of the knower to the known. This has resulted i:O: Naive Realism, 
Dualistic Realism and Subjectivism. Professor Montague claims that to 
understand Neo-Realism it is necessary to go back 
beyond Kant, beyond Berkeley, beyond even Locke and 
Descartes---far back .to the primordial common sense 
which believes in a world that exists independently 
1. Montague, Jour. Phil., 9(1912), 39-46. 
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of the knowing of it, but believes also that the same 
independent world can be presented in consciousness 
and not merely represented or copied by 'ideas.' In 
short, the new realism is almost identical with that 
naive or natural realism.! 
I am quite certain that Professor Perry would be in agreement vnth 
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this statement of Professor Montague for he makes a statement very similar 
to this which was quoted earlier in this paper. Also it is to be noted 
that Professor Montague embodies both of the two main principles of 
Realism, namely the principle of. independence and the principle of im-
manence, for he refers to, "the world exists independently of the knowing 
of it," and "the independent world 
not merely represented or copied." 
can be presented in consciousness and II 
With this background Professor Montague 
I 
points out one of the great weaknesses of Nee-Realism, i.e., the problem 
of error, with the following, 
Now the cause of the abandonment of naive realism 
in favor of the dualistic or picture theory was the 
apparently hopeless disagreement of the world as pre-
sented in immediate experience with the true or 
corrected system of objects in whose reality we believe. 
It follows that the first and greatest problem for the 
Nee-Realist is to amend the realm of conm1on-sense in 
such wise as to make it compatible with the universal 
phenomenon of error and with the mechanism of perception 
upon which that phenomenon is based and in terms of 
which it must be interpreted.2 
In his Paris address in 1922, Professor Perry said, 
La nouveaute de ce realisme consiste avant tout 
en ce qu'il vise a combiner le principe fondamental 
de 1' independance avec le principe d'immediatisme, 
ou, d'immanence. En d'autres termes realisme 
1. Montague, Jour. Phil., 9(1912), 39. 
2. Ibid., 41. 
1/ 
propose d'identifier l'objet reel et independant 
avec les donnees de percept ion e t de pensee.l 
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f his means as Professor Montague has indi cated, and vn1ich is true in any 
epi stemological monism, that the object of thought is immediat ely perceived 1 
without t he mediation of anything, and, most cert ainly vri thout the re- ! I 
flective mediation of the mind. How then is it possible for anyone to 
perceive anything which is not a true revelation of the objective world? 
Must perception be always correct and true ? In other words, if idea and 
object are one, if element corresponds with element, relation with relation 
and term with term how could one possibly be in error? Idea cannot be 
compared wi t h object to ascertain whether or not it is a correct con-
caption because idea and object are one and i mmediate. Perry reduces 
reality t o "neutral entities 11 of which mind and mat ter, idea and object, 
are only di f ferent aspects or relations. But unless there is a vital 
difference between these, we are, both practically and theoretically, 
reduced to an epistemological monism which is unable to account for the 
"universal phenomenon of error." 
II. The Ego-cent ric Predicament with Observations by Professor Mary W. 
Calkins. 
Professor Calkins sums up the main criticisms of Idealism in 
her article in the Journal of Philosophy, "The Idealist to the Realist ."2 
She stat es that they may be grouped under three main heads, (l) those 
1. Perry, PIVJM, 141. 
2. Cal kins, Jour. Phil., 8(1911). 
---------------------- ==== 
109 
which oppose Idealism on the ground that it is subversive of some impor-
tant system of beliefs, (2) tho se which charge Idealism with fundamental 
inconsistency and (3) those which claim that Idealism is based on 
unjustifiable assumptions. It is on the latter grounds primarily that 
Realists attack Idealism. Professor CaDcins says, 
The alleged oppositions of logic to Idealism 
consist, in fact, in the selection of some empirical 
and subsidiary logical principle and in the demonstra-
tion of its incompatibility with Idealism. Perry's 
'ego-centric predicament' is the, cleverest and most 
unblushing instance vmich I know. Idealism cannot be 
contradictory t o the fundamental laws of logic, for 
these are laws of mental self-consistency.! 
Professor Calkins says t hat the most fundamental criticism is that Ideal-
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ism is based on justified assumptions of which the first is the assumption I 
that an object, because knovm is theref.ore mental in nature. This of 
course is a reference to Perry's "ego-centric predicament" which Perry 
uses to lessen the importance of the mind itself in the epistemological 
process. Professor Calkins answers Perry's criticism with the frank and 
direct statement, "Idealism believes that objects as known are mental. n2 
Is it not true t hat when all the arguments are in and the smoke of 
battle has cleared away that all systems of thought must start with 
assumptions? These assumptions should be rational hypotheses; they should 
"fit in" with the rest of the world of knowledge consistently. But a 
beginning must be made. The Idealist starts with the assumption of the 
mental nature of objects and the Realists with the independent, physical 
1. Calkins, Jour. Phil., 8(1911). 
2. Ibid. 
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object. The question is which is more logical and rational. 
Professor Calkins analyzes the objects of physical science as con-
taining one or all of the following characters, (1) sensible qualities as 
extension~ motion, weight~ color, sound~ fragrance, etc., (2) relations as 
spatial and temporal positions, permanence or impermanence, likeness and 
difference, degree, singleness or multiplicity or totality. She clair~ 
that, the Idealist finds by exrunina·tion of objects that both sense qualities 
and relations are mental. This is directly contrary to realistic doctrine, 
for the realists will maintain that relations are not mental or internal I 
but rather extrinsic and external. Professor Calkins further challenges 
the Realist to make any assertion about sense qualities save in terms of 
Idealism. 
The Idealist claims that the universe is knowable. Is there any-
thing in the universe which cannot be known? If so, what is it? Is that 
which is "independent 11 for the Realist knowable? If so, then the claims 
of the Idealist are sound, if not, then it i s fair to ask the Realist how 
he knows that the independent is unknowable. How does he know that it is 
there at all? If you cannot see it, hear it, touch it, smell it, taste 
it or make any meaningful statement about it how is one justified in con-
tending that it exists except on grounds of assumption which then makes 
the Realist guilty of the very t hing he is accusing the Idealist. 'fhe 
Idealist believes that the universe is "put together mind-wise 11 as Everett 
put it. In other words that the facts of experience warrant the 
Idealistic position as more rational than that of the Realist. 'rhe "ego-
centric predicrunent 11 is merely another exemplification of the importance 
~-=-~~-==-==-=~~=======-=-=============-~-=-=-~==============--==~====== 
of mind as an explanation of the universe. 
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I' Perry repeatedly contends that the Idealist is guilt7 of ~~ng 
consciousness supreme and the self or mind the center of the lrnowing 
process. He says, "Idealists habitually construe things as 'thought of 1 
, I 
II and accordingly name them 'objects of thought, 1 or 1 ideas 1 • nl The 
predicament is this; when I think of a thing I have to have an idea of 
it. Ideas seem to be necessary for the apprehension of anything. The 
Idealist feels justified in starting with rtind and is, therefore, accused 
by the Realist of being a victim of the "ego-centric predicament. 11 I do 
not see how any philosopher, be he Realist or Idealist, can escape this 
"predicament. 11 The Realist must posit the physical object through the 
power of the mind; he must describe it by mental attributes and finally, 
he must subject it to logical processes which are essentially inherent 
in the mind. The Idealist certainly is justified in starting with con-
sciousness or the mind. vfuere he is subject to fair criticism on the 
part of the . Realist is when he takes the position of Berkeley, esse est 
percipi, holding that the object owes its existence to my idea or my 
mind, because of the act of perceiving. I doubt that any Idealist holds 
that my perceiving: of an object creates it. When the question is raised 
whether an object can exist without a cognitive consciousness either 
mine or God's then we face another problem. Is an object's existence 
dependent upon some consciousness? The Idealist ansvters in the affirms.-
tive, while the realist maintains that an object may be independent of 
any consciousness. 
1. Perry, PPr , 128. 
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In the light of the above I conclude that Perry is not altogether 
fair in maldng so much ado at the expense of the Idealist over the "ego-
centric predicament." Perry contends that, 11The fact is that without the 
says~ 11 I do not pretend to escape the embarrassments of ·t;he 'ego-centric 
predicament'. !he truth is that we all are in the 'ego-centric predica-
ment 1 the realist along with the rest. u2 
The rnain difference between Realist and Idealist concerning this 
"predicament" is that the Idealist considers consciousness important and 
the "key 11 to a. rational explanation of the universe while the Realist 
considers it minor and rather irrelevant. 
III. Professor Pratt's Contribution. 
In the Journal of Philosophy, Professor James B. Pratt contrib-
uted a very interesting article, ttProfessor Perry's Proofs of Realism, 11 3 
which vlill assist us in understanding Realism. He contends that Realism 
rises or falls upon Perry's fm.1r proofs, (l) the negative argument, a 
critique of Idealism, (2) the argument from externality of relations, 
(3) the argmnent from the distinction between object and avrareness and 
1. Perry, Jour. Phil., 10(1913). 
2. Ibid. 
3. Pratt, Jour. Phil., 9(1912), 573. 
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( 4) the argument from the nature of mind. Professor Pratt says, "1'he 
crucial question for realism is not the 'theory of hnmanence' but the 
'theory of independence.' nl I presume Professor Pratt arrives at this 
113 11 
I 
conclusion because there are other theories of immanence (any monism) 
while the "theory of independence" is essentially, realistic. I am in 
hearty agreement with Professor Pratt for I feel sure that it is the 
status of the independent that makes the cleavage between Idealism and 
Realism. 
rv. Professor Per~J Endeavors to Clarify his Position. 
In an article appearing in the Journal of Philosophy entitled 
"Some Disputed Points in Heo-Realism,"2 Professor Perry tries to clear up 
some of the points 1n.a.de by his critics. He observes, (1) "appearing in 
consciousness 11 requires explanation, (2) "appearingn would seem 
empirically to consist in a. relation located in, and exemplified by, the 
nervous response of the organism, (3) how shall we account for the 
diversity of appearance? 'l'he only positive results secured thus far have 
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been obtained by noting the manifold parts, sides, perspectives, relations~ 
etc., of the thing which appears, _and by noting that the nervous response II 
selects and combines these in a variety of ways, (4) no light whatsoever I 
is thrown on these questions by enveloping the whole in consciousness for 
the diversity of the appearances of finite minds of the real object of 
1. Pratt, Jour. Phil., 9(1912), 573. 
2. Perry, Jour. Phil., 10(1913). 
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the absolute mind is the same problem in different terms, and (5) there-
fore, this problem cannot be itself invoked as evidence for the theory 
of the universality of consciousness. 
In the article referred to above, Perry says, "If Idealism is false, 
Realism is true. 11 This I believe is true as far as the "independent 
object" is concerned. The statement shows why Perry is so insistent on 
attacking and annihilating Idealism. The whole problem rests on the 
status of the "independent object. 11 What gives it being and independence? 
Consciousness? If not, then it is unconditioned by consciousness and 
absolutely independent existing in its awn right. If the latter is true, 
what function does the "independent object 11 perform that is so necessary? 
Is it causal? Does it merely become the unconscious, unintelligent 
ground upon which intelligence places its feet? Does it somehow uphold 
all that is? Just why is it necessary in a rational system of thought? 
V. Neutral Entities. 
In analyzing critically Perry's doctrine of "neutral entities" 
we will ask a fevl' questions and answer them as a background for the later 
discussion. 
A. Are "neutral entities" mental? No, at least not inherently so, 
at all. Perry claims that mental relations or aspects are included in 
his theory. 
B. Are "neutral entities" physical? I think Perry would ansv1er, 
"No" although a causal observer would be inclined to classify them under 
a materialistic heading rather than the mentalistic. At least they seem 
to be independent of the subject. 
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C. Neutral entities are held to be neither mental or physical but 
rather as the label implies, neutral. 
D. Do they exist or subsist? Perry's anmverwould probably be that 
I 
they subsist. However, they seem to be the pulverized, a tomic, simple d 
I
I 
ground for everything. There are statements by Perry which indicate that 
these entities are 11nowhere 11 but come into being when they become 
"relationships " a meaning of their own which they possessed before they 
became related. But Perry's denies them existence in space and time. 
E. Vfuy are Neutral Entities needed by Perry? Perry considers two 
kinds of dualisms, namely, the dualism of mind and body and the dualism 
He says, 11The theory 
of immanence escapes these dualisms by employing the notion of relation I 
He endeavors to make his position II 
I 
of thought and thing. How does he overcome these? 
in place of the notion of substance."1 
clearer by using an illustration which he thinks explains the validity of 
his theory of relations. The residents of the United States, he calls 
to our attention, are divided into sexes, political parties, races, 
religious groups, ages, etc. These groups do not possess their members 
exclusively, but share their members . The difference betv1een any two 
groups is not a difference in members but a difference in principle of 
organization. Perry applies this illustration to the dualism of mind 
I 
I 
and body and of idea and object. In other words, the difference between 
mind and body and thought and thing is a difference in the principle of 
organization or relation. 
1. Perry, PPT, 308. 
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In criticism of Perry's illustration, I think it is fallacious in 
that the perso1n1el of a political group and the personnel of a religious 
group are composed of the same kind of individuals both before and after 
their mutual affiliation in the group. The principle of organization 
does no·l; in any sense make them anything but human. It does not trans-
form them into something else. It does not make them something neither 
religious nor political. If the political group had been made up of 
devils and the religious group of angels and the group organization had 
resulted in human beings, Perry's illustration would have had some force, 
but as it is, in my opinion, it proves nothing. 
VI. Critical Analysis of the Theory of Neutral Entities from the Stand-
point of Experience. 
The realistic theory of immanence means, in the final analysis, 
that things may be, and are, directly experienced without owing either 
their being or their nature to that circumstance. According to Realism, 
experience may be expressed as, (~)Re, where ~ is that which is ex-
perienced, and Re the experience-relation; and where ~ is independent of 
Re. Perry claims that the term 11experience 11 may be used loosely to mean 
either~· Re, or (~)Re. 
Now to use the term 11 experience 11 to mean either of the latter two, 
I 
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namely Re or (~)Re, will mean to arrive at a phenomenalism or panpsychism, I I in which the ultimate components of reality are experiences. To use it 
I ::.the former sense, to mean what is or may be 
__ L= d not be experienced, will lead to Realism. 
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Perry feels that it is better that Realism drop the word 
"experience" because, he claims, it gives a disproportionate emphasis 
to an accidental feature of things. Re, for Perry is not necessary to 
things, but (;~) is necessary. In fact, it is (.!::,) that makes what we call 
"experience" possible and raises the entire question of relations. But 
granting that (.!::,)has an independent existence, it certainly is true that 
the mind which apprehends (.!::,) and which relates (~) must exist and be 
prior if (~) is ever to be discovered and have any meaning whatsoever. 
For (_~) apart from Re and M (mind) is for all practical and theoretical 
purposes about as significant as a vacuum or 11nothingness. 11 
It seems to me that the important item in the cognitive process is 
not the object itself but the active mind and the relation which that 
mind gives to the object. Perry says, 11 Re is not necessary to things." 
What does he mean~ Merely that things have a bare existence? 'What are 
things for? .As I said above, they are empty, useless and meaningless 
apart from a cognitive consciousness. In spite of this Perry does not 
want to have the thing or object absorb everything so he objects to 
Professor Montague's term, "pan-objectivism," on the ground that it 
suggests the correlation of subject and object in the object. This im-
plies that he wants to keep the subject in spite of his discard of Re. 
So he says, 
The expression, 'neutral entities,' will 
perhaps serve better to emphasize the indifference 
of the terms of experience, not only of their 
subjective relations, but to their physical relations 
as well. We need some such expression with which to 
refer to the alphabet of being, as distinguished 
I 
I 
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I from any and all of the familiar groupings which its 
elements compose.l 
The inference seems to be this: the ground of reality is composed 
of finite, atomic, bits of neutral substance (subsistence). (It seems 
to me in the above statement when he is speaking of 11 reality 11 and 11being 11 I 
one would have the right t;o speak of 11 substance 11 with reference ·t;o the 
Neutral Entities.) vVhen these neutral, infinitesimals are related to-
gether in a certain manner or in any manner they become something which 
is no longer, 11neutral 11 but ra·t;her, "mental" and when they are related 
in another fashion they become, 11materia.l. 11 It. is only a difference of 
relation and not of subatance. Essentially they are composed of the 
same 11 stuff. tt Thus both aforementioned dualisms are overcome and a 
metaphysical monism as well as an epistemological monism results. When 
Perry is speaking of the dualism of idea. and object he is in the realm 
of epistemological speculation and these "neutral entities" may be 
subsistent logical points of space or instants of time but when he 
speaks of the dualism of mind and body and reduces this dualism also to 
"neutral entities11 are we not justified in referring that these are 
more than logical subsistents epistemologically and suspect that they may 
have some metaphysical significance? 
The theory of neutral entities is one of many theories which cannot 
be proved and neither can it be disproved. I can see no real ground for 
its acceptance except on .the basis of an exclusive adherence to the 
analytic method. It is the position to which analysis might logically 
1. Perry, PPr, 3lo. 
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drive one. It can not be refuted except by renouncing analysis and show-
ing its non-rational character in a view of the whole. This we have 
endeavored to point out above. 
Of course no neutral entities have been scientifically discovered in 
the laboratory. They couldn't be discovered anyway because all we know 
I 
is mind and matter and have no faculty for apperceiving anything which i~ ~~ 
not one or the other. I presume Perry could come back at me ~~d say that 
the fact is that we can only discover matter in the science laboratory 
and cannot 11 put our hand on mind" any more than we can put his "neutral 
entities 11 under a microscope. At any rate there seems to be no proof of 
"neutral entities." We do have evidence of mind but Perry and Neo-
Realists seem to stand alone as far as having any experience with 
entities." For all practical and coherent purposes I think it is better 
to 11muddle along" with mind and matter and hope for a light which will 
help us out of our 11muddle 11 more clearly than the darker solution of 
"neutral entities." 
The Nation, in an article appearing shortly after Perry's Present 
Philosophical tendencies came from the press, made a comment on dualisms 
and their solution saying, 
The New-Realism repudiates dualisms and regards 
reality as made up of elements of one kind only which 
may or may not, at any given moment, form part of the 
content of mind. It would seem that these 'neutral 
entities' belong rather to fancy than to philosophy.l 
Although I was not impressed with the philosophical ability of the 
1. E.B., The Nation, 95(Sept. 26, 1912), 285. 
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Nation, replied in the Journal of Philosophy as follows; 
1'h,e Nation has the hardihood t o accuse me of 
dogmatism because I say that 'consciousness is a 
selective response to a preexisting and independently 
existing environment.' 1'I'he independent existing 
environment,' my critic proceeds, 'independent be it 
remembered, not only of your mind and mine, but of 
all mind, and essentially non-psychical---has to be 
assumed or dogmatically asserted, if it is to be had 
at all. Doubtless these neutral entities may exist. 
B~~ we have as yet been offered not a single reason 
for supposing that they do. 1 'rhis is too bad. 
After having painfully elaborated my evidence for 
definite consciousness as I do, to be accused of 
dog;matic assertion by one who pays no attention to 
the evidence. After having carefully explained why 
I regard the definition of consciousness as decisive 
in the matter of dependence or independence of things 
on consciousness to have it coolly asserted that I 
have not offered a single reason for supposing the 
existence of independent entities. Such criticism 
is as impertinent as it is futile.l 
You will note in the above long quotation that Perry mentions the 
fact that he has given reasons for the existence of "independent entities.!' 
I run aware of the fact that he has argued at length for the existence 
of the independent object but this is something -quit;e different than his 
"neutral entities. " In the heated verbal battle between the Nation and 
Perry, where more heat than light is evidenced, my sympathies are with 
the Nation if I understand the problem at all. I am under the distinct 
impression from Perry's argument that the object exists while the 
"entities" subsist. In the article above Perry talks about 11existence 11 
1. Perry, Jour. Phil., 10(1913), 463. 
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of independent entities. · But in another passage in another book he says, 
The Realist must be satisfied to say that in 
the last analysis the elements of experience are 
not anywhere; they simply are what they are. They 
find a place when they enter into relationships; but 
they bring into these relationships a character which 
they possess qui-te-- independently and by themselves.! 
'rhis seems to me to be a very bare, empty and unsatisfactory solution of 
a ver~y difficult problem. 
VII. Concerning the Cardinal Principle of Nee-Realism and its bearing 
on a Theory of Relations . 
Perry says, "It would not, I think, be far from the truth to 
say that the cardinal principle of Nee-Realism is the independence of 
the innnanent. 11 2 1'he Theory of Independence means, "that things may 
be, and are, directly experienced without mving either their being or 
their nature to t hat circumstru1ce . 11 3 In a previous discussion I have 
dealt primarily with the independence of the thing from consciousness. 
In the present discussion I desire to raise the question of relations. 
We have , for example, many independent objects, all independent in their 
own right from any cognitive consciousness. The question I now raise 
is: How are they related to each other and to minds? Is the relation-
ship internal or external? Do the relations penetrate and possess their 
terms without destroying them? Or, are the relations held to be external 
l. Perry, PPT, 316. 
L 2. Ibid., 315. 3 . Ibid . 
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and extrinsic to the terms of the relation? Perry says: 
The most general argument for Realism is an applica-
tion of the theo~r of the external or extrinsic character 
of relations. According to the theory of externality 
of relations, terms acquire from their new relations 
an added character; which does not either condition or 
necessarily alter, the character which they already 
possess.l 
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.1'o illus-trate: here is term A and term B, both independent objects. I: 
1'hey become related and this relation causes both A and B to acquire I 
"an added character" which does not condition or alter the character 
which either A or B had before they became related. 'l'his "relation" 
which I shall call R has the power to bring meaning to both A and B. 
According to Realism there is no intrinsic or internal relation ·within 
the terms, in this case A and B. 'rhe relation is extrinsic and external 
to them. 
My point and criticism is this: does not R become a third independ-
ent term? If so, then there must be a relation between R and A and 
between R and B so that we have: 
·rerm (1) 
A 
Relation 
R 
Term 
(3) 
Term (2) 
B 
I 
Then is it not logical if you maintain the external view of relations 
to insert two more terms as follows: 
•rerm (1) Relation Term (2) ,I d 
A R-3 R R- 2 I 
Term (4) Term ~ 3) Term ( 5) I 
I 1. Ferry, PPT, 315 . 
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In other words, there is no way to bridge the gap between terms 
and we have a world of independent beings with no connection or relation. 
We might escape this, as Royce suggests, by making relations to be 
internal and the World to be One, but when you do this you have destroyed 
the essential thesis of Realism. Is it possible to explain the unity and 
multiplicity of things in the universe except on the plane of personality 
which is an example itself of uni ty and identity in the midst of change 
and multiplicity? 
VIII. Statement of Conclusions of this Chapter. 
A. Perry's "common errors 11 are no more applicable to Idealism than 
to other systems of thought including Nee-Realism. 
B. Realists are just as much "victimized" by the "ego-centric pre-
dicament" as Idealists. 
c. All philosophies start from presuppositions concerning either 
(1) nature, (2) God or (3) man. The Realists start with (1), the 
Absolute Idealists with (2) and Pragmatists end Personal Idealists with 
(3). It seems to me tha~ (3) is the most logical starting place. ~~en 
for Realism, man must exist in order to understand nature. In other 
words, man's mind interprets nature so that theoretically the Realist 
:rnay start from nature but practically he gets to nature from mind. 
D. The method of introspection is discarded by Perry for the 
method of observation without sufficient reason. 
E. It is impossible for the outside observer to know my idea. 
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F. Know-ledge is not immediate. All knowledge is mediated with the J 
possible exception of the knowledge of the self. 
G. Epistemological monism gives no explanation of error. The II 
"theory of immanence" makes error an impossibility. 
H. 1'he successful annihilation of Idealism would not necessarily 
establish Healism. 
I. 'J.'he "theory of independence 11 needs some metaphysical explanation. 
J. The theory of relations making them external to terms makes 
knowledge impossible. 
K. The theory of analysis makes it impossible to find the cord or 
bond that binds entities into a meaningful whole. 
L. The theory of neutral entities seems to me to be a fruitless and 
unwarranted hypothesis. 
1he above are my conclusions after this long exegesis. 1f'ie shall now 
turn to the problem of what meaning the above has for Personality. 
IX. Contributions, Effects and Inferences of Perry's Epistemology on 
Personality in the Light of the Previous Discussion. 
The treatment of Perry's philosophical system in Chapter 'l'hree 
and particularly his Epistemology thus far in Chapter Four has been 
rather long and we ·crust thorough. Criticisms have been made at length 
throughout the discussion. In this section it is my purpose merely to 
summarize briefly epistemological conclusions and show their relation 
to Personality without argument and in a tabulated form. Where both 
Epistemology a.11d Metaphysics are involved the Metaphysical implications I 
will be reserved for more complete treatment in Chapter Five. ~ 
A. Epistemology, Reality and Personality. 
For Perry, and Nee-Realists in general, Epistemology, (1) 
"does not affect reality," (2) "does not showwhat knowledge is possible," 
or (3) how knowledge is possible," (4) "throws no light upon the existent 
world," (5) "gives no theory of reality, 11 and ( 6 ) "solves no metaphysical 
problems." If we limit Bpistemology so drastically we can expect little 
or no help in formulating a theory of personality from Perry's episte-
mological point of view. Philosophers, as a whole I ·think, have usually 
considered that Epistemology dealt with such questions as, ~vnat can I 
Jmovt? How can I lmow it? By whom is it known? and How can Knowledge 
be transw~tted to another? rhese questions plus any metaphysical implica-
tions necessary for any particular philosophical system has been the 
field of Epistemology. 
B. Epistemology, Logic and Psychology. 
In the New Realism, Marvin says, 
The theory of kn~Iledge is one of the special 
sciences, that it studies knowledge as a natural 
event and in virtually the same way and by the same 
vmy and by the same methods as biology studies life, 
or physics, light.l 
Bpistemology, then, is a science. Does it have a distinct field of its 
ovm such as physics, chemistry, or botany? Evidently not, for it will 
apply to any of these fields. It seems to me that it has no particular 
value in Perry's use except as Logic and I am inclined to conclude that 
Epistemology and Logic are synonymous for him. What function does 
l. Marvin, HR, 50. 
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Epistemology perform in Perry's system that Logic vdll not accomplish? 
Bu·i:;--- in New Realism we note further that, "Logic, metaphysics, 
and some existential sciences are logically prior to the theory of 
knowledge. 111 'l'his problem in all probability should be referred to the 
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ne~~ chapter dealing with metaphysics but just an observation or two in 
in passing. Logic is the science of thinking. It connotes system, laws 
of thought, etc. If Logic is prior to t he epis t emological process just 
what is its status in Perry's system? The inference in the above quota-
tion is that it is "existential." Could it be that, although Perry does 
not claim to be a metaphysician one could hold to his Epistemology and 
still posit a Supreme Personality? f his seems to be a far-fetched 
possibility. If such a Personality is not the solution does Logic sub-
Or in neutral entities? 'iThat is '1 
kre they without the mind'! Just what is meant I 
sist in its ovrn right? Or in things? 
the status of categories? 
by making Logic, "existentially prior to a theory of knowledge?" Is it j 
existing in some mind or in things or in themselves? It seems to me that 
Perry is in need of some conception of Personality as rational to explain 
rationality in the world. 
If Epistemology and Logic are not synonymous entirely, what is the 
distinction between Epistemology and Psychology for Perry? Do they not 
perform the same tasks? ~batever his Epistemology is it seems to me to 
be limited to Logic and Psychology. It has not a distinct field of its 
own and leads to nothing beyond itself that is metaphysically real. 
1. Marvin, NR, 50. 
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C. Personality and Memory. 
In any Epistemology and theory of personality, memory plays I 
an important r'dle. It seems t o be the bond that connects the past with 
,I 
the present in some Personality. It makes a person unique in that "I" '11 
remember a former experience which "I" recognize as "mine" and also gives 
"me 11 a sort of personal consciousness that "I" am the s ame person who 
had t he experience in the past and am having another experience nm~ 
wherein tt r" remem·ber that experience of the past. 
Perry, as we noted before, makes a distinction between t he action 
and t he contents of consciousness and says that "It is doubtless true 
that a record of the contents of a mind is most conveniently obtained 
by introspecti on. nl But later we noted t hat he denies the method of 
introspection even as a means of knowing the so-called "contents" of the 
mind. Where then do such items of memory have their habitat? .Are they 
the contents of a ~~nd of a unitary, conti nuously existing personality? 
I can find no ground for such a conclusi on f r om Parry's Epistemology. 
He speaks about the 11 cont inuous history" of an organism, refers to 
memory as a fact but seems to feel t hat the central nervous system is 
capable of adequate l y accounting for items of memory. Perry's account 
of memory, in my opinion, is inadequate, unsatisfactory and non-rational. 
Must we not have a "knower" who knows and identifies these past ax-
periences as his and distinguishes between t hem and his present axperi-
ences? Is not Perry very near the position of Hume and is he not in 
1. Perry, PPr , 276. 
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danger of neglecting, if not renouncing, any unifying knower? He says, 
~fe shall find that it is impossible to find the 
conunon bond of things mental, until we abandon the 
introspective method and view mind as it operates in 
the open field of nature and nistory.l 
He further states, 
The natural mind, as here and now existing, is 
thus an organization possessing as indistinguishable, 
but complementary aspects, interest, nervous system, 
and contents. 2 
Interest is biological, contents has already been discussed and we have 
left the nervous system as the only bond to explain the unity of any 
organism and also to give any explanation of memory. 
D. Personality and Privacy. 
Perry's Epistemology leads to the denial of the privateness of' 
the self or mind. He says, 11The notion .of the privacy of mental contents 
rests mainly upon the fallacy of "exclusive particularity. 11 3 The mind 
is not such that it can have ideas exclusively its ovm. This is a result 
of Perry's theory of inunanence. 
E. Personality and Mental Activity. 
Perry's ~pistemology reveals no mental activity as such. He 
claims that when "the so-called experience of mental activity is analyzed, 
no activity-element is found. 11 Therefore, personality is not known as 
mental activity whatever else it may be. And further, those who hold 
1. Perry, PPT, 279. 
2. Ibid., 304. 
3. Ibid., 286. 
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such a theory are victims of the fallacy of 11 pseudo-simplicity. 111 
F. Ideas and Their Relation to Personality. 
Ideas have usually been looked upon as contents of a mind. 
Plato gave them ontological existence in a distinct realm. Perry is not 
clear as to the status of ideas in his system. It is apparent that ideas 
are not 11in11 a mind for he denies any conception of contents, contending 
that all contents can be revealed by observation and not by introspection. 
Activity of mind is also rejected. ' Vhere then is the locus of ideas? 
Are they in a distinct realm as Plato held? Or, do ideas have the same 
kind of subsistence as the "essences 11 of Santayana and the 11 qualia11 of 
Broad? Or, are ideas neutral entities? At any rate ideas seem to have 
some sort of a relationship to Epistemology which does not necessitate 
the creative activity of a mind. A person evidently is not the custodian 
of ideas alone. 
G. Personality an.d the Knower. 
Perry's Epistemology will give no knowledge of the 11 knower 11 
( 
apart from 11what is lmown" or "the object lmown. 11 .Analysis reveals 
nothing but contents and activity in the study of consciousness. As 
indicated above both are studied exclusively by observation. Neither 
the contents nor form (container) in which the contents might have 
resided is discoverable by introspection. In fact we can have knowledge 
of nothing comparable to what is generally regarded as Personality. If 
there is such a tlung as Personality, epistemological analysis does not 
1. Perry, PPT, 286 . 
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discover or reveal it. All that is discovered is something physical or 
neural. Perry says, "Mental action is a property of the physical 
organism, nl end "elements become mental content when reacted to in the 
specific manner characteristic of the central nervous system. 11 2 In the 
light of these statements we cannot conclude that ' the "knower" is some-
thing other than the nervous system. It seems unlikely that Personali~y 
is more than the 11lmower. 11 :::i uch at least is not the case if Perry's 
Epistemological position be accepted. 
H. Mind and Personality. 
~~hat lmowledge do we have of the 11whole mind wi thout? 11 What 
is the "mind without?" fuatever Perry means by 11mind 11 in this connection 
it is somethi:ng quite different than the usual understanding of the ·berm. 
Mind, for him, is not unitary, it is not indi-vidual, it is not the 
Absolute and it is not the sum total of indi-vidual minds. In conclusion, 
it seems to me, that when Perry uses the term "mind" he is using a 
familiar word but with an unfamiliar meaning. 
I. Personality is not discoverable as a "unitary whole." Such a 
discovery or assumption would be conuni tting the "fallacy of pseudo-
simplicity. 11 
J. Personality is not viewed as a matter of great importance for 
such would cause one ·co be the victim of the "fallacy of illicit impor-
tance." 
i l. Perry, P¥£, 298. 
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K. Personality is not looked upon as the "key" to unlock the secrets 
of the universe for by giving consciousness the place of superiority one 
is victim of the "fallacy of the ego-centric predicament." I 
L. Mind, or Personality viewed as mind, is not distinct from the 
body for to hold such a position would be to commit the "fallacy of 
exclusive particularity." 
ll 
I 
I 
M. Persol~lity is not to be viewed under only one aspect or one 
relational manifold for to do so would also be to make an assumption 
which would make one the victim of two fallacies, i.e., "initial pre-
diction" and "exclusive particularity." 
lif . Personality can not be assumed as an 11 a ll-general, all-sufficient 
first principle for to do so vvould constitute the 11fallacy of the 
speculative dogma." 
0. Personal i ty cannot be pictured in glovdng, high-sounding, elevat-
ing, superlative terminology for such would be the "fallacy of verbal 
suggestion or equivocation." 
P. No in.a.tter how se l f-evident the self or personality appears it 
is to conmlit t he "fallacy of illicit importance 11 to regard personality 
as of great importance. 
In conclusion, it would seem that to consider Personality as unique, 
unitary, individual, as a l01ower, as a creative factor in knowledge , as 
a substance, as an activity, as an all-embracing One is impossible from 
the standpoint of Perry's Epistemology. He has fore-stalled any pre-
suppositions concerning Personality by his 11fallacies," has denied 
any distinction between mind and body, idea and object in the process of 
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CHAPl'ER V 
THE N~TAPHYSICS OF PERRY AND ITS 1~FECT ON 
.i1. DOCTRINE OF PERSONALITY 
In the preceding chapters we have dealt ·with the Epistemology of 
1-Ieo-Realists in general and of Professor Perry in particular. We have 
related the epistemological positions taken to the doctrine of personality 
In the present chapter we will be concerned with the metaphysical impli-
cations of Neo-Realism in relation to personality. Before proceeding 
further and by way of introduction it seems desirable to consider two 
matters: 
1. '!'he Nee- Realistic so-called "emancipation of Epistemology from 
Metaphysics." 
2. 1'he Definition of the term "Metaphysics." 
To Professor Marvin fell the task of expounding for the school of 
Neo- Realism the relation between Epistemology and Metaphysics which one 
ma.y rightfully assume is the position of Professor Perry in view of the 
fact that he does not deny or modify the positions taken by Professor 
Marvin either in ''The New Realism or in any of his own published writings. 
In brief, the Neo-Realists assert:l 
1. Epistemology is not logically fundamental. 
2. Epistemology does not shaw either what lcnmvledge is possible or 
hovr. 
1. Marvin in Holt (ed), NR, 49-50. 
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3. Epistemology throws no light upon the nature of the existent 
world. 
4. Epistemology does not give us a theory of reality. 
5. Epistemology neither solves metaphysical problems nor is it the 
chief source of such problems. 
With the above limitations imposed upon epistemology by the above 
program it is difficult to ascertain just what intellectual fruit can be 
produced epistemologically. It rather forbids any knowledge of meta-
physics whatever . 
'i'his leads us to the second introductory question, namely, To what 
are Yie to understand that the term, 11metaphysics 11 refers and what field 
does it investigate? Originally the term "metaphysics, 11 ta meta ta 
physica, 11the (books) after physics," was the title given by an editor 
to a collection of writings by Aristotle.l This throws no light on the 
significance of the term for philosophical thought. Christian Wolff 
divided philosophy into the follovdng outline of special fields: 
1. Logic 
2. Speculative 
3. Practical 
General Metaphysics 
Special Metaphysics 
{ 
Ethics 
Politics 
Economics 
1. Leighton, MC, 1. 
rheodicy--Study of God 
Cosmology--Study of the World 
Psychology--Study of Wwm 
I' 
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Although the fields classified above are still regarded as parts of, or 
rel~ted closely to, the field of philosophy, today philosophy as a whole 
usually is divided into three great sub-fields of investigation. 
1. Epistemology---the Theory of Knowledge. 
2. Metaphysics----the 'fheory of Reality. 
3. Axiology-------the Theory of Value. 
There are some writers, such as Leighton~ who give "metaphysicsu 
the supreme place making it synonymous with the term 11 philosophy" itself. 
Others decry the study of metaphysics at all. Bradley's bon mot concern-
ing metaphysics is, "Metaphysics consists of finding bad reasons for 
II 
what we believe on instinct. 11 I think most Nee-Realists would partially 
at least adopt the 11bad-reasons, instinct" theory. 
In this dissertation we have devoted the preceding two chapters to 
epistemology, this chapter to metaphysics, and the following chapter we 
shall consider axiology. We are concerned only with the epistemological, 
metaphysical and axiological status of personality from the standpoint 
of Nee-Realism. 
In the consideration of the metaphysical field in . its entirety one 
would of necessity consider the relationship of epistemology and meta-
physics and the relation of both to axiology. One could not agree to 
the "emancipation11 of epistemology from metaphysics as readily or easily 
as Professor Marvin. One would certainly need to consider the meta-
physical status of values. In addition one who explores the field of 
metaphysics would be concerned with the relation of appearances to 
reality; the categories; likeness and unlikeness; identity and diversity; 
11 
I 
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quantity and quality; relations; order; the particular, universal and I 
I 
individual; substance; change and causality; value and purpose; space and I' 
I 
time; physical reality; life, mind, consciousness, and finally personality, 
both human and divine. The discussion of these problems would lead to a 1 
consideration of a 1tw'eltanschauung11 either denying such a possibility or I 
positing the world as One or as Many and of One kind of stuff, two or 
many. The denial of a world-vieW results in either Skepticism or Positiv-
ism. Affirmation that the world is One results in Monism; that it is 
many, in Pluralism.. As to the 11kind 11 of stuff of which the world-ground 
is composed the qualitative pluralist will hold to innumerable different 
kinds; the dualist, to mind and matter; while the monist are divided into 
three camps: first, the Idealist who reduces the universe to spirit; 
second, the Naturalist or Materialist, who makes mind to be an epiphe-
namenon of matter, the basic stuff; and third, the Realist, who makes the 
one stuff to be neither mind nor matter but a "neutral" something of which 
m~nd and matter and in fact all possible "stuffs" are aspects or expres-
sions. 
As indicated above, the specific task of this treatise is to consider 
the metaphysical status of personality from the standpoint of Neo-Realism 
and particularly that Neo-Realism of Professor Perry. He professes that 
the task of philosophy is, "to get at the bottom of things, nl 11to embrace 
the whol e of things, n2 11to determine the value assignable to natural laws 
1. Perry, DP, 17. 
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in the whole system of knowledge,"! "to correct the partiality of par-
ticular points of view by means of a point of view that shall comprehend 
their relations or transformations as shall enable them to constitute a 
universe, 11 2 and Perry adds, 11he is a philosopher in so far as the detail 
of his appreciation finds fundamental justification in a world-view."3 
The philosophers "determine for society what every individual l!Ulst 
I 
I 
I' 
I 
I 
practically determine upon for himself, the most I reasonable plan of I 
of an epoch can afford, 114 reality as a whole v1hich the data a.nd reflection 
while philosophy is "thought about the universe in its totality, or in 
r.: its deepest and essential character, 110 a.nd 11 is the knoviledge that compre-
hends the universe in its totality. 116 He further states that "the most 
adequate knowledge of which any generati on of men is capable will always 
be that which is conceived by the most synthetic and._ vigorously meta-
physical minds. 11 7 
All of the quotations cited in this paragraph are from Perry's 
first book Approach to Philosophy, written in 1905. In the light of 
l. Perry, Jour. Phil., 1(1904), 169. 
2. Perry, AI?, 33. 
3. Ibid., 41 
4. Ibid., 144. 
5. Ibid., 22. Italics mine. 
6. Ibid., 19. 
7. Ibid., 33 . 
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these statements it is safe to infer that he was more synoptic in his 
earlier years than in his nee-realistic period of thought later. However, 
in one of his latest books, A Defense of Philosophy, v~itten in 1931, he 
declares that the task of the philosopher is "to push to the boundaries 
of the universe, ttl which also is synoptic, implying that only as one in-
eludes a view of the entire universe does he have truth. 
From such noble expressed objectives and aims of philosophy one 
might justifiably believe that Perry would definitely include metaphysics 
as one of his chief pursuits. Yet Professor Perry seldom uses the word, 
"metaphysics 11 in any of his writings. One of the few places is in the 
last quotation where he speaks of "the most synthetic and vigorously 
metaphysical minds." In another place he states that Neo-Realism is a 
revival of that which has been referred to as the "antiquated metaphysics 
which talks about existence per se out of all relations to minds. n2 
In none of Professor Perry's writings is he engaged in the presenta-
tion of a systematic metaphysics. In his earlier book, 'The Approach to 
Philosophy, we find only an introduction with no positive formulation of 
doctrine. Present Philosophical Tendencies is primarily an attack on 
Idealism and the presentation of the Nee-Realistic theory of knowledge 
while General Theory of Value is purely the consideration of value, not 
a metaphysics . Professor Perry, as a philosopher according to his own 
definition, has not attained the objectives ~1ich he indicated for the 
1. Perry, DP, 16. 
2. Perry, PPT, 306. Quoting from Howison, LE, 21. 
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thinker regarding the universe as a whole possessing meaning and signif-
icance. It is di f ficult to find positive, definite statements on any 
recognized metaphysical problem. It is probable that Perry was right, 
not\vithstanding Professor Marvin's "emancipation of epistemology from 
metaphysics, 11 when he said in his first book, 
Rationalism and empiricism, realism and idealism, 
are doctrines which, though springing from the 
epistemological query concerni ng the possi bility of 
knowledge, may determine an entire philosophic-al 
system. They bear upon every question of meta-
physics, whether the fundamental conception of being, 
or ·che problems ~f the world's un~t~, origin, and 
_significance .I 
If Professor Marvin is correct how can one get from knowledge to 
reality? It seems that metaphysical skepticism or agnosticism is the 
logical result. What can we deduce from the conclusions of Perry's 
epistemology which will help us metaphysically? Scarcely anything. We 
might easily and hastily conclude that he is a metaphysical quantitative 
pluralist and a qualitative monist~ (neutral entities.) But, what does 
that mean for metaphysics? Does it warrant the belief in unique, in-
dividual persons? Does it posit a world-ground that is one and personal? 
Does it present any theory of the relation of persons to the One Person? 
The only answers we can offer will be inferential. What answers are con-
sistent with the rest of Perry's philosophi cal theory? Possibly we 
'I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
shall be justified in concluding that such a system would not warrant 
the belief in distinct, unique, sovereign persons or in a Supreme Person. I 
I 1. Perry, AP, 178-179. 
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It is the task of this Dissertation to ascertain the status of personality 
in Professor Perry's entire system. 
T}lere seems- to be a fundamental contradiction in the attitude of 
Nee-Realists to epistemology. On the one hand epistemology, as defined 
by Professor Marvin, is irrelevant. On the other hand, from epistemolog-
ical monism and the method of analysis, the whole metaphysics of neutral 
entities necessarily follows and therefore epistemology grounds meta-
physics. In such a system personality cruanot be ultimate. This problem 
;vill be considered more thoroughly later. 
I. Definition_ and Essential Characteristics of Personality. 
Before pursuing further our investigation into the meta-
physical status of personality in Perry's Neo-Realism, it seems necessary 
to define the term ttpersonality11 as understood by the writer of this 
treatise. We must know what we are searching for before we can be sure 
that we shall recognize it if we perceive it, otherwise we shall be, in 
'I 
I 
truth, subject to the derisive criticism of the "bad-reasons, instinct 11 ,I 
I 
conception of metaphysics. Vfhat are the necessary characteristics of 
personality? Let us posit them and then compare Perry's positions to 
these s-t;andards. Certainly it is possible and quite probable that Perry 
would not agree with our definition any more than we could find unanimity 
of opinion concerning the definition of "personality" at the outset of 
this dissertation. 1/Ye found there that some philosophical writers felt 
the term "personality" to be one of the most vague and .difficult concepts 
used in philosophy. In fact Professor Hoffding has said, "Personality 
I 
I 
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is the last, perhaps insoluble, riddle."l Professor Allport has explored 
the field studying the etymology and history of the word itself, listing 
some forty•eight definitions of the term as used in various fields and 
at various periods in history . He personally is interested primarily in 
the psychological aspect of the term. After considering and reviewing 
the forty-eight definitions, he submits, as his own definition of 
"personality," the following: "Personality is the dynamic organhation 
within the individual of those psychological systero~ that determine his 
I 
unique adjustments to his environment. it2 Here we might just note the 
following essential characteristics: (1) dynamic organization, (2) J 
psychophysical systems, (3) determination, (4) uniqueness and (5) adjust-
1
1 
ment to environment. 
Earlier in the dissertation definitions were presented fram 
Dictionaries and Encyclopedias. In addition vre noted that the essential 
characteristics of personality as listed by Professor Rashdall were, 
(1) consciousness, (2) permanence, (3) a self-distinguishing identity, 
(4) individuality and (5) activi~-. 3 Dr. Buckham felt that only four 
were necessary, (l) self-consciousness, (2) unity, (3) freeda.m and 
(4) worth.4 Dean Knudson differs slightly from Dr. · Buckham but needs 
only four essential characteristics, (l) individuality, which includes 
unity and identity, (2) self-consciousness, (3) free activity and 
___________ ,_ 
1. Hoffding, PR, 102. 
2. Allport, PER, 48. 
3. Rashdall, PI, 370-372. 
4 . Buckham, PCI, 12-26. 
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(4) dignity or worth.l 
Personality is no doubt the highest, most significant term used in 
reference to a hmnan being. Terms such as, mind, consciousness, activity, 
self, individual, organism, will, reason, judgment, emotions, autonomic 
ru1d central nervous system never mean, when taken alone, more than the 
term 11personali ty •11 Some of these terms can apply to objects less than 
a person but in no case do they ever mean more than a person. 
Before we search for characteristics of personality in Perry it 
seems advisable that we consider what characteristics are worthy of a 
place in one's conception of personality. ~Vhat are the essential 
requisites in a definition of "personality?" 
After considerable research and review of the material presented 
concerning personality it seems to the writer that there are nine absolute 
necessities in any complete and satisfactory view of personality. If any 
of these is lacking the remainder is unworthy of the designation "per-
sonality." It is true that some of these characteristics individually 
may be attributed to objects or beings not persons but all of these 
characteristics are necessary if an entity is labeled a "person." For 
instance, an animal may possess some of the proposed attributes of 
personality but no animal is qualified to be called a "person" unless it 
possesses all of them. Some of the characteristics about to be presented 
may properly be placed as sub-divisions under other more inclusive head-
ings and later we may consolidate them into four or five but at this 
1. Knudson, PP, 83. 
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juncture in order to point out clearly what we deem essential we present 
them in their own right and according to their ovm claims for inclusion 
in any adequate conception of personality. 
A. Uniqueness or Individuality. 
One of the prime requisites of a "person" is that he shall be 
unique and distinct from all other entities, be they vegetative, mineral, 
animal or human. A person is not a part of something else in a meta-
physical sense. He is distinct and individual existing in his own right 
apart from all other things and beings. Allport in the opening sentence 
of his first chapter says, "The outstanding characteristic of man is his 
indiv-iduality. He is a unique creation of the forces of nature."l But 
as indicated above individuality alone would not be sufficient to con-
stitute personality. Some entities are undoubtedly individual and 
unique but not personal. But no person lacks individuality. 
B. Consciousness. 
No being could possibly be considered personal who lacked the 
all important element of consciousness. Consciousness is the foundation 
or die Grundlage which makes later personal characteristics possible. 
However same beings possess a degree of consciousness who could not be 
described as persons. But no being could lack consciousness and still 
possess personality. Therefore vre conclude that both individuality and 
consciousness are essential in personality but are not limited to 
personality alone. 
1. Allport, PER, 3. 
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c. Identity or Consciousness of Selfhood. 
We now offer an essential characteristi c of personality which 
rise s one step higher than heretofore taken in asserting that personality 
demands the conception of an indj_vidual consciousness becoming conscious 
of itself as individual, unique and distinct. By the power of memory a 
person is able to identify himself as the same individual who existed in 
same previous instant. Although the cells, blood, bone, hair, skin, 
flesh and in faot all elements of my physical body may change every fml 
years, even my nervous system including my brain, yet although I am 
entirely nffiv physically and make a totally different appearance, I am 
conscious that I am the same person who ten years ago made a different 
appearance and was a different physical organism. I am conscious of my- I 
I 
self and my own identity amidst change. 
D. Unity . II 
Unity is usually considered in connection with Identity but I I 
believe there is a shade of difference which should be noted. I possess 
many physical organs all continuously changing. In addition I possess 
many activ~, changing mental powers and processes. Without, i.e., out-
side of myself, things are in a constant flux. But, to me, one of the 
outstanding characteristics of personality is not only that it is 
Individual, Conscious and is able to Identify itself over periods of 
time, but that it is the uniting bond which gives meaning and place to 
its many changing parts and powers. It is the core, the center, the 
essence and the unifier. It gives permanence to apparent continuous 
flu:x:. In fact, personality ·to me is the only key by which it is possible 
--==----=---===---=-=--=--=-=F!=I = 
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to solve the metaphysical problems of change and Identity and the Many. 
Personality is one and unites the many, it is changing and yet identical. 
Ther efore it seems that at least four characteristics are absolutely 
essential, individuality, consciousness, identity and unity. Without 
them all, there is no person. Yet there are other attributes which are 
also essential in distinguishing personality from other possible entities. ll 
As Leighton and others point out, a self might meet the above four 
I standards but a person is considered to possess some distinguishing marks 
higher and more significant than is usually meant by "self. 11 We shall 
now consider five further attributes of personality. 
E. Anticipation of the Future. 
It appears to me that vision is a necessary and unique 
characteristic of a -person. Just as memory serves to connect and identify 
the person through past to the present so vision by the unique power of 
imagination enables a person to project himself from the present into 
the futt~e and actualize ideals. He sees a goal; he imagines a needed 
change in society; he invents a labor-saving machine. In brief, he 
envisions the future. He perceives himself, though changed, playing a 
responsible rSle in world affairs tomorrow. Thus a person as with 
no other being is able to .mould the future, change his enviro:mnent and 
transcend his present limitations and inconveniences. No other being I I 
I 
I 
possesses this characteristic. It is peculiar to personality alone. \I 
F. Privateness. 
The characteristic of privateness appears to the writer as a 
necessary quality of personality. I am sovereign at least over my own 
===B===-=~=-==-----~-=-====~=-=-==-========================================~-=-=-=-=--==-=======~F====== 
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mind. I can close it or open it at will. No one can trespass on the 
premises of my mind. Neither evil nor good can come to me unless I open 
the door and permit it to enter. I agree with the old motto of the 
Stoics which reads, 11Let us stand steadfast in the faith that nothing can 
harm us unless we ourselves open the gate to the enemy." The privacy of 
my innermost person cannot be broken. As Washburn has said, "That the 
mind of each human being forms a region inaccessible to all save its 
1
11 possessor is one of the oammonplaoes of reflection."l Nothing can enter 
my mind which does not first have my approval and then it becomes mine as I 
I 
I 
i 
soon as it crosses the threshold. If such were not the case and it were 
true that anything could came to me and become part of me without my 
knowledge or approval it would destroy the whole moral structure and 
fabric of persoP..a.lity. The Scriptures read, "As a man thinketh in his 
heart so is he, 11 and 110ut of the heart flow the issues of life." The 
contents of my mind, the condition of my self and the virtue of my entire 
being are due to the exercise of my will in guarding what enters into my 
personality. If I rum not a being possessing such privacy and selective-
ness I cannot be held responsible for what enters without my knowledge 
or approval. Therefore it appears to me that the privacy of my mind is 
an essential to personality. 
G. Activity. 
A person must possess the ability to move or act. It is not 
confined to a static, immobile or constant place of condition. It is 
1. Washburn, Jour. Phil., 6(1909), 29. 
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ever changing# growing, progressing and acting. It is reaching forward, 
combating opposition and fighting enemies. Through this process it is 
expanding, strengthening and enriching itself. Activity is not only an 
essential characteristic of personality but also is the distinguishing 
mark of being in a metaphysical sense. Professor Bowne adopts this view 
of being when he says, 11Metaphysically considered, being ~s self-centered 
activity, without distinction of parts or dates. "1 Further he adds, 
"Activity is the fundament~! mark of all being. n2 
H. Freedom. 
Some thinkers combine Freedom with the· foregoing characteristic 1 
of activity. It is possible that they could well be considered together 
but there is a shade of difference in that activity an sich might be 
merely of a mechanical, routine kind but freedom indicates the high plane 
of morality which is essentially peculiar alone to personality. Freedom 
may be considered merely as psychological; freedom to think. This is 
necessary but more is needed and I believe it c.orresponds with the 
facts, namely, freedom to act after thinking; freedom to follow one's 
conclusions after reflection and meditation. We will not attempt here to 
present a long discussion of fatalism, determinism, indeterminimn or 
self-determinism but merely to offer the opinion of the writer that an Ji 
essential characteristic of personality is Freedom and of a self- I 
determining type. 
1. Bowne, MET, 25. 
2 • I di b • , 30 . 
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Freedom implies the possibility of various alternatives. No one 
could be free if there was only one possible course of action. Freedom 
requires at least two • . This means that a person must then accept his 
inheritage of freedom plus his endowment of a mental apparatus enabling 
him to weigh the alternatives and finally to place his entire self or 
person on the side of one alternative in preference to the other or others 
and act. Freedom is both a privilege and a responsibility. Because a 
man is free he is responsible. If he could not have acted othennse he 
can not be held responsible. It is this which makes possible good and 
evil. And this leads to the ninth and final essential characteristic of 
personality. 
I. Value, Worth and Dignity. 
Because a person can think and is free to act he can acquire 
value or worth. As one has said, . "Persons are carriers of value." The 
most valuable thing in the world is personality itself. Of what value 
is money without persons to spend it; of what use is a home without 
persons to enjoy it; of what value is an automobile Ynthout persons to 
drive it; of what value are books without persons to read them; in fact, 
of what value is anything apart from persons. Persons msJce things of 
great or small value. All things possess merely instrumental value. All 
persons possess intrinsic value. As Thomas Hill Green has said, "Our 
ultimate standard of worth _is an ideal of personal worth. All other 
values are relative to value of, for, or in a person."1 
1. Buokham, PCI, 21, quoting Green. 
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A person is the end, all things merely means. As Aristotle said 
a person is an entelechy. And for a person virtue is the highest good 
which is possible only to a conscious, reflecting free being. 
Our definition of a person then is as follows: 
A person is a con:sc.ious, unique, individual entity; identical 
through the passage of time; permanent runidst change; a unifying agent 
I 
experiencing itself in privacy; possessing the power of creativity through 
rationality, imagination, and the anticipation of the future; an active, 
free existent, the only carrier of intrinsic value. 
We now approach Perry's philosophical system to ascertain to what 
degree he is in accord with our analysis of the essential characteristics 
of personality. For the sake of convenience let us group the nine 
characteristics under four heads: 
1. Individuality including uniqueness, identity, change, perma-
nence, memory and unity. 
2. Consciousness -- including consciousness of self, privacy and 
anticipation of the future. 
3. Activity ------- including Freedom. 
4. Value ---------- including worth and dignity. 
With these essential characteristics in mind we shall now turn our 
attention to the following discussions: 
1. Professor Perry's view of individuality. 
'I II 
I 
j 
I 
2. An analysis of Perry's entire philosophical system with particular / 
emphasis on the status of the individual 11 lmower. 11 I 
3. vThat is the metaphysical status of consciousness in Perry's 
system? I 
~ 
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4. A brief account of the argument of Realism concerning conscious-
ness. 
5. Is Perry a _behaviorist? 
6. General conclusions and summarized criticisms. 
II. Professor Perry's View of Individuality. 
Because Perry has not v~itten a systematic metaphysics in which 
such problems as individuality, unity, the one and the many, change and 
identity are treated as sp~cial problems it is difficult to present a 
coherent account of his conception of these problems. About all that 
can be attempted is to present a passage from here and there of his writ-
II 
ings and make inferences leading to personal conclusions and interpreta- !I 
tions. \I'Vhen we come to the next section on Consciousness our task will 
be easier because Perry has specifically discussed this matter at length. 
Let us now attack the problem by considering in turn the following I I 
questions: 
1. Is the person for Perry a unique individual? 
2. If so, in what does this individuality consis·t;? 
3. \"ifhat unites or unifies Perry's "person?" 
4. Does memory perform the function of identifying the "person" 
through its various stages in time? 
5. Is the "person" of Perry a coordinating center or core such as 
-!' an individual self existing in its own right and thus solving the problem i 
'I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
of change and identity and of the One and the Many? 
A. Is the Person for Perry a Unique Individual? 
--- ------·1- - - - --- --
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An affirmative answer to this question is the corr ect one. Per-
sonality is unique and distinct. Each person is an individual in the 
sense that he is separate and different than any other entity in the 
worl d or of the human species. In fact no two human beings are alike. 
They differ in weight, size, color, complexion, disposition, desires, 
i..'l.stincts, aspirations and ideals. Each person is a product of natura, 
distinct and different from every other human product. Professor 
Perry says, 
We conclude, therefore, that personality and 
its prerogatives are peculiar to organic individuals . 
of the human species, or to units of life having the 
peculiar structural and functional organization 
characteristic of organisms endowed with a highly 
developed central nervous system.l · 
From this statement we are justified in concluding that personality for 
PerrJ is individual, peculiar to organic individuals of the human species. 
B. If so, in what does this Individuality Consist? 
This Individuality consists in nothing more than the "physi cal-
neural" organism in its separateness from other "physical-neural " 
organisms as well as any other entities. 
c. What Unites or Unif ies Perry's "person?" 
This personality is an individual and distinct organism. '!Jilhat 
gives unity to this _ individuali~? It seems to the writer that there 
I 
il 
·' I 
.i 
I 
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I 
are three possible answers, (1) the physical body, ( 2) a highly developed I 
central nervous system, or (3) an existent self. 
1. Perry, GTV, 435. 
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In the Approach to Philosophy Professor Perry makes the following 
statement which at least carries the phrase, 11 uni ty of our natures: 11 
But when we discover life for ourselves, we 
who make the discovery and we who live, are identi-
cal. From that moment we both live, and know that 
we live. 
Moreover such is the essential unity of our 
natures that our living must now express our knowing 
·and our knowing guide and illuminate our living .1 
!
1 This seems to imply that when we discover that we are alive and make the 
II 
I 
,I 
I 
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further discovery that we know that we live that herein lies the 11uni ty 
of our natures •11 I do not know of any way to interpret this quotation 
other than by positing a self who discovers itself as living and as 
knowing. However, I wm sure that Perry would not now agree with this 
view. He may have held it prior to the development of his Nee-Realism. 
We would be justified in concluding that the thing that unifies 
the 11 person 11 of Perry is not a self nor merely a physical organism but a 
11highly developed central nervous system, 11 on the basis of' his statement 
in 1924. 
Personality and its prerogatives are peculiar 
to organic individuals of the human species, or to 
units of' life having the peculiar structural and 
f'unctional organization characteristic of' organisms 
endowed with a highly developed central nervous 
system.2 
D. Does Memory perf'orm the £'unction of' identifying the 11person11 
through its various stages in time? 
1. Perry, AP, 6. 
2. Perry, Jour. Phil., 21(1924), 90 and GTV, 435. 
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In an early article (1906) entitled "The Knowledge of Past Events, ttl 1l 
Professor Perry analyzes the process by which past experiences are known. 
He always finds three terms and two relations in the recall of past 
events. 
1. An event referred to, containing its time of occurrence. 
2. The present time as part of some present event, such as a 
bodily state. 
3. Some further context. 
4. The external relation, known with, subsisting; transitively 
be~veen the above terms in the above order. 
5. The relation, earlier than, referring; to (1) and relating; 
to ( 2). 
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I I 11 Concerning; constituent# 3 Perry says, 11 doubt may be raised" as to its 1 
I' virtue but 11it is mainly through this further context that it is possible I, 
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to distinguish one individual's knowledge from another's when times 
present and past are the same. n2 Following this we have a statement of' 
Perry's peculiar position that, "It is not necessary to suppose that any 
given state of knowledge is peculiar to one individual, for it may be a 
conunon experience in which two or more selves intersect. 11 3 He adds, 
"In such a case the identification of the individual knower is possible 
onl y through a relation between _the given state and further outlying ~ 1 
context. 11 3 .And this significant statement, 11As a matter of fact, however, 
jl 
a total state of lalowledge is commonly if not always, internally unique. n3.J 
~ I 
--------------------- ----· 
1. Perry, Jour. Phil., 3(1906), 617-626. 
2. Ibid., 623. 
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In these statements we have some direct indications of individuality 
I 
and uniqueness even though privacy is denied in all cases of knowledge. 
What does Perry mean by a "state of knowledge," and "internally unique" 
and later the "cognitive manifold?" He means that the physical-neural 
organism in its living has built up over the years an internal fund of 
knowledge. But the vital question is: "What does the relating? What 
connects the present with the past? 'What identifies this "cognitive 
manifold" of the now with the 11 cognitive manifold" of the then? Is a 
"highly developed central nervous system" a sufficient explanation or 
do we need a unifying, coordinating, conscious self? 
As was indicated in our prelinttnary discussion of the essential 
characteristics of personality identity of the person at different 
instants of time seemed necessary. Memory was the faculty of the person 
by which one was able to say, 11 I am the same person who existed ten years 
ago although my physical and neural systems are completely new and dif-
ferent." How does Perry account for change and identity of his "person?" 
This in part is answered by the following statement, 
Personality consists in a type of integration 
or interdependence of interests such as occurs when 
the interests in question are dispositions or activ-
ities of one concentric and integumented organism. 
It is a peculiar autonomous system, or field of 
control, such as in the physical man is condi.tioned 
by one continuous nervous tract having a continuous 
history.! 
This is a significant statement but the crux of the matter is this: Does 
the 11persoE'1 condition the growth, continuity, unity and continuity of a 
1. Perry, GTV, 435 • It;a li c s mine • 
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"highly developed nervous system" or does the "highly developed nervous 
system" condition itself and in addition give full explanation of unity, 
identity, permanence and change? It appears to me that Perry's words 
commit him to the latter position. In short, his theory seems close to 
the naturalism he has elsewhere attached.! I 
E. Is the "person" of Perry a coordinating center or core, such as \ 
an individual self existing in its own right and thus solving the problems j 
of change and identity, individuality and multiplicity? 
Vfhatever explanation is given by Perry to these problems is found 
in his view previously quoted that "personality is a peculiar autonomous 
system-----conditioned by one continuous nervous tract having a con-
tinuous history." ,And another statement supporting the same position, 
"----but this is possible only through the identity of the nervous 
system. 112 .And further Perry states, 11the seat of personality is the 
neurally controlled cr ganism. 113 With this as an introduction we desire 
I 
I 
li 
I 
to take up more specific points and explore Perry's system more thoroughly ~ ~ 
III. An Analysis of Perry's Philosophical Systemwith Particular 
Emphasis on the Status of the Individual .. Knower. 11 
Perry himself gives a ve~J clear, concise analysis of his 
system in an article appearing in the Journal of Philosophy in 1909.4 
1. Perry, PPT, 63 ff. 
2. Perry, Jour. Phil., 6(1909), 34. 
3. Perry, Jour. Phil., 21(1924), 91. 
4. Ibid., 6(1909) 709-718. 
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for our search for personality concepts we shall give a brief resume. 
He approaches the problem through the epistemological door stating that 
in any knowledge experience there are four items to be considered. 
1. The person who knows. 
2. The knowledge which the person has. 
3. The thing of which something is known. 
'· 
I 
4. The something known. I 
I' 
Steps # 2 and # 4 are essentially epistemological matters while # 1 and 
=If: 3 are primarily metaphysical~ In a previous chapter we have presented 11 
and criticized# 4 which is Perry's doctrine of the "independence of the 
object." The object is not dependent upon its being knovm the opposite 
of which he claims is the central thesis of Idealism. But =//= 1, the 
person who knows, is our immediate concern in this chapter. 
Does Perry give the subject of his knowing process the same meta-
physical independence which he ascribes to the objec·t? Apparently not. 
The following table will help us get a clearer conception of Perry's 
system in relat ion to other philosophical schools of thought .1 
1. Objective Idealism-------(EM) (OI) (PI) 
2. Subjective Idealism------(EM) (or) (PR) 
3. Realism------------------(EI\<1) (OR) (PI) 
4 . ~nosticis.m--------------(EM) (OR) (PR) 
5 --------------(ED) (OI) (PI) 
1. Perry, Jour. Phil., 6(1909) 709 ff. 
'I 
1: 
I' 
\I 
IJ II 
I 
-~ ------·------·-
. -
6. ------------(ED) (OI) (PR) 
7. Leibniz----------------(ED) (OR) (PI) 
8. Locke, Descartes-------(ED) (OR) (PR) 
KEY:---
E----Epistemological 
0----0ntological 
P----Psychological 
M----Monism 
D----Duali sm 
R----Realism 
I---- Idealism 
------ -
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It vdll not be necessary here to define EM (epistemological Monism) 
or ED (epistemological dualism) because they have been discussed at 
length in earlier chapters while here we are interested primarily in 
metaphysics. We are interested in what Perry means by OI (ontological 
idealism), OR (ontological realism), PI (psychological idealism) and 
PR (psychological realism). 
There are two an~ers to the question, What is the relation between 
the thing (4) and what is known of it (3). One is Ontological Idealism 
and the other is Ontological Realism. By Ontological Idealism Professor 
Perry means the theory that contends that eyery item in the world must 
be known in order to be. The thing is what is known of it together with 
something more. Is the something more also something known? Is the 
nature of the thing constituted by, or its existence conditioned on, its 
being known? The affirmative an~er is Ontological Idealism. The 
opposite doctrine, namely, that the thing is independent of its being 
knmvn is called Ontological Realism. 
Vfuen we come to the question, 'Nhat is the relation between the person 
(1) and his knowledge (2) we also find two answers possible. Psychological 
------
--------
-------- ---
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Idealism contends that the person necessarily involves his knowing some-
thing. He may be the series of his sensations, the sum of his perceptions 
the development of his ideas, or any sort of specific organization of 
which his content of mind is an integral part. Psychological Realism 
holds that the person is definable independently of his lcnowing. Perry 
says, "This doctrine may assume forms ranging all the way from 
spiri tualis:m to materialism, 11 and further, "the person may be defined 
as indivisible soul-entity, as well as activity, as energy or as body."l 
Epistemological Monist and a Psychological Idealist. He says, 
Such a. doctrine would assert that while a thing 
is not conditioned by its being known, nevertheless, 
in so far as it is known it is distributively 
identical with the knowledge of it; and that the 
person must be defined as an organization into which 
knowledge enters as an essential component.2 
Observations and Criticisms. 
(a). It is strange that Perry should so strongly espouse 
Ontological Realism denying Ontological Idealism regarding the "thing" 
or "object" and then support Psychological Idealism and deny Psychological 
Realism regarding the 11person11 or "subject." He is a Realist regarding 
the "thing" and an Idealist (using his definition) regarding the "person." 
In other words, the "thing" is independently existing which is the 
"object" but the 11 person11 which is the "subjeot 11 is denied independence. 
This position to me seems inconsistent and illogical. 
1. Perry, Jour. Phil., 6(1909), 714. 
2. Ibid., 716. 
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(b). In his classification of possible philosophical systems 
Professor Perry leaves two vacancies and I merely observe that Personal-
ism as held by Bovme, Brightman, Knudson, Flewelling and others could 
have been inserted in place 1/= 6 which advocates ED (epistemological 
dualism), OI (ontological idealism) and PR (psychological realism). 
(c). In enswering the question of the general heading of this 
section of the dissertation we conclude that Perry's 11 person11 is not a 
coordinating center or core, such as an individual self existing in its 
own right. His conception of the individuality of the person is no more 
than a single physical organism possessing a "highly developed central 
nervous system." 
Vfe shall now proceed to the major problem of this entire chapter, 
What is consciousness in Perry's system and how does it affect one's 
view of Personality? 
IV. What is the Metaphysical Status of Consciousness in Perry's System? 
Professor Perry says, "There is no philosophical term at once 
so popular and so devoid of standard meaning .as 'consciousness.' 111 He 
is probably correct for we do hear of the object of consciousness and 
the subject of consciousness, and the union of the two in self-conscious-
ness; of the private consciousness, the social consciousness, and the 
transcendental consciousness; the inner and the outer, the higher and 
the lower, the temporal and the eternal consciousness; the activity and 
1. Perry, Psych. Rev., 11(1940), 282. 
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the state of consciousness. What is the common meaning, if any, of the 
term 11 consciousness? 11 Many claim that the term is indefinable. But 
surely we must kn~1 what is meant if we are to obtain clarity in conclu-
sions. 
First, Perry defines consoio_usness in terms of relativity. This 
is properly designated as Psychological Idealism and is also known under 
the names of perceptual Idealimn, Phenomenalism and Sensationalism. 
Perry says, "This theory arises from the possibility of indefinitely 
extending the psychological manifold ."1 "The perceptual idealism of 
Berkeley announces subjectivity as an ontological, and not merely an 
epistemological principle, 11 observes Perry. 2 This he renounces as invalid. 
Sensationalism, Perry feels, scarcely warrants serious treatment 
because it is reduced to pure relativism. The Transcendental Idealist 
seeing the impossibility of defining objects in terms of relativity 
conducts the thinker dialectically to the conception of the Absolute, and 
as Perry observes, 11The sequel to my previous relativistic errors or 
exclusiveness, is truth or inclusiveness. 11 3 Corrected experience implies 
a last correcting experience; partial cognition, complete cognition; 
empirical subject, a tra11Scendental subject; finite mind, an absolute 
mind. Hence, being is definable as for a standard, complete, transcen-
dental or absolute consciousness. Perry dismisses this theory of 
1. Perry, Psych. Rev., 11(1904), 282. 
2. Ibid., 291. 
3. Ibid., 292. 
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consciousness on the ground that it gives no specific meaning, for where 
consciousness is recognized as relative what does it mean apart from 
that relativity? He concludes, 
But if consciousness lcnown as experience relative 
to a point of view, is not defined save in terms of 
that circumscription, then to retain the concept of· 
consciousness for a realm defined as free from just 
that factor of circumscription, is sheer absurdity. nl 
In Kantian transcendentalism the object can neither be inside nor 
outside of my private c onsciousness. Perry says, "The dilemma is 
solved by defining the object as apperceived by a transcendental ego 
which is the ideal cognitive subject logically immanent in my conscious-
ness."2 For those who desire a metaphysical doctrine there are two 
possibilities. It may be conceived that thought ceases to be distin-
guishable as thought, and therefore realizes being as independent of 
thought; or one may conceive successful thought as still essentially 11 
thought and therefore realizes only its ovm consummation. Perry says 1\ 
that Kant's phrase, "intelligible intuition," permits either interpreta-
tion with the former being the interpretation of Platonic Realism and 
the latter Post-Kantian Idealism. 
The Transcendental Idealist defines the real in terms of that 
activity, purposiveness, or category of objectivity which he regards as 
the most important factor of the knowing state. Perry says, "Indeed he 
quite frankly acknowledges that metaphysics and psychology coincide 
1. Perry, Psych. Rev., 11(1904), 292. 
2. Ibid. 
in the conception of the self."l 
"Self-consciousness, 11 Perry says, 11is introduced to terminate the 
series of relativities defined by perceptual idealism. 11 2 Perry himself 
disclaims this necessity by asserting that, "the term 'consciousness' 
has reference to relativity and exclusion within a world of reals, and 
therefore cannot signify a principle constitutive of that world 
itself. " 3 
Professor Perry concludes his article on "Conceptions and Miscon-
captions of Consciousness" by saying that it is the chief interest of 
faith that certain values shall survive and be consummated. He contends 
that if consciousness be either a specific or unique kind of thin£, 
"as certain so-called spiritualistic philosophers" would have us believe 
or a general form of being it cannot be centrally important in such an 
issue. And now we finally have Perry's position on consciousness when 
he says, 
But if c onsciousmiss be taken to signify 
selection within the realm of things, then though 
it cannot be the ontological first principle, yet 
as the most general category defining a self it 
1vill apply either to psychology or the religious 
aspect of metaphysics.4 
So, it would seem that Perry has renounced the relativism of 
sensationalism and the empty inclusiveness of transcendentalism in a 
1. Perry, Psych. Rev., 11(1904), 295. Italics mine. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 296. 
4. Ibid. 
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theory of consciousness which he declares to be neither. But just what 
it is is not yet clear and we shall search further for more light. 
Mary Winifred Sprague in commenting on Perry's article says that Perry 
concludes that the only way to escape from subjective idealism is to 
deny conscio~sness as a general form of being, and to regard the terminus 
of thought as a thing not constituted by that thought. Consciousness is 
experience relative to the self as distinguished from valid objective 
experienoe.l 
V. A Summarized Account of the Arguments of Realism concerning 
Consciousness. 
One of the most conoise smmnarizations of the Realist's 
account of "consciousness" appears in an article in the Journal of 
Philosophy in 1913. 2 It is so clearly in accord with the positions 
which we have taken earlier in this dissertation that I list the points 
made briefly. 
1. "Appear in consciousness" requires explanation. 
2. "Appearing" would seem empirically to c_onsist in a . relation 
located in, and exemplified by, the nervous response of the organism. 
3. H~r shall we account for diversity of appearance? By noting 
that the nervous response selects and combines these in a variety of 
ways. 
1. Sprague, Phil. Rev., 14(1905), 230. 
2. Perry, Jour. Phil., 10(1913), 462. 
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4. No light whatsoever is thrown on these questions by enveloping 
the whole in consciousness. 
5. Therefore this problem cannot itself be invoked as evidence for 
the theory of the universality of consciousness. 
VI. Is Perry a Behaviorist? Methodological or Metaphysical only? 
Professor Perry discusses at length the relation of the two 
nervous systems, the cerebro-spinal or central, and the autonomic. The 
for.mer regulates the organism's external affairs and the latter its in-
tarnal affairs. Ordinarily Psychology concerns itself with the former 
leaving Physiology to consider the latter. Where does the "mind" fit 
into the picture, and where the will and the reason? Perry answers, 
"Somewhere between the stimulus and the aot."l He observes that if you 
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are an introspectioniat you regard the mind as something that supervenes, 1·
1 
1: 
or hovers about the hiatus. If you are a behavioris~. you regard the 
mind as something that intervene:! as an arc or oircui t of the general 
causal nexus. Perry adds, 
When so regarded the mind appears as a physical 
complex which receives, transmi ts, converts, and 
give~ out physical influences, and which is con-
stantly changing its external and internal adjustments 
in consequence of its activities.2 
Professor Perry is aware that many will object that flconsciousness 
i s being left out." But he draws an analogy between "consciousness " and 
1. Perry, Jour. Phil., 18(1921), 86. 
2. Ibid., 87. 
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the old conception of 11 soul 11 pointing out that we thought that we could 
never get along without the 11 soul11 but remarks that we ~e doing nicely 
and will be no worse off minus consciousness. The f acts of both theories 
he beli eves can be retained without the retention of either the "soul" 
concept or the 11 oonsciousness 11 concept. 
The behaviorist he claims regards an animal reflex or habi t as a 
more elementary mental phenomenon than an introspectively discriminated 
sensory intensity. He believes that introspection does not present mind 
as such, i.e., as mind. Perry says, "Behaviori sm in the generalized 
sense i s simply a return to the original ,Aristotelian view that mind 
and body are related as activity and organism. 11 1 Further amplif'ying 
his position he says, "Expressed in more modern terms this means that 
the mental life consists of' those performances of' an organimn that im-
mediately involve the exercise of' its nervous system. 112 In his Paris 
addre~s Perry asks t he question, Vihat is Behaviorism? and answers as 
f'ollows: 
C'est-a-dire que l'esprit a tous ses niveaux, 
qui vont de la sensibilite primitive de l 1amibe 
aux processus intellectuals et meraux de l'homme 
m@.me, se trouve essentiellement dans les actions 
specifiques de 1 1 organisme nerveux qui, premierement, 
sont excitees par les agents physiques et fond 
d'une chose un objet en la choisissant dans le 
milieu.3 
1. Perry, Jour. Phil., 18(1921), 85. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Perry, PWA:", 144-145. 
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Professor Perry's acknowledged behaviorirun comes out more explicitly ! 
and more clearly in his controversy with Professor Calkins. In revievnng 
I 
Perry's GTV Miss Calkins defines "consciousness" as "awareness of 
experience, distinctively real and irreducible to bodily processes."! 
In her analysis of Perry's interest theory she accuses him .of confusing 
psychological and biological interests or making them appear as 
synonymous. She is determined not to reduce psychological interests to 
biological. On this point Perry and Calkins come to grips over the :! 
status of consciousness. Miss Calkins po~nts out that Perry repeatedly 
rises to the psychological in distinction from the biological when he 
talks of purpose, pointing out that he says, "the only purpose which 
we are permitted to recognize is a purpose which is psychologically 
existent and psychologically operative. "2 She further contends that 
Perry's doctrine of interest is psychological, in the sense that interest i' 
II 
means to Perry conscious enjoying, wishing, desiring, purposing. He I 
I 
also attributes to men not only the properties of "laughing and climbing 
trees" but those of "thought, will or interest. "3 The point Miss 
Calkins is trying to make and thrust home to Perry is that he repeatedly 
denies consciousness yet affirms it in his theory of value and thus 
appears inconsistent. 
In replying to Professor Calkins, Professor Perry goes the whole 
way with the behaviorist when he says, 
--------·----
1. Calkins, Jour. Phil., 24(1927), 578. 
2. Perry, GTV, 515. 
3. Ibid., 429. 
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There is, how·ever, no inconsistency 1mless it 
is assumed ·that the psychical does not lie upon the 
plane and in the context of physical nature and 
that mind is not a f1mction of the organism. 
This assumption of course I reject and the 
rejection of it i s so central an article of my 
philosophic cree.d that I have been willing even 
to call myself a 'behaviorist' lest pao£la might 
suspect that I make such an assumption. 
He goes farther when he says later in his reply to Professor 
Calkins, "I think that in the present state of philosophy the terms 
"mental, 11 "conscious" and "psychical" are so dubious that merely to 
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attach these adjectives to a substantive is no longer illuminating. 11 2 ' 1 
In a more positive rather than negative manner Professor Perry pro-
ceeds to inform Professor Calkins what "consciousness" is (to him) when 
he says, 
Trying to find out what consciousness is, I 
seem to find that it consists of characteristic 
activities of the living and neurally integrated 
organism together with the 'objects' to which 
these address themselves. 
But this does not mean that one has 'reduced' 
consciousness to the organism, any more than one 
has elevated the organism to the level of mind. 
It means both and neither. It means that one has 
substituted a continuity or progression for a 
flat dichotomy of incommensurable terms.3 
Having taken this position he feels that he has satisfactorily defended 
himself from the attack of Professor Ca lkins and concludes, 
One who takes a certain view of consciousness, 
to the effect, namely, that it consists in a 
----------· - -
1. Perry, Jour. Phil., 24(1927), 683-684. 
2. Ibid., 684. 
3. Ibid. 
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characteristic mode of organic behavior, should 
not, then be accused of denying consciousness, and 
of being blindly and basely ma.terialistic. 1 
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Once more Perry labels himself a. 11beha.viorist 11 when he says, 
I am a behaviorist---in the ante-bellum 
sense. Before the war a behaviorist was a man 
who construed mind as a. function, or a. way of 
behaving, characteristic of a living org~~ism.2 
Because of the fact that we have discussed Perry's theory of mind 
at length elsewhere it will be sufficient to make a few observations con-
earning this controversy betv•een himself and Professor Calkins. His 
main points are: 
1. The mind is a function of the physical nature. 
2. The terms "mental," 11 conscious" and 11phychical 11 are dubious 
and to attach them to a substantive is no longer in vogue. 
3. Consciousness is characteristic activities of the organism. 
4. Along with the "objects" to which they address themselves. 
5. But---he claims that consciousness is not reduced to the 
organism nor the organism elevated to the level of mind. 
It means both and neither. It avoids the usual dichotomy. 
,6. Consciousness is a characteristic mode of behavior. 
7. "Mind is a function, a way of behaving . 11 
Perry may be right in claiming that Professor Calkins does him an in-
justice when she says that he denies consciousness but my reaction on the 
entire matter is that when Perry uses the word "consciousness" he means 
something quite different than Professor Calkins means and I might add 
I 
I 
1 . Perry, Jour. Phil., 24(1927), 684. 
2. Ibid., 685. I 
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that most people mean when the term is used. Certainly what Miss Calkins 
means by "consciousness" doe.s not exist for Perry. His 11 consciousness 11 
is behavior and that which does exist is the p?ysical-neural organism. 
We are right back at the starting point of the debate concerning in-
teres·bs, and at the question: How do vre c ome to know that there is a 
nervous system? Ju'e there interests which are psychical and not merely 
biological? Professor Calkins claL-ns that Perry makes the distinction 
but when pressed denies that there is a 11mind 11 or a "consciousness" which 
may have psychical interests but does maintain the biological organism 
which does have physical interests. He claims not to reduce conscious-
ness to the physical organism but makes it something very vaporous and 
mysterious; it is t he behavior or activ i t y between the organism and its 
objects. Neither one nor the other. This reverts to his epistemology 
which we discussed at length earlier. We grant that Professor Perry on 
this point remains consistent with his general theory but that does not 
satisfactorily account for the metaphysical status of consciousness. For 
in reality for him consciousness is behavior. It is not that which 
causes the organism to behave. It is behavior. Thus consciousness is 
denied any metaphysical existence. 
Additional Statements supporting the argument above. 
1. Perry denies subjective existence. 
11But perhaps I should say that the Realist _c?.oes deny 
purely subjective existence; for any Realist would deny that there is 
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anything that is subjective through and through."l 
2. Perry abandons analysis of mental contents saying, "I am con-
fident that the nature of mental action is discernable neither by 
analysis of mental contents nor by self-intuition; that it is necessary, 
in short, to abandon the method of self-knowledge altogether and substi-
tute that of general observation. n2 In brief. Perry's method denies the 
possibility of finding the self within or without. 
3. Wbat is "mind?n 
'~ind appears to me to be a mode of response to an independently 
existing environment."3 
CONCLUSION. 
We shall here present general conclusions and summarized criticisms. 
1. The position of Neo-Realism is that things may be related with-
out being dependent on each other or upon either a finite or infinite 
mind. This is the doctrine of the externality of relations. If mind 
is denied the ability to relate and give meaning what is the "unifying" 
bond of knowledge as well as of being itself? 
2. Epis t emologically, for the Neo-Realist, everything is reduced to 
"neutral entities" which are neither idea nor object. Perry explicitly 
refers to "mind" and "matter" as. reducible to complexes of uneutral 
entities." YH1en one speaks of 11 idea11 and "object" he is distinctly in 
1. Perry, NR, 143. 
2. Perry, PPT, 283. 
3. Perry, Mind, 22(1913), 546. 
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the realm of epistemology but when the reference is ·!:;o 11mind 11 and 
"matter" metaphysics enters into the picture. In reducing all four to 
"neutral anti ties 11 it means that everything is thus reduced not only 
epistemologically but metaphysically as well. I can readily see and 
agree that "neutral entities" (epistemologically) "subsist" a.nd do not 
"exist" such as, instants of time or points of space. But from a meta-
physical standpoint are .''neutral entities" "existent" or "subsistent?" 
If they are "subsistent, 11 then what in all the universe uexists?" 
Can anything 11 subsist" unless there is a realm of "existence?" What is 
real? This is a fair metaphysical question. The Nee-Realist doesn't 
answer it very clearly. It would be extremely difficult and maybe im-
possible to prove that Perry holds to the "existence" of "neutral 
entities." Yet what does "exist?" 
If the "neutral entities" do exist what relates them and gives them 
meaning? Here we see the need of consciousness or better still, persons . 
Of course the Nee-Realist will try and explain meaning by 11relations • 11 
But are not "relations" themselves "neutral entities? 11 Wherein is there 
room for purpose, value and freedom in such a "multiplicity" of equally 
meaningless entities minus any dynamic coordinator? 
It would be helpful and enlightening if Perry would positively say 
what does "exist. 11 He reacts strongly against Materialism, for he says, 
"The defeat of Materialism is not to be regretted. ul He is opposed to 
Naturalism and in violent opposition to Idealism in any of its forms. 
1. Perry, Psych. Rev., 11(1904), 283. 
As a qualitative metaphysician we might be justified in labelling 
him a "Monist" (one kind of stuff--"nautral entities"). But what is 
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he quanti·batively? A Pluralirl? Yes, bu·b in what does his Pluralism 
consist? Certainly not a Supreme Person plus finite persons. Rather, 
just an unlimited number of nneutral entities" distinct and separate 
from each other. His system is a nsawdust universelt without either the 
particles having within them the power of cohesion nor a cordinating 
principle outside of the particles. 
3. Perry and Neo-Realism in general have no satisfactory theory of 
"causality. 11 In fact as Dean Knudson says, 'tit (Neo-Realism) relegates 
substance and cause to the limbo of discarded ideas. ttl 
4. Perry adopts Behaviorism defining mind as "only the peculiar way 
in which a living organism endowed with a nervous system behaves. 11 2 
5. In spite of his opposition to Naturalism it is difficult not to 
regard Perry's Behaviorism as Philosophical Naturalimn for in many places 
he refers to mental action as a property of the physical organism. 
6. The "unity" of consciousness is not a conscious self that acts, 
but it is "bodily action itself, 113 elsewhere referred to as a "highly 
developed central nervous system." 
7. Although Perry would contend that he is neither a Materialist 
nor Idealist yet I agree with Dean Knudson when he says, "The fundamental 
------------------------
1. Knudson, PP, 407. 
2~ Perry, PCI, 378. 
3. Perry, PPT, 285. 
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sympathies of Neo-Realis.m are, I think it may fairly be said, material-
istic."l 
8. Perry rejects the reality of the self. This point also is held 
by Dean Knudson. Such a denial renders impossible any explanation of 
unity and identity in consciousness. 
9. "Unity,"- such as it is, is achieved through the "highly developed 
central nervous system." 
10. Perry's "person" possesses "individuality" but only in the sense 
that a "physical-neural" organism is distinct from other similar organ-
isms. 
11. Perry's account of memory is unsatisfactory. 'I'Yhat is a "state o:f 
lalowledge" or what is meant by "internally unique" or a "cognitive mani-
fold?" These are vague expressions and non-explanatory as the means by 
which the past is related to the present in consciousness. 
12. Perry adopts Psychological Idealism renouncing Psychological 
Realism declaring that the "person" is not more than his sensations, the 
sum of his perceptions, etc. 
13. Perry accepts Ontological Realism in preference to On·tological 
Idealism maintaining the independence of the 11 object 11 as something more 
than merely what is lmow:n concerning it. 
14. Perry is inconsistent in accepting Ontological Realism and denying 
Psychological Realism. Why should the "object 11 be more real than the 
"subject?" 
1. Knudson, PP, 407. 
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15. With reference to "consciousness" Perry rejects Sensationalism 
because of its relativism; Absolute Idealism because of its completed-
ness and Transcendental Idealism because of its meaninglessness. 
16. Perry adopts the "relational theory of consciousness." 
174 
17. The Nee-Realistic theory of consciousness "seems to leave out 
'consciousness,'" observes Hoe~le1 and with him I agree. At least the 
lifeo-Realist defines "consciousness" in totally different terms than is 
commonly understood when the term is used by either the professional 
philosopher or by the common man. 
In this chapter we have been concerned with Perry's metaphysical 
conception of personality. At the outset we considered definitions of 
''metaphysics" and the essential characteristics of "personality. 11 We 
concluded that there were nine necessary attributes in a complete picture 
of personality vvhich could be consolidated under four major requirements, 
Individuality, Consciousness, Freedom and Value. In this chapter we have 
discussed the first two, Individuality and Consciousness. Because 
Freedom and Value are so inseparably connected we shall consider them 
together in the next chapter when we explore Perry's entire system of 
Axiology. 
1. Hoernle, SCM, 230. 
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CH.APrER VI 
PERRY'S AXIOLOGY A}ID ITS BEARING ON THE CONCEPT 
OF PERSONALITY 
INTRODUCTION. 
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In the opinion of the writer little fruit has been garnered from 
Perry's epistemology or metaphysics as far as the concept of personality 
is concerned. Y'lhen we step into his axiology we find much richer material 
At times it approaches the sublime as ethical theory. Man is given an 
important place of responsibility in a world conducive to the production 
of value. Individuality, self-consciousness, purpose and freedom seem 
to be essential characteristics of the "person" in his quest for value. 
The entire tenor of his axiology is quite di fferent from the spirit of 
either his epistemology or his metaphysics. One who holds the positions 
of the writer of this dissertation feels very much at home here, and 
finds within himself a definite favorable response to Perry 1 s ethics as 
a whole. The major question which arises in one's mind is whether one 
is justified and consistent in offering such splendid ethical ideals with 
so little, if any, metaphysical background. Is Perry's axiological 
system merely a counterpart of religious and moral humanism? Is it merely 
a social ethics devoid of a metaphysical foundation? Is personality the 
supreme value and the carrier of all intrinsic values? Do purpose and 
freedom :m.a.ke such value possible? Will a personality who acquires 
Perry's highest conception of value survive death? Are values eternal, 
surviving the temporal and existing in any beyond the physical grave? 
-----· 
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Are values worth fighting for; worth conserving; worth perpetuating and 
increasing ; and finally, worthy of immortality? These are some of the 
quest ions which we shall consider in the present chapter and the next. 
In t he present chapter we shall discuss axiological problems under the 
following headings: 
I. Professor Perry's General Theory of Value. 
II. Obse~ations and Criticisms of Perry 's Theory of Value . 
III. The place of Purpose in Professor Perry's Concept of Personality. 
IV. Professor Perry's Conception of Freedom and its Relation to 
Personality. 
V. Professor Perry's Denial of Personality to Society and its 
Implications for a General Theory of Personality . 
I. Professor Perry's General System of Value. 
In 1909 Professor Perry brought forth his Moral Economy which 
was his first systematic presentation of axiology. Following this he 
v~ote several articles for the various philosophical journals on some 
phase of value and finally, in 1926, published his large and more 
exhaustive treatise the General Theory of Value. Assuming that the 
readers of this dissertation are fanuliar with the elements of Perry's 
system of values we shall not give a detailed account of his position 
but merely present a resmne with particular emphasis on items which have 
a bearing on the concept of personality. 
A. A Brief swmnary of Perry's Axiology as presented in The Moral 
Econ_omy. 
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1. In~erest and Value. 
A~ the ou~se~ Professor Perry says that morality 11 is the 
one in~erest tha~ virtually represents all in~erests. ul It is ~he 
coordinating interest uni~ing all others. It gives meaning and place to 
all lesser interests. Value for Professor Perry is that in which we are 
interested. Goodness may be described as "fulfillment of interest"2 or, 
if desire is substituted for interest, 11 goodness consists in the sa~is­
fao~ion of desire."2 "Things are good because desired, not desired 
because good. 11 2 Without elaborating or discussing this debatable position 
we proceed to find that the "moral drama" for Perry begins when "interest 
meets interes~;" when one part of life crosses another. Here rises the 
11moral 11 idea according to ·which "interest allies itself with interest in 
order to be free-handed and powerful agains~ the common heredi~ary enemy, 
~he heavy inertia and ~he incessan~ wear of the cosmos. n3 Morality makes 
a plurality of interests an "eoonomy11 or 11 connnunity of interests." 
In the above, Professor Perry has spoken as if the moral situation 
were essentially a social one. But he says, "~he essence of the matter 
is as ~ruly represented within the group of in~erests sustained by a 
single organism, when these, for example, are united in an individual life 
purpose."4 
1. Perry, ME , 8. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 13. 
4. Ibid., 13-14. 
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2. Interests and Morality. 
Morality doesn't arise on the plane of a single interest. 
The fulfillment of an isolated interest is good for the individual but 
only _"the fulfillment of an organization of interests is morally good. nl 
But in addition to goodness there enters life at the moral stage a "new 
element of value, the rightness or virtue of an action" which is con-
trolled by regard for a higher or more comprehensive interest . 11This, 11 
Professor Perry says, "is the distinguishing quality of all that wins 
moral approval! thrift and temperance; loyalty and in-l:;egrity; justiceJ 
unselfishness, and public spirit; humanity and piety. 11 2 
3. Authority in the Moral Life. 
Professor Perry takes the position that authority in all 
matters of morality is not duty imposed by society, nor even God, but by 
man himself. He maintainsJ as Inunanuel Kant did before him that, 11'fhere 
is no authority in moral matters more ultimate than a man's ~m rational 
conviction of what is best • 113 Each person decides for himself what is 
the best and highest. Form here Professor Perry proceeds to the position 
that the higher interest possesses a certain priority in its claims. By 
higher he means greater and by greater is meant broaderJ more inclusive 
and more embracing than others. In other words, the more inclusive and 
universal an interest the more claim it has over the individual . He adds, 
11the goodness of action must be determined with reference to nothing less 
1. Perry, MEJ 15. 
2. Ibid., 19. 
34. 3. Ibid. J 
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than the totality of all affected interests, ul and "Indeed, action is 
not wholiy good until it is controlled vnth reference to the fulfillment 
of the totality of interests. n2 
b~ery action may be judged in two respects: first, in respect of 
its immediate return of fulfillment; and second, in respect of its 
bearing on all residual interests. He says, 111very good action will be 
both profitable and safe; both self-sustaining and also serviceable to 
the whole. 112 It is necessary to relat e properly these two considerations 
for either can be exaggerated thus producing vices. "The undue assertion 
of t he present interest," he says, "constitutes materialism, in the 
moral sense. 11 Such materialism is the forfeiture of the greater good for 
the nearer good. On the other hand, formalism si gnifies the "improvident 
exaggeration of ulterior motives." Formalism is the rejection of lower 
interests in the name of some higher good. The .conflict between .the 
material and the formal motives in lif e is present in every moral crisis. 
A materialist is condemned because he is not interested in the general 
good while the formalist, although good-hearted and we l l- intentioned, is 
ridiculed as impractical or the victim of misguided zeal. 
4. Classification of Interests. 
(a). The simple interest. This is the isolated interest 
not yet brought under t he form of morality. 
1. Perry, l'IIE , o7. 
2. Ibid., 75. 
II 
-==l:i=====-=--=-----==----==-=-=-=-=------=--- ----=---------- ----·---- ----
180 
(b). The reciprocity of interests. Here is the rudimentary 
form of morality in which interests enter only into an external relation, 
through which they secure an interchange of benefits without abandoning 
their independence. 
(c). The incorporation of interests. Here elementary 
interests are unified through a purpose which subordi~Ates and regulates 
them. 
(d). The fraternity of interests. The rational or per-
sonal unit of interest is recognized as fixed. 
(e). The universal system of interests. Provision is here 
made for any interest that may assert itself. This is the realm of good-
will. 
Each of these classifications has its characteristic principle of organi-
zation, or typical mode of action. From these we are able to derive five 
virtues: intelligence, prudence, purpose, justice and good-"'"rill. From 
each of t hase virtues there accrues to life a characteristic benefit: 
from intelligence, satisfaction; from prudence, health; from purpose, 
achiev~~~t; from justice, rational intercourse; and from good-will, 
religion. Not only do these virtues bring a positive virtue but the 
absence of these virtues defines a group of negative vices; incapacit y, 
imprudence, aimlessness, injustice and irreverence. 
By applying the distinction made earlier bet ween formalism and 
materialism, Professor Perry endeavors to show that we may obtain two 
further sets of vices. It is possible to exaggerate the principle of 
organization and thus neglect the constituent int erests, or on the other 
====== ------- - --------
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hand, to exaggerate the good attained by the good attained from special 
interests and thus neglect t he wider spheres . Therefore we may have the 
materialistic series of errors : over-indulgence, sordidness, bigotry 
or egoism and- worldliness. The formalistic errors are: asceticism, 
sentimentalism, anarchi sm and mysticism. '!'he above system may be sumrnar-
ized and seen more clearly by means of Professor Perry's chart . 
Economy Virtue. Value Negative Formalism Materiali sm 
Vice 
Simple inter- Intelligence Satisfac- ;I:ncapacit;y Over-
e st tion indulgence I 
Reciprocity Prudence Health Imprudence Asceticism Sordidness 
of interests 
Incorporation Purpose Achieve- Aimless- ~entimen- Bigotry 
of interests ment ness tal ism Egoism 
Fraternity of Justice Rational Injustice .Anarchism Worldliness 
interests Inter-
course 
Universal Good-will Religion Irrever- Mysticism 
System of ence 
interests 
B. Professor Perry's analysis of value in hi s later works, particu-
larly General 'rheory of Value. 
1 . Relations of Value and Interest . 
Professor Perry opens his discussion of value i n his 
General Theory of Value by saying that the "fundamental problem of theory 
of value is to define the concept of value. nl In order to do this he 
1. Perry, G1~, 17 . 
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approaohes the problem from the generic point of view. He will deal 
with the motor-affective life of the individual ; that is, with instinct, 
desire, feeling, will, etc. In order to refer to them as a unit he will 
use the term "interest." There are four possible relations of value to 
interest. First, value may be quite irrelevant to interest; second, 
value may be considered as that which evokes or regulates interest; 
third, value may be assigned to the objects of certain duly qualified 
interests; and finally, there is the simpler and more comprehensive view 
that value, in the generic sense, attaches promiscuously to all objects 
of all interest. Professor Perry adopts this last view. 
2. Professor Perry's view of the relation of Value and Interest. 
Vmatever is an object of interest is eo ipso invested with 
value. ".Any object, whatever it may be, acquires value when any interest 
whatever it may be, is taken in it, nl P'"rofessor Perry maintains. His 
famous and oft-quoted phrase is, ''Value as any object of a:ny interest. n2 
Value in the generic sense arises from interest. Interest is the founda-
tion upon which value is built. And this interest generically springs 
from the physical-neural organism. Its beg:i,nning is biological. In 
reaching h is theory of the relation of value and interest Perry has con-
sidered and rejected the three other relationships as recounted above. 
He defines value as, 11the peculiar relation between any interest and its 
objects; or that special character of an object which consists in the fact 
1. Perry, GTV, 116. 
3. I bid., 115. 
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that interest is taken in it. nl After submitting this definition of 
value he proceeds to show how interest develops biologically, pointing 
out the adaptations of the organism to its enviroma.ent and progress in 
development. He further indicates that animal s exhibit not only organi-
zat ion and adaptation, bu·t ~-organization and ~-adaptation. He sa;)'s, 
nThey not onl y act in a manner that is adaptive; but select an adaptive 
course of' acti on in consequences • 112 Subsequently, we find this statement: 
11 0w·ing to the capacity of memory, life is circumspect and prophetic. 11 2 
He does not attribute intelligence to all living things but does impute 
it to the higher forms of animal life. vrherever intelligence is present 
he claims there is an additional factor of the organism which causes it 
to be more selective than those being s on a lo·>'rer scale. But even so 
he says , 111'he explosion (action of intelligent being ) is satisfactorily 
accounted for as a resultant of two physically existing factors, t he 
int e rnal organizati on of stored energies and the external spark or 
trigger. 11 2 This explains the acts of all animals but in the case of the 
intelligent one 11 it seems necessary to r efer to the sequel as be i ng 
somehow in prospect at the moment when the action occurs."2 Intelligence 
seems t o bring a bit of a pause in order to achieve a forvrard view t o the 
end of the action, but still it is all on a strictly biological plane. 
3 . The Prospicient Capacity. 
The foundation of Professor Perry's ~~alysis of value is 
1. Perry, GTV, 124. 
2. Ibid., 177. 
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found in the following statement : "However he may have come by it, the 
animal is supposed at the moment of action to po s sess a capacity for 
prospicient_ly determined action. nl He acts not from what is or what has 
been but because of what he anticipates. And it is right here at the 
point of' the prospicient tendency that Professor Perry claims that the 
animal rises from the mere biological plane to the psychological. He 
says , 
The agent vi~«s the situat ion, whether by associa-
tion , inference~ or spontaneous insight, in the light 
of some aspect or relation t hat transcends given fact; 
and he acts according ly, that is, his acting as he 
does is determined by hi s viewing the situation as he 
does. Yle are now here clearly upon psychological 
ground.2 
Until mind appears Professor Perry claims t he living organism pro-
vides the context of interest b).lt we do not recognize "that specific 
type of organic complexity which is peculiarl y characteristic of human 
behavior, and whose diverse modes furnish the data of the science of 
value. n3 Spontaneity, organization, individuality and adaptation may 
serve to distinguish l ife in t he broad sense, they do not adequately pro-
vide for its moral, economic and cultural developments. And now we r each 
an i mportant step when he says, "That which is lacking in the strictly 
biological picture has been provisionally t ermed 'prospicience' and consist 
1. Perry, G~V , 178 . 
2. Ibid., 179. 
3. Ibid., 180. 
--------------------
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in the capacity to act in the light of expectation. nl Further he sa;jrs, 
Vihile this capacity may doubtless be traced far 
backelong the line of biological evolution, it is 
notably characteristic of man; and is that one among 
the primitive factors of life which constitutes the 
need of the characteristic human developrn.ents .1 
In addition it is noted that it is not enough that the human organism 
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contains internally stored energies what are released by stimuli from the 
envirorunent but the fact that "their release depends in some sense upon 
what he thinks. nl The animal organism is characterized by adaptation, but 
man is characterized by adaptability. It consists 11 in an ability to form 
projects, deal with novel situations, overcome difficulties and plan 
ahead. 11 2 
4. Definition of Interest. 
At this point Professor Perry is ready to define interest 
by stating that "An act is interested in so far as its occurrence is due 
to the agreement between its accompanying expectation and the unfulfilled 
phases of a governing propensity."3 A "governing propensity" is a de-
termining tendency which is at any given time 11 in control of the organism 
as a whole. n3 'rhis definition of interest he holds both continues the 
biological account of life and paves the way for the philosophical account. 
He says, 11As prospicient adaptation, interest may be regarded as 'teleo-
logical 1 without implying any breach with 'mechanism. 1114 But on the other 
1. Perry, GTV, 180. 
2. Ibid., 182 . 
3. Ibid., 184. 
4. Ibid. 
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hand, "the presence of intelligence, in the simpler forms of perception, 
memory, meaning and expectation, paves the way for ideation and judgment, 
and for t he more developed forms of will and personality in which these 
occur. nl Here it seems that the 11prospicient adaptation" is the connect-
ing link between the biological development and the foundation of the 
psychological part of our human natures. · It provides for upurpose 11 
without of fending "mechanism. 11 In brief, it appears to me, that this 
"power of prospicience 11 may become the determining feature of Professor 
I 
Perry's entire system of values. Later in our criticism of the system 
we shall have occasion to consider this more fully and relate it to 
personality. 
5. Determining Tendencies. 
At t his stage of the analysis Professor Perry uses the 
expression 11 determining tendency." Determining tendencies are 11 disposi-
t ions, unconscious in their operation, which take their origin from the 
meaning of the idea of the end and look towards the coming perception of 
t he object. n2 The "determining tendency 11 while it resembles the instinct, 
the complex and t he emotion is free from the primitive, pathological or 
catastrophic implications which limit t he r31e of these conceptions. 11The 
determining tendency," Professor Perry says, 11 is characteristic of human 
life in its normal activities and its higher and more specialized develop-
ment.113 Instincts, complexes, emotions and determining tendencies 
1. Perry, GTV, 184. 
2. Ibid., 202. 
3. Ibid., 203. 
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illustrate the presence in man of governing propensities. Professor 
Perry concludes that "we shall find the factor of interest or purpose in 
the modus operandi of these governing propensities."l 
6. Purposive Action. 
Professor Perry now has reached the following definition: 
"Interested or purposive action is action adopted because the anticipatory 
responses which it arouses coincide with the unfulfilled or implicit phase 
of a governing propensity." 2 Here Perry points out that 'William James' 
central contentionwas that selection is the essential and distinguishing 
feature of mind. James said, "Consciousness is at all times primarily a 
selective a gency.n3 But when Professor Perry proceeds to say that 11 our 
senses themselves are organs of selection" and that 11attention1 perception, 
thought, taste, and the moral will are all modes by which a man's per-
sonality and his world are finally individuated and stabilized," one is 
disillusioned of the effects of James' quotation and the apparent tendency, 
in this section of Perry, to posit purpose by a conscious self. It seemed 
that Professor Perry was talking about a person who did the choosing but 
when he makes his sense organs and other faculties all media of choice 
the word loses its common meaning for another which is new and in need of 
further explanation. Professor Perry states that 11this conative, exper-
imental or tentative character of mind, is amply provided for in our 
1. Perry, GTV, 204. 
2. Ibid., 209. 
3. James 1 PP, Vol. l~ 139. 
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account and ·without invoking any agency which is alien to the physical 
organism. 111 Does this mean that 11mind 11 or "consciousness" or "self" is 
part of the physical organism having arisen out of it or that it is alien 
to it? 
7. Interest and its relation to the organism and the environment. 
Returning again to the question of interest, value, etc., 
Professor Perry says, 11 Interest is a peculiar intercourse between two 
systems which we call the organism and its environment."2 'I'his peculiar 
intercourse or rapport is a function of all that affects either of these 
systems. Here we have an allusion to Perry's epistemological system of 
relations. He says, 
A given individual's present interest is on the 
side of its environment a function of the condition of 
the earth's distance from t he sun, and of the structure 
of the atom. On the subjective side it is a function of 
the physico-chemical constitution of the organism, and 
of innumerable remote biological causes.2 -
He adds, 11Man's interest in his world is a function both of man and of 
his world, and of all which either man or his world is in turn a 
function. 112 
8. 'l'he generation, excitation and modification of interests. 
The question now arises, How can interests be generated, 
excited, modified, limited or negated? Professor Perry answers this 
question by presenting four methods for the control of interests. First, 
1. Perry, GTV, 211. 
2 • Ibid • , 5 21. 
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present to the subject an object which will cause him to receive effective 
stimuli to an interested response for which he is already predisposed. 
Second, manifest or simulate an interest in the object yourself. Seek to 
arouse interest in another by e~>ibiting an unusual interest in it your-
self. Third, deprive the subject of the object altogether. Fourth, 
seek to gain the end indirectly by dealing with his other interests. 
'l'hese four methods of arousing and stimulating interest may be illustrated 
with four cormnon mottoes. First, "Give the people what they want ; 11 
second, "Show that you mean it; 11 third, "People only value what they have 
to work for;" and fourth, 11See him just after dinner." 
9. The Critique of Value. 
The ques·cion now be,fore us is this: What is that condition 
of an object in virtue of which it may be said to be better (or worse) 
than ru1other object, or the best (or worst) among several objects, and 
which would therefore render true a judgment of comparative or superlative 
value? Profe s sor Perry answers the question by presenting four notions 
which are employed as principles for the systematic gradation of values. 
They are: correctness, intensity, preference and inclusiveness. In dis-
cussing the first, he says, "the object of a correct interest is not 
ipso facto better than the object of an incorrect interest. nl But a 
"value founded on truth is not only wisely and rightly founded but is 
securely founded. nl This of course raises the question: Wnat is truth? 
Is it something apart from the organism or is it in the environment or 
1. Perry, G~V, 614. 
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does it have a realm of its awn? 
The other three standards of measurement of value, intensity, 
preference and inclusiveness may be illustrated as follows: ,An object 
wine, is better than an object, water: (1) if the interest in the wine 
is more intense than the interest in the water; (2) if the wine is pre-
ferred to the water; and ( 3) if the interest in the wine is more inclusive 
than the interest in the 1vater. 
10. The Highest Good. 
The supreme good for Professor Perry is conceived as the 
object which satisfies all individuals, when individuals are both per-
sonally integrated and harmoniously associated; and if this object is 
interpreted to mean the joint and inclusive satisfaction of all indi-
viduals.1 The hi ghest good is that definable ideal which, if adopted 
by all as an ideal would be best; and it is t he ideal ;vh ich is by its 
nature best qualified to be so adopted. ,An ideal should satisfy two 
important demands; it must be what it is claimed to be, the best, and it 
must be realizable. But this does not mean that the ideal must be in 
fact realized. It must be what we deem and approve as best and it must 
thought to be realizable. 
It appears that the 11hi ghest good" in Perry's system is happiness. 
Happines s signifies that life in all its aspects is auspicious . Professor 
Perry says, "The happy man has not[l..ing to hide from himself; all of his 
interests are prosperous; and he f inds satisfaction in a life that is at 
1. Perry, GTV, 686-687. 
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the same time well-rounded and wel l-developed."1 .And more specifically 
he adds, "Happine ss wi ll imply that a man can enjoy the universe, that 
is to say, the widest world which is brought into view by the exercise 
of self-consciousness, memory, imagination .and .foresight." 1 This is 
excellent and could be agreed upon by most all thinkers. But how is this 
happiness possible and by what means is it brought about and who or rather 
what is the . 11 person11 who is happy? 
11. A Classification of Values. 
In a postscript Professor Perry gives three classifications 
of values. First , the most aged, the trinity of canonized values, knovrn 
as "the True, the Beautiful and the Good. 11 This, may be called the 
11axiological 11 classification, Perry thinks. Second, the psychological 
division which assumes values to be functions of interest and divides 
them in accordance with the several modalities of interest or the different 
relations which objects may sustain thereto. Such has been the attempt 
of Perry in his General Theory of Value. Third, the historical classifi-
cation which adopts the divisions already made among the several moral or 
social sciences, such as, moral, economic, political, aesthetic and 
religious values. The axiological classification Professor Perry objects 
to on the ground that its psychology is doubtful. The psychological 
classification tends to be exceedingly detailed and schematic. He con-
eludes, "A fruitful theory of value vrill accept those stable and v;ell-
marked unities in which the values of life are already grouped . The great 
1. Perry, GTV, 293 . 
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foci of interest are science, conscience, art, industry, state and 
chur ch . nl Professor Perry has hope that now that he has examined the 
gener a l nature of value and elucidated the principles which determine its 
varieties 11 to employ these principles for the rectifications of frontiers 
and the establishment of order among its historically authentic realms ."l 
0uch , he feels, would be a proper sequel to his General f heory of Value. 
We would judge, then, f r om the above that Professor Perry has not 
had his last say on the n~tter of value but that in a future volume on 
ltealms of Value some of the perplexing questions and diff.icult problems 
;,rill be answered. Professor Perry is not yet an old man and although 
fourteen years have elapsed since the appear ance of General 'rheory of 
Value we trust that he may complete his exploration in the field of value 
and give the world this needed contribution. 
II. Observations and Criticisms of Perry's Theory of Value. 
A. Professor Perry's theory in relation to other types of philosophy. 
All objective theories of value Professor Perry considers under 
the heading , "value as irrelevru1.t to i nterest. 11 His own theory makes 
value relevant to interest but any theory which divorces val ue from in-
terest is objective. Under the heading, "value as object of qualified 
interest" he considers all theories that may be described as normative 
especially t heories of Kantian origin. 
Professor Urban says, 111'he general thesis of t he book (GTV) is a 
1. Perry, GTV, 694. 
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modernized form of British empiricism." 1 This conclusion of Professor 
Urbru1, I believe, is well taken. 
I 
B. Concerning the faculty of 11prospicience. 11 
The essential distinction betv1een man and the rulimal is the 
faculty of prospicience. Because of t his unusual ability to "plan ahead;" 
11to think; 11 and anticipate the end of an act, man rises to the highest 
plane among being s. Professor Perry clai ms that this faculty of 
11prospicient adaptation 11 may be regarded as "teleological" and at the same 
time avoids, "any breach with mechanism." This 11 prospicient adaptation" 
is "the connecting link betw·een t he biological and psychological." My 
criticism is this: ·what causes the "faculty of prospicience" to arise in 
one physical organism and not in another ? If it is neither biological 
•i 
11 nor psychological is it part of both or neutral? Because it is important 
rl 
I' ,I there should have been a clearer explanation of its genesis. In reality 
,, this "faculty of prospicience 11 makes purpose, cognit ion, freedom and mor al 
worth poss ible. It really takes the place of a conscious self, for it 
performs the func t ions which a conscious self would perform i f present. 
C. The Critique of Value. 
'I Vihy is one value to be preferred to another? If a certain object 
1 
I 
I 
I makes a greater claim on my interest than another object it follow·s that 
greater value is to be derived. Professor Perry maintains as we have seen 
t hat an object is better if it is judged according to the standards of 
correctness, intensity, preference and inclusiveness. He uses as an 
1. Urban, Jour . Phil., 24 (1927), 106. 
I' I 
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illustration, wine. If the interest in wine is more intense than the 
in·terest in water; if it is preferred and if it is more inclusive, it is 
better. It seems, ••rhen t his is analyzed, that values are based on inter-
est and that interest is primarily biological. Wine could be more i ntense 
and could be preferred to vmter by the individual organism and still be 
bad or lacking in value. Porfessor Perry might answer that if so it 
would not meet the standard of "correctness." Yfuen he does, he makes his 
11highest court of appeal, 11 coherence, r ather than intensity or preference. 
If he says that ;vine hurts the organism and therefore should be excluded 
(lack of inclusiveness) he has resorted to the "pragmatic criterion." 
It is difficult to ascertain just what Professor Perry's criterion of 
value is and how to apply it. If there is a conflict between standards 
what is the "hi ghest court of appeal?" 
D. Relation of Value t o Existence. 
11
'.Lhe meaning of meaning is fast becoming ·the crux of value 
theory, as indeed, of epistemology and metaphysics," says Professor 
Urban.l 'rhis statement appears to be true. Professor Perry however limits I 
"meaning'1 to the psychological sense, excluding all logical and meta-
physical problems. In the preface to GTV he says that there are two ldnds 
of philosophy, "that which cuts the Gordian knot and that which attempts 
to untie it." He professes the latter kind but, instead of untying the 
knot, has cut it, separating valua from metaphysics. 
Professor Perry's sy stem provides for the follmrlng all on the 
psychological basis minus metaphysical interpretation: the interaction of 
1. Urban, Jour. Phil., 24(1927), 108. 
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interest and mechanical environment involves material values; the in-
herent structure of a simple interest, desiderative values; the differ-
entiation of a simple interest, or reciprocity of tvvo or more simple 
interests, involves fundamental moral values; the reciprocity of moral 
interests, justice and free ideal values. 1 
~. Value and Consciousness. 
Value must be considered either as "extra-mental 11 or as some 
activity or attribute of consciousness. 'l'o make value to be "extra-
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mental 11 means that value exists or subsists independently; that is without 
the need of any consciousness. The question before us is: v1hich type 
of value theory does Professor Perry adopt? To be consistent with his 
epistemology he should adopt the "extra-mental" or independent theory. 
But when he makes value dependent on interest and interest to be the 
manifestation of some organism, one is throvm into confusion concerning 
the possibility of making value "independent." This confusion can be 
abolished when we remember Professor Perry's theory of consciousness. 
Nevertheless, he does make value dependent on consciousness for he 
explicitly says, ''Value is dependent on consciousness, 112 and a few 
sentences later, "value is dependent on desire. 112 This seems to indicate 
that desire is at least a part of consciousness. But Professor Perry 
has earlier adopted the "relational ·theory of consciousness" which 
contends that conscious.ness consists of relations among entities which are 
1 . Perry, Phil . Rev., 16(1907), 151. 
2. Perry in Holt (ed) NR, 140 . 
I 
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t hemselves not conscious . It appears that Perry uses the term "conscious-
ness" at times in the specific sense of his definition, and at other 
times in the sense of the cormnon understanding of the term. All this is 
com"using in analyzing his theory of value. 
Upon this non-conscious, non-conscious-purpose foundation Professor 
Perry builds his theory of value . Value is a "function of desire," 1 
and "desire" i s synonymous with "interest," while an "interest" is "a 
unity of life, 112 "an organization which consistently acts for its ovrn 
preservation. 113 This all seems to be on a purely biological basis for 
Professor Perry says in PPT, "I use the term interest primarily in its 
biological rather than its psychological sense."4 
If interest is primarily or generically a biological unit how can 
we account for it except in physiological terms? This really is the issue 
of the debate between Professor Perry and Professor Calkins which we 
treated at length earlier. Perry makes value dependent on interest. 
Interest is biological not psychological and therefore, physiological. 
Yet later in G1'V Professor Perry speaks about interest as if it >vere 
psychological . If so, how does psychological interest appear? Is it a 
grm~h from biological interest? or does it appear in its ovrn right? 
Ve do not step up to the realm of morality until we transcend a 
single interest and have an organization of many interests. Professor 
1 . Perry in Holt (ed) NR , 140 . 
2. Perry, ME, 11. 
3 . Ibid. 
4. Perry, PP'l', 304. 
----- -------- -------
197 
Perry says, "Only the fulfillment of an organizati on of interests is 
morally good . "l If such is the case is there any qualitative difference 
between an 11 organization of simple interests 11 and a single interest? 
That is, does the "organization" possess something that is not to be 
found in any of i t s constituents? If so, is Professor Perry not abandon-
ing his analytic method in favor of the synoptic where values are involved, 
particularly moral values. But is i t not a fact that in his system an 
"organization of interests" is only greater in quantity of interests which 
are similar in quality? This is sort of er1 "interest-atomism." But what 
is the binding power ,_and that which gives the group moral status? Unless 
the " organization" is effected by a consci ous self and given meaning it 
is only more valuable to the extent to which t here are more s imple 
interests. If an 11 organi zation of interests" is moral wherein does it 
receive its morality? From t he ttorganization" itself? · Do we not find 
here a weak link in Professor Perry's chain? Do we not find again the 
need of a coordinating, conscious existing person as the unifying bond? 
F. Subjectivity of Value. 
Professor Perry, as we have seen above, holds that value is 
dependent on consciousness. He denies the personality of God and objective 
values and yet he is a meliorist hoping for the final objective trirlmph 
of value i n the world. VThat is to triumph? If values are dependent on 
consci ousness it follows that consciousness must survive if values are to 
triumph. But if one denies the continuance of consciousness how can the 
l. Perry, l lli , 15. 
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meliorist have any rational ground for his faith if the thing which makes 
value possible is annihilated? And further, if, as we have noted, in the 
study of the metaphysics of Professor Perry, consciousness is behavior 
having no definite metaphysical status, how can value depend on such a 
non-existent? And finally, how ca.n one be a consistent meliorist unless 
consciousness is an essential characteristic of personality which persists 
after death. It is most difficult, well-nigh impossible, to relate these 
two antithetical positions consistently vnthout positing personality. 
G. Professor Perry's 'l'heory of Value and Personalism. 
1. Bot;h Professor Perry and Personalists make value dependent on 
consciousness. But Personalists make it dependent not on human conscious-
ness alone . Subjective value implies objective value but this objective 
value is identical with the pers onality of God. The Supreme Person be-
comes the synthesizing unity of subjective and objective values. 
2. Both Professor Perry and Personalists are melioristic. Both 
hope for the ultimate triumph of the good but Personalists place their 
hope in personality overcoming evil finally. 
3 . Both Professor Perry and Personalists posit freedom. But 
Personalists make freedom an important characteristic of the "person. 11 
4 . Both Professor Pe ry and Personalists posit purpose. But 
Perry makes purpose the result of organic prospicience while Personalists 
make purpose the objective of a free agent or person. 
5. Although Professor Perry posits freedom he provides no 
metaphysical home for it unless it be in a complex of homeless 11 neutral 
-· -----==-=---=::--====-=--------
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entities. 11 A self-conscious pers on is a suitable entity for freedom and 
its responsibilities, benefits and dangers. 
b . 1ben it comes to religious values Personalists offer a more 
reasonable accotmt than He o-Real ism; for Professor Perry, in PP'I', re-
pudiates 11 every moral and spiritual ontology. 11 1 His theory of 11neutral 
entities" offers little to worship and does not stimulate faith in the 
=#=====- ---·----
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entities. 11 A self-conscious person is a suitable entity for freedom and I 
i t s responsibilities, benefits and dangers. 
o. When it comes to religious values Personalists offer a more 
reasonable account than Neo- Realism; for Professor Perry, in PPT, re-
pudiates 11 every moral and spirit ual ontology . nl His theory of 11neutral 
entities 11 of fers little to worship and does not stimulate faith i n the 
ultimate triumph of the good. Personalism offers a Supreme Person worthy 
of worship, adoration and reverence; one ~~th whom we can work, f ully 
bel ieving that as nworkers together with Him, 11 we can make t he world 
better . 
7 . l'Jeo- Realism does not make personality t he home of values. 
Its t heory is impersonal or subpersonal, reducing personality to conscious-
ness; consciousness, to behavi or; and value to biological interest. 
III. The Place of Purpose in Professor Perry' s Concept of Personality. 
Professor Perry holds to the category of purpose , which is as 
Dr. Brightman has said, n t.,-a;-' E-sox.,-'11 the catsgory of personality. 11 2 
But we shall not investigate whether or not personality plays a s i gnificant 
part i n Perry ' s conception of pu~pose . Professor Perry explicitly posits 
purpose wh en he says, "I do not mean to exclude the category of purpose, 
i . e ., to suggest that there is no such thing as moral or rational 
causation. tt3 ,And again he says, 110ver and above these neglected properties 
1. Perry, PPl' , 344- 34 7 • 
2. Brightman in Wilm (ed) SP, 42 . 
3. Perry in Holt (ed) NR, 110. 
----
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of ticings there remain the purposive activit~es of thought. It is 
equally preposterous to deny them and to describe them in mechanical 
terms . "l .And in a more popular vein writing in the Atlantic Monthly he 
says, 
I wonder if there is any better definition of that 
most hateful of predicaments, which we describe as 
' having made a fool of one's self,' than to say that 
it is to have exerted one's self for an end that turns 
out to be worthless -in attaimnent. 2 
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We can readily see from the above statements that Professor Per~J believes 
in purpose . But let us analyze just what his conception of purpose is. 
"Purpose, 11 he says, "consists in the determination of an action by 
its agreement vrith the agen·i:; 's expectation. 11 3 Purposive behavior, for 
Perry, means that in responding to stimuli, the organism exhibits two 
propensities; a higher and a lower. The higher, or selective propensity 
excites activity and determines its character and end; dominates the 
whole situation. The lower propensity is more specific and transitory. 
'f he organism is acting purposively ·when its behavior is determined by a 
controlling propens ity. 
A determining tendency is a ugeneral response-system, tentatively 
advancing tow-ards completion, or tentatively renewing itself . "4 Interested 
or purposive action is "tentative action adopted because the anticipatory 
responses whi ch it part ially arouses coincide with the unfulfilled or 
l. Perry, AP, 141. 
2. Perry, Atlantic Monthly, 114(1914), 415. 
3 . Perry, Phil . Rev ., 26(1917), 477. 
4 . Perry , Jour. Phil., 18(1921), 105. 
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implicit phase of such a determining tendency. 111 
Professor Perry endeavors to build up a theo~J of purpose without 
any appeal to consciousness. In his article, "Docility and Purpose, 11 2 
he would not attribute 11 causal efficiency" to "mental states." In 
addition he does not find it necessary 11 to believe that any mysterious 
psychic force is at work. 112 And further, az1d very definitely he says, 
"to explain this process by reference to ·what is commonly regarded as 
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consciousness would be to connnit the fallacy of obscurum per obscurius. 11 3 
'.L'he fact seems to be that Professor Perry wants to account for con-
sciousness vnthout going outside the physical sciences* and yet, a s Dr. 
Brightman has pointed out, 11he does not wish to admit tha-t; this logically 
shuts h;i.m up to naturalism. rr4 
As we have noted before, Professor Perry uses the terms, "selective 
propensity, 11 11 higher propensity 11 or "dominant propensity" rather than 
refer to "conscious purpose. 11 Purpose is seen when an organism does 
something, the end of which is observed by the 11 power of prospicience" 
and not only does the organism act but in the very process it learns how 
to do something. It seems that the organism is controlled by something 
yet to be done, not by conscious purpose. .And in the doing of this 
controlling "something to be done" it learns how to do better something 
1. Perry, Jour. Phil., 18(1921), 105. 
2. Perry, Psych. Rev., 25(1918), l-20. 
3. Ibid., 16. 
4 . Brightman in Wilm (ed) SP, 42. 
--------
which later is to be done by the organism. All of this is process of 
organic growth minus conscious purpose . Action is 11 determined .by its 
relation of prospective congruence with a controlling propensity. nl 
'Vve conclude, therefore, that Professor Perry does claim that the 
category of purpose is part of his system but that the meaning of this 
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category of pttrpose is not that it is conscious purpose of a person taken 
after due reflection. It is a purpose devoid of mental content. James 
Seehorn Seneker says, 
While some behaviorists strive to banish striving 
from their descriptive interpretations, still others, 
for example, E. c. Tolman and R. B. Perry, admit 
striving and purpose in htunan and animal action, al-
though they try to empty them of all mentalist 
implications .2 
This discussion now leads up to the important problem of freedom and 
its significance for personality. 
IV. Professor Perry's Conception of Freedom and its Relation to Personality. 
A. Study of freedom from the standpoint of the moral life. 
Professor Perry begins his study of freedom not with metaphysics 
nor even ethics but with the moral life. He says that in spite of the 
fact that "freedom has been declared absurd and childish, 11 3 and has, "been 
disproved with all the rigor of the scientific method," it still persists. 
He adds that whenever any idea survives a long process of attack and 
1. Perry, Psych. Rev., 25(1918), 12. 
2. Seneker in King ( ed) BEH, 235. 
3. Perry, Int. Jour. Ethics, 13(1902-3), 40 . 
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counter-attack it is entitled to a place among human ideals. "Kant, " 
he observes, "cannot have been all wrong when he called freedom a postulate 
along with God and immortality, and found their roots in the moral nature 
of man."l Freedom and moral value are common experiences of life. "The 
moral values," says Perry, "demand the unflinching loyalty of him to 
--------- __________________ _!_ ---------
203 
counter-attack it is entitled to a place- among human ideals . ''Kant, 11 
he observes, "cannot have been all wrong when he called freedom a postulate 
along with God and imrnortali ty, and found their roots in the moral nature 
of m.a.n . 111 Freedom and moral value are connnon experiences of life. "The 
moral values," says Perry, "demand the unflinching loyalty of him to 
whom they are revealed, 11 ru1d further, "conscience submits to no majority, 
though the powers of Heaven and Hell combine against it. ul nDuty and 
responsibility are terms which signify to most men the heart of life. 11 1 
The voice of duty "gives a touch of sublimity to the most paltry of human 
beings. ttl Perry concludes, "Duty obeyed, responsibility fulfilled, mean 
worth and honor . Duty violated, responsibility repudiated, mean worth-
lessness and shame."l 
B. The meaning of freedom for morality . 
Vfuat is the meaning and place of freedom in this moral picture? 
In the first place, Professor Perry says, "Freedom means alternative 
possibilities."2 And out of the consciousness of freedom comes "the will 
to achieve" the g ood and do my duty. Professor Perry considers the 
philosophical system of determinism and more specifically the place of 
freedom in the philosophy of Spinoza, Kant, Schopenhauer, Hegel and Royce 
concluding that they all give freedom a prominent place in the temporal 
practical life but their metaphysical positions all result in a similar 
conclusion, n~~ely, that the universe is fixed, complete, perfect and 
1. Perry, Int. Jour . Ethics, 13(1902- 3), 40- 41. 
2. Ibid., 40. 
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finished. 11 Spinoza, 11 he says, "is the most representative and consistent 
of the necessitarians, but when we turn to his doctrine of life, ttl we 
find him enthusiastic in his moral philosophy urging his friends to follow 
"purpose" and "a fixed mode of living" and "to set before them definite 
aims. nl Spinoza calls the essential nature of the universe, Substance; 
Schopenhauer, Will; Schelling and Hegel, Reason. In all instances it is 
super-temporal and its character is immutable. Freedom in such systems 
may have a practical value but actually the universe is finished and 
freedom is not real. 
C. The relation of the doctrine of freedom to metaphysics. 
Professor Perry now proposes his thesis of the meaning of 
freedom: 11The practical consciousness of freedom implies that the ultimate 
nature of the universe is sub,iect to temporal change."2 After elaborating 
on this at length he says, "We must conclude that a metaphysical theory 
which fails to provide for the freedom of real alternatives fails also to 
provide responsibility. 113 In brief, Professor Perry has endeavored to 
show that the practical conceptions of duty and responsibility imply a 
definite conception of freedom. This conception of freedom has involved 
a metaphysical conception of fundamental importance. He claims that such 
a conception, "is antagonistic alike to the temporal determinism of 
1. Spinoza, Letter LXIII, Bohn's Ed., Vol. II, 389. 
2. Perry, Int. Jour. Ethics, 13(1902-3), 51. 
3. Ibid., 54. 
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naturalism a._11d the super-temporal determinism of idealism. ul His position 
is simply this: when a human individual believes that he is responsible 
for the fulfillment or violation of duty, he believes also, "that he 
inhabits a universe which permits a selection f rom among genuine possibil-
ities and suffers absolute change . 112 ;.L'his same thought is expressed in 
his belief in a "pluralistic universe 11 which is included in his Paris 
address when he says, 
Un univers 'pluraliste' est un ' univers qui 
contient une chance de devenir enti~rement bon.' 
A l 1 agent moral il offre l ' occasion de vaincre le 
mal definitevement en le laissa.nt tomber, en le 
jetant par- dessus bord, et en ava.ncant au dela, 
avec l'espoit de reussir a cr~er un univers qui 
oubliera sa pl ace et son nom. 3 
D. Points of Agreement. 
Apart from some of the details of his attack on the various 
philosophers and their systems of thought I find myself in essential 
agreement with Professor Perry on the conception of freedom for I believe 
that the fundamental necessities in a sound theory of freedom are: 
1 . Alternatives are necessary if one is to be permitted the power 
of free choice. 
2. 1'he individual must believe that he is free to choose between 
these alternatives . 
3 . Duty demands that he choose what appears to him to be the right 
co~~se of action. 
l. l?erry, Int. Jour. Ethics, 13( 1902-3), 55 . 
2 . Ibid. 
3. Perry, Pi1lM, 142. 
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4. Choice of the right alternative brings a "sublimity" to the 
"most paltry of beingsu as well as to others. 
5. Choice of the wrong; violation of duty; and responsibility re-
pudiated, bring "worthlessness and sha.me 11 to the individual. 
6. Duty obeyed; responsibility fulfilled, mean "worth and honor. 11 
7. The individual is responsible and accountable for the results 
of his obedience or disobedience to duty. 
8. The metaphysical conception of the u~iverse must be one that 
permits real change and genuine freedom. 
9. The universe is not static, complete and finished nor is it 
perfect, but rather is perfectible. 
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10. The temporal activities of a 11free person" are a genuine part of 
the process and progress of the universe as a whole. 
The writer agrees with Professor Perry concerning the above enumerated 
ten points. The Perry of his pre-nee-realistic period holds these vievrs 
and I find -no repudiation of these principles in his later writings. 
E. Implications of Professor Perry's Theory of Freedom. 
Although we reached agreement on the ten points listed above 
and also it is the opinion of the writer that Professor Perry is justified 
in his attack on Naturalism and Absolute Idealis.m relative to their 
conceptions of freedom, we still have to examine the conclusions which 
are implied in his doctrine of freedom. The logical implications of his 
theory, it appears to me, are: 
1. There must be "someone" who is free. Not just a 11physical-neural 
-------------------=:::--=--=-=-_____:.:--=-=--=-=-=--=-===-=-=-=-=---=-===---====tt===---=--
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organism, 11 or 11 a highly developed central nervous system" but an in-
dividual, self-conscious person. 
2. If the acts of this "person" necessitate a new metaphysical view 
in V'.rhich "free acts" a.re real and genuine then this "free person" himself 
must possess metaphysical reality. 
3. If the acts of this "free person" result in "worth" or 11vTorthless-
ness" depending upon his use of freedom, then he is a 11carrier of value 11 
which is produced by his free activity in choosing between alternatives. 
4. If the universe must be such, metaphysically, as to permit 
genuine "free acts" in order that 11 persons 11 may acquire ''worth" through 
following duty and 11fulfilling responsibility" then the universe must be 
constructed so as to favor such a system as will produce worthful persons 
and further the production and conservation of values. 
However, in the light of our discussions of Professor Perry's 
epistemology and metaphysics earlier, we are justified in concluding that 
he would not accept the metaphysical implications of his doctrine of 
freedom and therefore he is as inconsistent as he thinks that Naturalists 
and Absolute Idealists are. They (absolute idealists) seem to have 
magnified their metaphysical conception of the perfectness and complete-
ness of the universe at the expense of genuine freedom while Professor 
Perry nas magnified freedom at the expense of their metaphysics but re-
fuses to follow the logical implications of his mvn theory of freedom. 
F. Types of Bondage and Methods of Liberation as Suggested by 
Professor Perry with Criticisms. 
In GTV Professor Perry says, "The degree to which a man is free is 
--1-1---===-·------------===---=----_-
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t he degree in which his action is positively interested; the degree, in 
other words, in which he does what he wants or chooses. 111 Man, he notes, 
is enslaved by three masters; automatism, passion and circumstance. 
Slavery by automatism is "to behave reflexly or habitually rather than 
interestedly. 11 2 To be enslaved by passion implies that "one of his 
interests is uncontrolled by the rest and usurps their share of the 
conunon resources of the orga.nism."3 Enslavement by circumstance means 
that "the range of choice is restricted, or that interest is mediated 
either by indifferent judgments, or by negative interests. One does what 
one wants, but under circll1)1.stances not of one's own choosing. 11 3 Enslave-
ment of the first type "is escaped by development of interest." The 
latter two types are escaped by intermediation of interests, that is, by 
subjecting interests to mutual control. 11 3 
The above is an interesting analysis of the bondage of individuals; 
the solution, however, is open to doubt. How may freedom be obtained? 
By "intermediation of interests. 11 But who, or what, is to do the 
mediating? In the first place, who decides whether one is in bondage or 
not? Hovv does one 1mow it? And if one lawws it how does he proceed to 
decide which interest needs mediation? How does he organize all his 
varied interests into a harmonious whole? And, finally, who is the 11 one 11 
1. Perry, GTV, 440. 
2. Ibid., 441. 
3. Ibid. 
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who does all this? Here it seems t o me we need a conscious self capable 
of knowing when it is enslaved; whether its enslavement is due to 
automat ism, passion or circumstance; and further, wi·bh the power and 
di scernment to recognize the trouble-making interest and subvert it to 
approved higher interests. The nervous system is inadequate to perform 
such a profotmd and high task. An individual, conscious, free self is the 
only responsible entity capable of such a worthy and gigantic tmderte.king. 
V. Professor Perry's Denial of Personality to Society and its Implica·bions 
for a General Theory of Personality. 
Professor Perry in treating t his subject goes into a l ong 
sociological exploration considering various theorie s of society held by 
outstanding sociologists and concludes that Society cannot properly be 
called a "person. 11 Therefore, it ·will be helpful and enlightening to us 
in our search for personality characteristics to ascertain just why 
Professor Perry denied 11 personality11 to Society and what he considers 
essential in a proper conception of the term. He limits possible theories 
of personali~y to four which we shall now consider. 
A. Theories of Personality. 
I 
I 
1. A person is a "collection of states, an aggregat e of "mind- \
1 
stuff," or a "stream of consciousness," as held by Hurne. If such i s the I 
case i t is evident, Professor Perry observes, that "persons can be com-
pounded by the simple process of addition. nl In such a view Society would 
be "the sum of the states or mind-stuff, or a confluence of the 
1. Perry, GTV, 432. 
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consciousnes s streams of i t s members."l This theory Professor Perry 
rejects . 
2. For this theory originally offered by Leibni z, a person is 
exclusive; is not compounded nor i ncluded in another. 11The essential 
privacy of the mind 11 is maintained and its 11 peculiar internalit y" renders 
it 11accessible only t o introspection."1 This theory also is rejected by 
Professor Perry . It is a theory which vrould deny personality to Society 
for a social person would be excluded from t he privacy of human minds . 
But if it did invade their privacy both the person and Society having lost 
their privacy would cease t o be persons. In fact, Professor Perry dis-
misses both this and the previous theory on the g round that "they fail to 
provide for the unity of personality . 11 2 
3. Personality, in this thir d v iew, as held by Hegel, is the 
systematic uni~; of experience, or t he organization of objects into a 
world. Professor Perry dismisses this view on the ground that 11if there 
is only one organized world of objects it would impel us to affirm that 
there is only One Person, .who is nei ther man nor society . 11 3 
4 . A person is "an organi zation not a.1JJ.ong the objects of mind, 
but among its acts-- -of cogniti on or of interest."3 Acts of mind, he 
claims, are integrated in tvlo ways: firs·b, directly as acts of one agent 
or indirectly through their objects . "The former is the type of 
1. Perry, GTV, 432. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 433. 
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integration that is characteristic of personality; the latter is character 
istic of society. 111 This fourth view is accepted by Professor Perry as 
his view of personality. 
B. Important Characteristics in Professor Perry's Concept of 
Personality. 
1. Personality as Intermediation of Interests. 
Personality is "limited to such acts as are embodied in 
the same physical organism, and so connected by one continuous and con-
centric nervous system. n2 This limitation denies personality to society 
because society is composed of two or more organisms ttneurally discon-
tinuous and eccentric. 11 Professor Perry labels the t wo types in 
integration~ 11 intra-organic 11 and "irrber-organic 11 the former referring to 
personality and the ~atter to society. 
2. Intra-organic Integration is most Simply Represented by 
Habit and Memory. 
This signifies that the several acts of 11 one cognitive 
process must be embodied in the same organism. 11 3 Habit is the resul·t o:r 
the trial and error experience of one organism. Memory loses its meaning 
unless it re:rers to one and the same organism. 
3. Intra-organic Integration is also Represented by Interest 
or Purpose. 
1. Perry, GTV, 433. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 434. 
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We have noted previously, that an "interested act," for 
Professor Perry3 is one which is performed because of what is expected 
of it. He observes, "The term 'because' here signifies an internal and 
not an external nexus."l In other words, "I cannot in this sense act 
because of what you expect of my act. n2 The act must be mine and the 
expectation mine. This is peculiar to personality and cannot be applied 
to society. 
4. Intra-organic Integration means a Hierarchy of Purposes. 
In a person one interested activi-ty is subordinated to 
another. If I seek money because I want power the subject of both 
interests must be the same organism, and "the control exerted by the one 
over the other is of the type which a single nervous system subserves."3 
.And then comes this important statement, 
This relation, which we have described as the 
mediation of one interest by another, or the inter-
mediation of interests, constitutes that which best 
deserves the na1-r1.e of personality, and can be shown 
to underlie the traditional prerogatives of per-
sonality, such as rationality, freedom, responsibility 
and happiness. 4 ----.- · -
Professor Perry says, 
We conclude, therefore, that personality and its 
prerogatives are peculiar to organic individuals of 
the human species, or to units of life having the 
1. Perry, GTV, 434. 
2. Ibid., 433. 
3. Ibid., 434. 
4. Ibid. Italics mine except the word, "intermediation." 
II 
I 
I 
peculiar structural and functional organization 
characteristic of organisms endowed with a highly 
developed .central nervous system. 1 · 
Yifi th this definition and for reasons enumerated above Professor Perry 
denies personality to society. And with him I am in hearty agreement. 
The following clarifies further his meaning of personality: 
Personality consists in a type of integra-
tion or interdependence of interests such as oc-
curs when the interests in question are dispositions 
or activities of one concentric and integumented 
organism. It is a peculiar autonomous system, or 
field of control, such as in the physical man is 
conditioned by one continuous nervous tract having 
a continuo~ hiStOry. 2 
c. Stunmary and Criticisms. 
It is unnecessary to consider Professor Perry's progression 
of thought in which he points out the impossibility of ascribing his 
conception of personality to society because our primary interest is 
the ascertainment of his conception of personality irrespective of its 
relation to society. From our study of his positions taken above we 
note that his 11 person11 must possess the following characteristics: 
1. Individuality. 
2. Organization. 
3. Uniqueness. 
4 . Memory 
l. Perry, GTV, 435. Italics mine. 
2. Ibid., 435. Italics mine. 
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5. Habit-forming. 
6. Purposeful. 
7. Control . 
8. Rationality. 
9. Freedom. 
10. Autonomy. 
11. Responsibility. 
12. Happiness. 
A personality possessing such traits is a personality indeed. 
But how are these characteristics possible? Within a short space, 
Professor Perry uses the three phrases, "a highly developed central 
nervous system, 11 "one concen·l;ric and integumented organism, 11 and 
_
11 one continuous nervous tract having a continuous history." It 
appears that these unique essential charact eristics of personality 
are not possible because of a conscious self but are adequately accounted 
for by the physical organism poss13ssing the above-described highly 
developed nervous sy stem. After .such a wonderful explanation of the 
meaning of personality, as contrasted vdth society, it is disappointing 
not to find a fuller explanation of the development and control of these 
characteristics. Deies the physical body control these activities? 
If so, what part of the body? The -nervous system? If so, what part 
of the nervous system and further is the control impulsive, spontaneous 
or reflective: If it is reflective, who is doing the reflecting? 
Such considerati ons seem necessary. It appears to me that if the 
person is free, autonomous, responsible and purposeful some one must 
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be held accountable and that this accountability cannot be charged 
against an impersonal 11nervous system." Here is the need for a 
conscious self which is individual; which organizes its various 
inter e sts and desires; which has the ability to form habits; which 
ties the -past to the present by its power of memory; which acts 
purposively; which is rational, free and responsible and which may 
be happy by coordinating all of its interests and following the path 
be held accountable and that t his accountability callnot be charged 
against an impersonal "nervous system." Here is the need for a 
conscious self which is individual; which organizes its various 
interests and desires; which has the ability to form habits; which 
ties the -past to the present by its power of memory; which acts 
purposively; which is rational, free and responsible and wi1ich may 
be happy by coordinating all of its interests and following the path 
of duty with resultant personal value and worth. 
CONCLUSION . 
In this chapter we have been concerned with axiology and its 
relationship to personality. We have considered Professor Perry's 
treatment of the ~~o essential characteristics of personality, 
Freedom and Worth. We have found that he considers freedom an 
essential of personality in a me lioristic un1verse but that no meta-
physical status is given t o the "person" possessing this freedom. 
In addition, we have found that personality is considered as of 
greatest worth among knmvn entities. However, a s yet, we have not 
found any justification for a position t hat thi s worth is metaphysical . 
In t he following chapt er ·we shall be concerned explicitly with the 
following problem: Is Professor Perry's conception of personality 
such t hat vdll warrant the existence of personality after physical 
death? 
===--------· 
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CH.APT ER VII 
THE EFFECT OF PROFESSOR PERRY'S IIJEO-REALISM ON THE DOCTRINE 
OF SURVIVAL OF PERSOIIJAJ~ITY AFTER DEATH 
INTRODUCTION. 
In the preceding chapters we have considered the philosophical 
method employed by Professor Perry; have analyzed his theory of neutral 
entities; have defined what we consider the essential characteristics of 
personality; and have investigated his epistemology, metaphysics and 
axiology in search of such characteristics. In this, the concluding 
I 
chapter of this study, we shall be concerned vdth such problems as: 
(1) Does Professor Perry desire and hope for the survival of the "person" 
after physical death? (2) If so, what are his arguments supporting such 
a possibility and (3) Will the doctrine of personality involved in his 
view be consistent with his epistemological, metaphysical and axiological 
theories? 
It may be definitely stated that Professor Perry does desire earnestly 
and hope sincerely that individual persons ·will not end their existence 
at death but rather that they may live after death carrying out and finish-
ing what they commenced in this tempor al existence. He not only hopes and 
desires immortality but presents definite arguments sustaining the 
rationality of such a belief. 
I. The Doctrine of Innnortality in Professor Perr y's Earlier Writings. 
The philosophical v~itings of Professor Perry are prolific and 
exhaustive on the subjects he treats. However, it is noticeable that the 
===f:t==== 
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question of man's possible survival after death is one to which he gave 
little or no attention for most of his life. The subject is scarcely 
referred to either directly or indirectly. It is not until January, 1935, 
that Professor Perry deals definitely with the problem in the Hibbert 
Journal under the caption, 11 The Meaning of Death." In previous articles 
appearing in the various philosophical journals or in his books there are 
references to irrunortality only in an unsympathetic or critical vein 
particularly when he is attacking Idealism. An example of this is as 
follows (1910): "Idealism assures man that his life, whether long or 
short is unique, indispensable and out of time. 11 1 In this same article 
whichwas primarily an attack on Absolute Idealism he comes definitely 
to the problem of immortality vrhen he says, "the religious belief in im-
mortality arises from a solicitude that is specific and unmistak:able."l 
Further, he expresses the opinion that, "Its ( inmlortality) root is the 
dread of annihilation. ul He adds, "Innnortali ty is a prerogative by 
virtue of which man hopes that he may continue thus to live, after that 
natural-his·l:;orioal event called death.nl Professor Perry concludes that 
the idealistic belief in immortality results in "unmitigated barrem1ess" 
and is left in "as great darkness as before, 11 for he says, "It is doubt-
ful if this would be recognized as even remotely relevant to the religious 
issue, were it not disguised in such phrases as 'the eternal life.' In 
any case its barrenness is umnitigated. 112 His conclusion is as follows: 
~-------------- -
1. Per~-, Hibbert Journal, 8(1910), 635. 
2. Ibid. 
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"After the idealist has offered his consolation, the real object of hope 
and fear, :n1..a.n's chance of life ~fter death, remains in as great darlmess 
as before."1 
It was not until 1915 in the American Journal of Theology that Pro-
fessor Perry makes any further allusions to immortality and that in 
connection w-ith objects of religious belief, not a critical treatment of 
the problem itself. He says, 
~veryone would, I suppose, admit the distinction 
betvreen the soul's being really immortal and my 
supposi~~ it to be immortal. The suppositional im-
mortality is of my oYna making, and is an example of 
what I shall call an ideal religious object.2 
1'wenty years pass without any definite treatment of the doctrine of 
immortality and then appeared the article referred to above in the 
Hibbert Journal. During the brenty years of silence it is fair to assUII'.e 
that the problem of immortality concerned him very little. There are no 
statements directly repudiatin~ belief in survival after death but one is 
impressed that Professor Perry 's silence is due either to disbelief, in-
difference or to the consideration of problems he deemed as of more 
importance or wluch had greater prospect of producing definite fruit, 
especially in view of the impersonalism of the doctrine of neutre,l entities 
and the consequent lack of ultimate reason for the continue d existence of 
any complex such as a person. 
On October 23, 1933, a great tragedy came to the life of Professor 
1. Perry, Hibbert Journal, 8(1910), o35. 
2. Perry, Am . Jour. Theo., 19(1915), 8. 
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Perry in the passing of his wife. No one can judge whether or not this 
great sorrow caused him to meditate on the problem of immortality but it 
was not long after that the article, "The Meaning of Death11 appeared in 
the Hibbert Journal, which will be analyzed in this chapter. 
II. The Desirability of Immortality as Expressed by Professor Perry. 
A. The Defini"Gion of Inmortality. 
Dr. Brightman says, "The problem of immortality, it may be said 
at once, has to do solely with the survival of individual personal con-
sciousness."l Professor Perry by immortality means, "quite simply and 
literally the extension of the histo~J of the human individual beyond that 
biological event which is called 'death. •"2 We are justified from this 
statement in concluding that he is referring to the immortality of social 
institutions or organizations. He does not, it is true, speak of the 
survival of "individual personal consciousness" as Dr. Brightman, but he 
is referring definitely to the individual human organism and the possibilit 
that the life of such an individual being extended beyond biological death. 
His previous definition of 11 consciousness 11 would prohibit his using the · 
term with the adjectiye 11 person~l 11 but nevertheless he is concerned with 
the possibilities of Ralph Barton Perry or any other individual continuing 
such uniqueness in existence after the physical death of the temporal 
biological organism. Later we shall have occasion to raise the question 
1. Brightman, IPKI, 2. 
2. Perry, Hibbe.rt Jour., 33(1935), 162 . 
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whether such a. doctri ne is possible in the light of his previous 
epistemological, and metaphysical theories. How·ever, at the moment, vre 
are concerned only to establish tl1a.t Professor Perry is talking about 
the immortality of individuals and this I believe is clear from his 
definition of the term nirmnorta.lity" and will be substantiated further 
by his arguments supporting such continued existence. 
B. Immortality is Desired. 
Professor Perry says, 11 I have a strong desire for innnorts.lity, ttl 
"I should like to justify the desire for inrrnortality," "had I any proofs 
I would rejoice as the bearer of good tidings, 11 and 11 I also share the 
common hope. nl Although some thinkers have little or no desire for con-
tinued"existence , while others deny its rational possibility, Professor 
Perry definitely states that he both desires and hopes for immortality 
and proceeds to present arguments supporting such desire and hope. 
C. Arguments for Immortality are not Based on Empirical Evidence. 
The doctrine of immortality Professor Perry says, 11 is a 
monument of man's effort to justify a dear belief. 11 2 It is not found in 
the "certified record of human experience 11 nor is its truth "demonstrated 
in any reasoned theorem of mathematics.ll 3 Furthermore, it is not "thrust 
upon the mind by perception or logic, 11 but is, "teased by hope out of 
ignorance."3 There is no adequate explanation of the vitality of the idea. 
1. Perry, Hibbert Jour., 33(1935), 162. 
2. Ibid., 161. 
3. Ibid. 
I' I 
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of i:rmnortality which does not "emphasize its practical and emotional 
roots. nl As far as "theoretical evidence for i:nunortali ty11 or even 
"arguments for its probability," Professor Perry says, 11 I come forw·ard 
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empty-he.nded . ttl It appears that his statement denying "arguments for its 
probability" is too strong in the light of the plausible arguments he is 
about to present. However, its probability depends on evidence for God, 
which he has not considered. By itself, ·the case for i:rmnortality is 
weak. 
Having denied the possibility of proving i~~ortality by perception, 
logic or theoretical evidence, he says, 11 I must justify my prescription 
on other grounds . n2 He believes that he has something positive to offer 
on the problem for he observes, 11 if I had only negations to offer I should 
remain silent. 11 2 Even when none of the above excluded avenues is pro-
ductive, he says, "my philosophy tells me that even in default of knowledge 
belief is sometimes justified by the insistence or depth of the need which 
it satisfies. 112 
III. Professor Perry~s First Argument for Immortality---the Necessity of 
Completing and Fulfilling Present Interests. 
The question before us is this: Is it better that biological 
death should be what it appears to be--namely, the end? Or, is it better 
that it should be, "a transition to some new phase of life in which the 
1. Perry, Hibbert Jour., 33(1935), 161. 
2. Ibid., 162. 
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individual's identity is preserved and in which his characteristic 
activities are prolonged?"1 Professor Perry's answer affirms the second 
alternative. 
As he observed in 1910 and again reiterated in 1935, the "evil of 
death lies in dread of future annihilation. 112 However, Professor Perry 
now qualifies this somewhat by contending that it is not the annihilation 
that is the real cause of dread as much as it is the cessation of the 
activity in vibi ch I am engaged in following my int eres.ts. He informs us 
that William James during the last five years of his life expressed the 
fear that he would not have time enough to say all he had to say. Renouvie 
said, 11 1 am leaving the world before I have said my last word. A man 
always dies before he has fini shed his work, and that is the saddest of 
the sorrows of life. 113 These expressions of James and Renouvier are 
similar to the regret that he could not "write himself out on religion" 
expressed by Professor Durant Drake to Professor Brightman after learning 
that he could not live more than a few months at the most . 
This first argument of Professor Perry for immortality follows 
logically from his axiology which we considered at length in the preceding 
chapter. Value is "the peculiar relation between any interest and its 
object. n4 Immortality is a value because interest is exhibited in it as 
1. Perry, Hibbert Jour., 33(1935), 161. 
2. Ibid., 162. 
3. lvietehnekoff, PL, 127. 
4. Perry, GTV, 124. 
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an opportunity of continuing and expanding the entire hierarchy of .r 
interests. Professor Perry says: "The hope of a future life grows out 
of every type of positive interest, whatever its rank in the hierarchy 
of values. 111 
A human being arises above the animal level and through the power 
of "prospicience" becomes purposeful; correlates its interests; freely 
chooses its course of action and acquires worth. The person becomes 
active in great forward-looking enterprises, becomes continually enriched 
in spirit, loves and is loved. It is prospect of the loss of these 
matters of sig~ificant value that make annihilation to be dreaded. Pro-
fessor Perry says, 11To retain posession of the energy, faculties and 
powers whioh one 1 s interest's require, is to be alive; and the regretful 
sense of their precariousness constitutes that general fear of death which 
is rooted in the very nature of vital interest."2 He adds, 11Wherever there 
is a will at all, there is unfinished business. 112 This will to live is 
relative to the specific object of vvill. If tomorrow will finish my 
task then Professor Perry says, 11my life day after tomorrow is a matter 
of indifference."2 But tomorrow brings new interests and new tasks. As 
I grow my interests increase and my tasks become greater and more worth-
whi le. Immortality for Professor Perry is relative to interest, and 
interest to task; worthy tasks take time. 
1. Perry, Hibbert Jour., 33(1935), 164 . 
2. Ibid., 163. 
========-~~~=-=-=-~~--== 
I' 
==:li-:-==----
224 
"To a man with positive interests and with a sense of their fecundity 
death if it be taken as a finality is always an unwelcome intruder, 11 1 
says Professor Perry. People who commit suicide usually do so ·when life 
loses its interest and there are no values worth fighting for and con-
serving. But for a man with positive interests Professor Perry is correct 
in concluding that annihilation is "the great silencer, 11 "the blank wall, 11 
"the universal enemy," 11the reaper whose scythe leaves desolation in its 
wake, 11 11the universal catastrophe."l 
In advancing this argument Professor Perry is aware that it vnll be 
attacked severely and that he will be accused of basing "the hope of a 
future li f e on ignoble grounds."l 
Thus far it appears to me that we might sunnnarize the case as 
presented by Professor Perry as foll~1s: 
1. Immortality refers to the survival of the human individual after 
death. 
2. The 11 individual 1 s idEmtity is preserved. 11 
3. The individual's "characteristic activities are prolonged." 
4. Professor Perry personally desires bmnortality. 
5. He 11 shares the c ammon hope. 11 
6. Arguments for immortality cannot be based on empirical evidence. 
7. Immortality is not demonstrable by mathematics. 
8. It is not "thrust upon the mind by perception or logic." 
1. Perry, Hibbert Jour., 33(1935), 164. 
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9. In spite of these three previous facts, Professor Perry has 
something positive to offer regarding immortality. 
10. Belief is sometimes justified "by the insistence or depth of 
the need which it satisfies. 11 
11. Need of immortality is based on positive interests. 
12. "Unfinished tasks" need time for completion. 
13. ,Annihilation is the "universal catastrophe." 
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In the light of the above it seems that there are some implica-
tions which justify one in drawing the following conclusions: 
1. There is 11 something 11 or, better, "someone," who is to survive 
death if imm_ortality is a reality. 
2. It is not the physical organism, for that re:m.a.ins in the grave, as 
an uncontested and accepted fact. 
3. With the biological organism goes the "highly developed central 
nervous system." It does not survive. 
4. Neither is it the most highly developed part of the nervous system, 
the brain, that survives for that too is in the physical grave. 
5. ~lliatever is to survive must be something other than the body, 
nervous system or brain. 
6. It is fair to imply that all that is left to survive is conscious-
ness, or a self, or personality. 
7. "Consciousness," as Professor Perry conceives it, is not capable 
of surviving, for in reality it does not n~f exist. It is dependent upon 
the living, physical organism in its relation to its environment. As 
==#===-=---=-----
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soon as the physical organis.m is extinct, nee-realistic consciousness is 
impossible. It has no metaphysical status in its own right, 
8. In spite of the above Professor Perry feels that the value and 
worth of the person demands the extension of its existence beyond the 
"biological event which is called 'death.'" 
9. Otherwise, we run into a 11blank wall." This really means that 
the_ universe is meaningless and a 11blind alley," going nowhere in particu-
lar, if it permits the annihilation of the only entity it produces of 
intrinsic and supreme worth. In other words, if death ends all; if highly 
developed persons are ruthlessly annihilated; if values are not worth 
conserving beyond the grave, the universe is a sort of irrational meaning-
less madhouse and nothing is genuinely worthwhile. This present position 
seems to contradict the position of Professor Perry in 1912 when he said, 
"For re.alism explicitly repudiates evecy spiritual or moral .. smtology. ul 
10. This carries us into a metaphysics of value. Is the world such 
that it is interested in value? Professor Perry thinks that it_ is and 
should be interested enough to extend life beyond the grave. 
11. The analytic method here is laid aside for a synoptic view of 
things. Such considerations of value could never be found by analysis. 
· 12. If the above reasoning is sound and necessary, and further, if the 
human individual has possibilities of continued existence without the 
present physical-neural organism, is it not reasonable to postulate a 
cosmic power which is personal and is similar qualitatively to the 
1. Perry, PPT, 344. 
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post-temporal individual? Is immortality possible at all on the 
basis of analytic realism? 
13 • .And finally, this Supreme Person would be the personification 
of objective, metaphysical value and be the guarantor of the continued 
existence of persons. 
In the light of' the above considerations, would not Professor 
Perry be justified in reconstructing his epistemology and metaphysics 
because of the demands of his axiology? wbatever of the person, is 
to exist beyond the grave must exist now. If he exists now, he 
can be the unifier of experience instead of the "highly developed 
nervous system11 vrhich will be incapacitated for further functioning 
after death. He can give conscious purpose to acts rather than have 
chem spring from an impersonal 11 power of prospicience." He is free 
to follow duty and derive its benefits, or repudiate responsibility 
and merit tts losses. He is the responsible entity and not some 
impersonal, physical organism. .And finally, he is the 11carrier of 
values 11 and thus becomes worthy of continued existence beyond the grave. 
IV. Professor ·Perry's Second Argu..ment for Inunortality-- the Significant 
Implication of the Meaning of Death to Those Who Survive. 
Professor Perry opens the presentation of his second 
argument 1vi th the follo·wing statement: 
\!There the dead is a son or daughter in whose 
young life the old have learned to breathe .a reviving 
air of hopefulness, a husband, <rife or friend bound 
by old ties of' equal companionship, the tragedy, is, 
====#=====~~================-------------==================~~=~~~-=-==-~-=-======= 
on the assumption of annihilation, so poignant and 
so unrelieved as to make even sympathy seem impertinent . 1 
In order to avoid such suffering one might wi sely avoid loving, for 
"the heart which loves is the heart which aches," and 11its suffering 
wi ll be proportional to its tenderness . "1 The less one loves the 
less ei'i'ect death has on that one and if he loves not at all he 
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suffers not at all. Annihilate love and you can almost love annihilation 
is t he thought Professor Perry is bringi ng out here. In other words, 
to take the suffering out of death one must harden t he heart. But 
Professor Perry is correct ·when he says that to do so is 11 to buy 
inmmni ty from suffering by forfeiting life 1 s greatest good. n2 
The wound of bereavement may be "cauterized by forgetfulness." 
But this, he says, is 11to substi tute an anaest hetic for a remedy . 11 2 
To adopt either course means that the "death of others is robbed of 
its t error by rooting them out of one 1 s life; but in roo·cing out the 
affections that bind us to othe rs we have destroyed the best that is 
in ourselves. 112 Therefore, "the only hope of bereavement whi ch is 
not through insensibility or forgetfulnes s disloyal to love, is a hope 
that the dead will live on. 112 
The i mpl ications and conclusions of this argument appear to be: 
1. Suffering caused by death on the part of the bereaved 
is due to love. 
2. To remove the sting of death we must either crush love 
1. Perry, Hibbert Jour., 33(1935 ) , 165. 
2. Ibid., 166. Italics mine. 
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from the heart, forget loved ones and thus be disloyal to love, or 
provide a future life. 
3 . Love is 11 life's greatest good." To crush it is to 
make life barr en. 
4 . To root out such affection is to 11 destroy the best 
that is in ourselves .". 
The above indicates, (1) the supreme value of persons, (2) the 
reality of love as the highest of personal values and (3) the 
desirability as well as rationality of accepting a belief that such 
person s and love itself shall not perish from the universe. It 
also i mplies, as the first argument did likevrise, that a person 
is a definit e 11 carrier of value 11 and may live af ter t he death of 
the physical organism. 
V. Professor Perry's Third Argument for Immortality--the Co st 
and Value of Personality Rationally demands Continued Existence . 
With the presentation of this argument Professor Perry 
leaves the arguments of the heart and asks whether or not it is a 
11 go od thing that men who die should live again? 111 The premis e of 
this third argument is the statement, 11 In rrry philosophy the beginning 
of wisdom is to see that good comes into the world vii th life. 112 ,And 
it follows, he observes, that if, 11 a manYvith desires, hopes, 
l. Perry, Hibbert Jour., 33(1935)~ 167 . 
2. Ibid. 
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aspirations in his heart brings good with him into the world he takes 
good with him when he goes."1 · such an unwarranted, irrational 
destruction of good seems to Professor Perry to reflect unfavorably 
on the universe and make good of little concern. Therefore, he argues 
that the presence of good is a reason for the continuance of persons 
after death that good may not be destroyed. 
Persons are important. ·without them the world would be devoid 
of good for he says, 11A world devoid of feeling--in which there was 
nobody who cared--would be a world devoid of good . 11 1 He adds, "Let 
us remind ourselves of the peculiar va lue of a human person measured 
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in terms of his cost, his uniqueness and his unrealized potentialities."1 
Persons are "products of growth--they are what they have become and 
their becoming is a long, intricate, and a toilsome process . 111 A 
person "is a complex tissue of habits, and dispositions, slowly built 
out of inheritance and experience enriched by the culture of its age 
and united by repeated sessions of reflective thought."1 Each person 
Professor Perry considers as unique for, 11Neither the inheritance nor 
the circumstances which enter into a human life are ever repeated, 
so that each product of the sort is unique." In this last quotation 
Professor Perry accepts t he idealistic consideration which he reje cted 
in the Hibbert Journal in 1910 when he said, criticizing Idealism, 
"Idealism assures man that his life, whether long or short is unique. 112 
1. Perry, Hibbert Jour., 33(1935), 167. 
2. Perry, Hibbert Jour., 8(1910)635. 
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I In t he same Journal in 1935 Perry himself accepts the idealistic assertion 
1\ concerning the uniqueness of each human life. 
Because we are particularly in search of traits of personality ~~d 
because the following statements from Professor Perry are so enlightening 
it seems imperative to have them included in this study: 
1. Nor can personality be transmitted to posterity 
merely through the fact of having been. There is, it 
is true, a lingering wraith of memory, growing ever 
fainter with time and then when it is not extinguished 
altogether, superseded by some stereotyped distortion 
in history and tradition.l 
2. There are parts of a person--his ideas, the 
effects of his deeds--which continue l ike an echo to 
reverberate after their source is silent. 
But the peculiar essence of a person cannot persist 
vicariously. He consists in capacity, skill, taste, 
judgment, sentiment, which no one can fill or exercise 
in his place. 
He is a substantive thing--not a collection of 
deeds, but a complex tendency· to act in ways which 
are at the same time diverse and characteristic, and 
which are re ady to unfold in the presenc e of new 
occasions. 2 
It is a calamity that a fully developed person must be annihilated. 
"There is a tragedy in t he fallen tree because it has been so long in the 
growing, and cannot be remade again. This tragedy is multiplied a 
thousand-fold in the f a llen man." 3 And concludes Professor Perry, 
We have to see the person in al l t he fulness of 
his being, in all the richness of his acquisition and 
1. Perry, Hibbert Jour., . 33(1935), 168. 
2. Ibid. Italics mine. 
3 . Ibid. 
I 
I 
.J 
1\ 
-----::--===··-·---------_::....-==:-=-==-=--==~-==:t:-------
fecundity of his powers, in order t o feel the tragic 
wastefulness and futility of a world in which so 
great a t hing should be at the same time fragile and 
evanescent, at the mercy of every gusty wind of 
fortune.l 
Here Professor Perry seems to be deploring a view of the universe vvhich 
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is capricious, chaotic and meaningless. His interests demru1.d a universe 
which is favorable to the production and conservation of values. 
Up t o this point Professor Perry has been praising life and con-
dawning death. Now he looks at the reverse. For some death is a relief. 
But why? Because lif e has lost its interests. Profe ss or Perry remarks, 
"Annihilation is. welcome only when one is smoked out of li fe . 112 We have 
seen in our previ ous discussion that i n proportion as the individual's 
life is "governed by noble aspirations death comes as a meaningless 
interruption.n 3 It is as though "through some mechanical flaw or clumsy 
inadvertence the c urtain had descended in the midst of the play."3 But on 
the assumption of a future life udeath is the end of a chapter, and not 
the end of the book. 114 The continuity of one through youth, middle-age 
and old-age and finally, as it were, a little sleep, to awake in ete~nity 
the same person, the same identity as one possessed in the various stages 
of grow'ch in the temporal existence. Professor Perry says, "So a little 
life tha"c is 'rounded with a sleep' would not lose its contours if 
l. Perry, Hibbert Jour., 33(1935), 168. 
2. Ibid., 169. 
3. Ibid., 170-171. 
4 . Ibid., 171. 
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there were to be a reawakening . 111 
When is the right time to die? Various answers to this question 
have been advanced such as, vVhen there is a young man to take my place~ 
with woman, when she hath weaned her child. These would mean then that 
the only function of a human individual is to remain long enough to 
perpe·buate the race, as Schopenhauer seemed to think. The end is mere 
perpetuation in itself . But Professor Ferry concludes correctly, "It is 
clear that this would not do . 112 Life means growth, new interests, new 
tasks and new fields of exploration. "The more a man knows the more 
interesting it is to learn. n3 Personality with its supreme value is too 
costly to be annihilated. The relations of friendship and marriage 
"become dearer as the connnon fund of memories, habits and familiar 
intimacies accQmulates, and in so far as these activities are well and 
richly exercised they are increasingly wor~hy to endure.4 
From this third argument of Professor Perry for immortality we list 
the following conclusions: 
1. If a man brings good into the world he takes good out of the 
world when he goes, if conservation of values is in any way analogous to 
conservation of matter and energy, as Hoffding thinks . 
2. Annihilation of good m£W<es the universe irrational . 
3 . Persons are necessary for the existence of good . 
1. Perry, Hibbert Jour . , 33(1935), 171. 
·2 . Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid . 
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4. A person is: 
(a) unique; 
(b) valuable 11 in terms of his cost;" 
(c) "a substantive thing. 11 
5. A person cannot be tttransmitted to posterity" by just having been. 
6. The "peculiar essence of a personn cannot persist vicariously. 
7. The universe is capricious, chaotic and meaningless if annihila-
tion is a fact. 
8. Immortality gives purpose, meaning and significance to the universe 
9. Death is not the "end of the book," but merely the 11 end of the 
chapter. 11 
10. The person remains identical through the various stages of its 
temporal existence and 11would not lose its contours if there were to be 
a reawakening 11 following dea-t:;h. 
From these conclusions of Professor Perry's third argument the 
following implications seem apparent: 
l. Good is a real value which must be conserved. 
2. Persons are necessary for the conservation of good. 
3. Persons themselves are too costly and valuable to be destroyed. 
4. /1. person is a "substantive thing 11 and not a "collection of deeds." 
It appears to the vrri ter that Professor Perry is making metaphysical 
assumptions inconsistent with his initial theories. He has made persons 
posses s metaphysical value end given them ontological existence . He had 
defined a 11 person 11 as a 11 substantive 11 rather than an "adjective" of the 
body. On this point, one of his colleagues in the school of Nee-Realism, 
-·--------
Professor Montague, in his book dealing with inunortality, The Chances of 
Surviving Life, discusses t his very point asking the question, "Is the 
person substantive or adjectival. 111 That is, is the person merely a 
description of the physical-neural organism, or is the person itself a 
substance? Professor Montague affirms the lat;ter. The person is more 
than an adjective of the body. It is a substantive. On this point 
Professors Per!"'J and Ivlontague are in agreement. Professor Montague also 
believes in immortality for he says, 11The highest prospect for eternity is 
that personal life, at least, not only goes on growing but wins to some 
strange mystic union with that greater Life in which it has its little 
being. 111 
vve have found nothing in the study of Professor Perry's epistemology 
or mete.physics that would warrant such a conception of "personality" as 
appears in his axiology. In fact, both his epistemology and metaph ysics 
would deny such a conception. Here there seems, to me, to be a glaring 
inconsistency which I am unable to reconcile. If one accepts Perry's 
epistemology with its metaphysical counterparts his axiology must be 
denied, while if one accepts his axiology one must reconstruct his 
epistemology and metaphysics. His axiology seems to be in accord with 
experience and facts. 
VI. Professor Perry's Fourth Argument for Immortality---the Opportunity 
for Correcting -~'frongs, Retrieving Evil and Balancing the Ledger of 
Justice. 
1. Mon·tague, CSL, 98. 
------------·- ----=-=-------------
=--=-=-==--=: ..=.:..---===----.:.:_=----=-====-==-~ -=====:.:..:=.--==----·-
-----
II 
=== -------------
236 
Death not only blots out value, if annihilation is true, but it 
"r emoves monsters . 11 .As good comes in and goes out of life 11 so death takes 
evil out. 11 1 But says Professor Perry, "Evil which is brought to an end 
is not expunged." It remains a part of the record and 11its discontinuance 
means that it is left forever as it stands."l lffith this brief intro-
duction t o the argument, we have the premise before us as follows: "Evil 
may be abbreviated by death, but it can be u:mnade only by the extension 
of life."2 
Mistakes that are made in t h is temporal existence can be retrieved 
and one may learn by errors . Professor Perry states accepted truths 
beautifully when he says, "That which is hateful in proximity may become 
admirable in perspective. Love may be deepened by injuries forgiven, and 
lovers' quarrels sometimes end in a more a rdent embrace; wickedness through 
being; punished may testify to grace; tears of grief may by some subtle 
emotional alchemy be transmuted into tears of j oy. 11 3 
There are failures unretrieved, err ors which teach no lesson, crimes 
that e.re left unpunished, injuries which remain unrepented of and unfor-
1 
given. If bodily death i s, e.s it appears to be, the end, such "evils 
remain urunitigated and unatonecl. 11 3 1'hey are left as 11 irreparable mis-
fortunes. 11 3 Here is need for immortality. 
Suppose a young man inflicts injury upon his fellow. His heart is 
filled with malice and that of his victim with resentment. If he perishes 
l. Perr;,r, Hibbert Jou.r., 33(1935), 174. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
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at the moment, further injury is prevented but also the possibility of 
reconciliation is removed. The stain of the act may be forgotten but it 
I _ is not eradicated. But so long as both men live there will alvmys remain 
t he pos si bili ty of reconciliation. In the light of this type of illus-
tration, Professor Perry says, 
The only r emedy for present and past evil lies 
in the future, and a future lif e when so conceived 
presents itself as the limitless possibilit~y of 
living down and making good, that which must other-
wise b e finally charged as it stands against the 
account of nature, fate or whatever gods there be ,1 
Immortality means that the "ledger of life is never closed, there is 
I 
no bankruptcy, no final ~d irretrievable failure. 11 2 
From this argu.ment we make the follmving observations: 
1. Irrunortality gives the possibility of retrieving rrd.stakes. 
2. It g ives persons who have failed a chance to 11make good. 11 
3 . Death, if lt is the end, leaves the books completely 
"unbalanced." 
4 . ~he only remedy for past and present evil "lies in the future.' 
5. If an opportunity is not given in the future for the mitiga-
tion and atonement of evils it must be "charged to nature, fate or 
whatever gods there be. 11 
VII. Concluding Considerations of Professor Perry Concerning Immortality. 
After the consideration of the preceding four arguments for 
i mmortality, Profes sor Perry says, "The desire for a future life depends 
1. Perry, Hibbert Jour., 33(1935), 175. 
2. Ibid. 
- + 
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then, on that general confidence in oneself, or in rnankind , or in the 
world at large, which, because it can never be resolved into a certainty 
is called faith. 11 l In the last analysis, "the question resolves itself 
into a choice bebreen faith and despair. " 2 I f one cling s to the "belief 
that good can i n the long run prevail , and if one has t he wi ll to 
victory, one will ask for time. " 2 1'he desire for more life springs from 
the belief that "life on the whole is good, and to ask for more time it 
to have some affirmative reason for its use . n3 
11 I believe, then, 11 says Professor Perry, 11 for reasons that I hav e 
given that it would be a good thing if t he lives of human individuals 
were prolonged after the event of death . u3 This prolonged life will be 
"a vista of further achievement and of continued joy, unfolding his 
present goods . 11 4 
Professor Perry's exploration of t he field of possible reasons for 
belief in immortality conc l udes as follows: 
1 . 
2. 
3 . 
4 . 
5 . 
He ·will make his life good as he g oes, hoping 
that he may g o on; conceiving his life beyond in 
terms of his '1.ighest moments--in terms of valorous 
achi evements, i ts joyful insights , its magnanimity, 
its melting of the heart, its loving companionships., 
so that when he dies he will be a l ready living in 
t h e manner most worthy of c ontinued living, if 
happily his time be extended beyond the grave. 5 
Perry, Hibbert Jour . , 33(1935), 176. 
Ibid. , 175 . 
Ibid. , 176. 
Ibid., 178 . 
Ibid. 
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VII. Concluding Observations and Criticisms of Professor Perry's Theory 
of Immortality and its Effect on t he Concept of Personality. 
A. Professor Perry is undoubtedly correct in insisting that 
immortality is a doctrine which cannot be proved in the laboratory. It is 
not discoverable empirically. It must be reached dialectically as a 
logical result of previ ously considered premises and become a harmoTl.ious 
part of our entire philosophical system. It is a "derivative from our 
Weltanschauung, our total view of t he world. ul Any doctrine of a philoso-
phy or a t heology must be consistent within itself, but also it must be 
coherent with all other doctrines of' that particular system of philosophy 
or theology . In theology, for example, one 1 s anthropology should 
harmonize with one's soteriology, Christology and eschatology. One cannot 
hold a view of soteriology which destroys or is inconsistent vdth his 
Christology. Likewise all the theories of a philosophical system must 
submit to the test of cons i stency. One must seek to remove all apparent 
contradictions. 'l'vro positions which are mutually opposed to each other 
cannot both be true. 
One major criticism of Professor Perry's philosophical system is that 
his epistemological conception of personality and its logical metaphysical 
outcome makes his axiological theory of personality impossible. He 
denies any metaphysical status to consciousness, denies the self as a 
simple entity and reduces everything to impersonal, nonconscious "neutral 
entities." In his argument for i!llillortality he gives value metaphysical 
1. Brightrruan, IPKI, 4. 
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reality, makes personality supreme and of such ontological worth that it 
should not be destroyed at death. But what is to survive? The only thing 
that possibly can survive is the conscious person, which earlier has been 
denied temporal ontologicr l existence. It does not seem consistent to 
deny metaphysical status to the person in this life and give such status 
to the same person beyond the grave. If I can exist in the future life as 
an identical conscious person of ·worth, without the physical-neural 
organism and its "highly developed -central nervous system" why should I 
not exist now, in the metaphysical sense, in interaction with my biological 
organism? It appears th~t I can, but Professor Perry, either fails to 
see this inconsistency or has not endeavored to solve the problem arising 
from this apparent contr~diction within hi s system. 
B. Both Professors Perry and Montague in their discussions of 
immortality take the person as a "substantive" being. There are various 
I 
possible meanings of this term nsubstantive, 11 yet there is one thing 
that all substantive theories agree on, namely, that the pers on is a 
unitary center irrespective of what kind of substance is posited. 1'he 
person is not merely considered as an adjective of the body or some 
function of the biological organism. In our study of Professor Perry 1 s 
epistemology we could find no "substantive" subject in the lmowing 
process other than the physical-neural organism itself. At death this 
material body will become dec01nposed. Yfhat then, is to exist in the 
future life as 11 substantive? 11 Certainly, Professor Perry does not mean 
that at death when the physical body is sloughed off, a metaphysical 
substantive being will be straightway created. .li.t least he has not 
--------
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intimated such a possibility and I am sure that he would not hold such an 
arbitrary theory. If he did, he would have to provide some power capable 
' 
of' making such a creation which at the present he does not believe exists, 
and some reason for the creation 1 s not occurring sooner and also, the nevr 
being would not be the same person, and thus the whole meaning of 
immortality would be foiled. He must mean, as he has indicated in his 
study of the possibility of immortality, that just as it is a fact of' 
experience f'or a person to remain identieal through the changes from one 
stage of' life to another, i.e., from childhood to youth; from youth to 
middle-age; and from middle-age to old age, it is possible for this 
identical person to pass rfrom the stage of old age through death to 
bmnortality without losing this identity. The person reaches its fullest 
and most complete stage of his existence minus his physical-neural 
organism. In our previous study of Professor Perry's metaphysics we found 
that it was this physical-neural organism that gave the person his 
11 indi viduali ty." Unity amidst multiplicity was explained by the nervous 
system with a "continuous history. 11 But now, in the future life, what is 
it that accounts for unity and identity? It must be something other than 
the physical organism. It evidently is this "substantive" being. But 
what can that be other than a conscious person who finds his identityZ 
If such is the case this consciously existing person is the very thing 
that Professor Perry denied in his epistemology and metaphysics. He 
attacked the idealists for holding such a theory, accusing them of the 
f'allacies of "pseudo-simplicity," "exclusive particularity" and "specula-
tive dogma." Earlier Prof'essor Perry accused any philosopher referring 
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to nself, 11 11 consciousness , 11 11 life, 11 11will, 11 etc., of being guilty of the 
fallacy of "pseudo-simplicity, 11 which meant that the philosopher was 
viewing such terms as simple and not subject to analysis . But now 
Professor Perry himself is referring to a 11 substantive being" as if it 
were simple . If it is he himself is guilty of the fallacy of 11 pseudo-
simplicity." The same line of argUlllent could be followed with regard to 
the fallacies of "exclusive particularity 11 and "speculative dogma." 
Here, it appears, is an inconsistency in Professor Perry's system which 
is in need of correction. 
c. In the light of the preceding argUlllents and criticisms it seems 
apparent from Professor Perry's discussion of immortality that what ever 
exists after death must be "individual," 11 conscious, 11 11free 11 and of 
intrinsic "worth." These are the four essential characteristics of per-
sonality which we adopted earlier in our study. These characteristics are 
"adjectives" describing a "substantive" being . My brief connnent is this: 
if these characteristics are essential for future life why are they 
denied to temporal existence? The only possible response that I can 
imagine that Professor Perry would give is this: the considerations of 
the needs of immortality are based on dialectic and spring from practical 
and moral sources while the epist emological and metaphysical considerations 
are confined to the empirical and analytic method. Such metaphysical 
necessities as are described concerning the person in a future existence 
are not to be found on purely epistemological and metaphysical grounds 
but are possible only as axiological postulates. Yet how can he allow 
incoherence of fundamental postulates? 
---+1-------
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D. It seems fair to say that the rutalytical method makes the doctrine 
of immortality impossible. No simple entities resulting from analysis 
would possess any of the qualities which vwuld make immortality signifi-
cant; and there is no ground in analytic method for supposing that any 
complex can be permanent . Only by endeavoring to see the meaning of life 
as a ·w-hole is one moved to conclude that immortality is rational, desir-
able and possible. In his axiology, particularly when dealing with the 
problem of immortality, Professor Perry, resorts to the synoptic method. 
In his epistemology and metaphysics he adheres strictly to the method of 
analysis which yielded only 11 neutral entities. 11 Thus the synoptic method 
employed in his axiology resulted in his theory of immortalitywhile the 
analytic method used in his epistemology and metaphysics denied such a 
theory as possible . Atomistic logic analyzes immortality away. Organic, 
synoptic logic makes immortality at least possible and even probable. 
E. Professor Perry makes positive declarations of the fact that he is 
a behaviorist. Consciousness is not a metaphysical reality but is action 
in relation to the physical organism and its environment. If consciousness 
has no metaphysical status there is nothing to survive the death of the 
physical organism after it has been placed in the grave . The person, for 
the behaviorist, has gone to the grave with the body unless you maintain, 
as Professor Perry does :i:n his argument for i:mm.ortali ty, that the person 
is a 11 substanti ve 11 being and is capable of existing beyond the grave. 
But when you take that position you are no longer a behaviorist. 
F. For Kant, moral value became the key to reality. Such may be the 
case with Professor Perry, for moral value plays a great part in his system 
=====~·:r:----------
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and seems to demand that persons exist after death . It may be possible 
that Professor Perry's axiology >rill become primary and eventually result 
in the reconstruction of his metaphysics and epistemology in terms of 
personality. Value apart from personality is an abstraction. Value is 
resident in personality . In fact, no metaphysic of value is possible 
without a metaphysic of personality . This seems implied in Professor 
Perry's argument for irmnortali ty when he makes good to be possible only 
when persons are existent in the world . 
IX. Relation of Professor Perry's Doctrine of Immortality to a Doctrine 
of the Per sonality of God. 
For most thinkers who believe in iMnortality belief in God is 
essential. The most notable exception to this is Professor McTaggart who 
maintains the belief in the eternal existence of persons but sees no 
necessity for the positing of t he existence of a Supreme Person. He 
adopts a s ort of pluralistic personalism vnthout any binding principle or 
personal unitary bond. This is a kind of "sawdust" universe of personal 
particles . At the other extreme , are the Absolute Idealists , who posit 
God as -Ghe Supreme Being, but deny that He is personal. Irmnortali ty, for 
such thinkers, is accepted but the individual person becomes, or rather is, 
a part of the Absolute . He loses his unique personality but lives on 
after death only in the sense of being part of the ~bole. Professor 
Bradley is an example of such a philosopher. Most thinkers also ·will 
classify Hegel in this category although there is some evidence which seems 
to imply that indj_vidual persons maintain their individuality even though 
they are parts of the Absolute . There are some Absolute Idealists who 
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argue for the continued individuality of persons in a future life but as 
parts of the Supreme Person. 
Our task is not to endeavor to establish the correc·bness or error 
in the above three distinct types of .possible theories regarding immortal-
ity and their relation to a Supreme Being, ·but simply to ascertain what 
the view of Professor Perry is on the problem. 
It may be stated briefly at the outse·b that Professor Perry does 
believe in the immortality of persons but does not believe in personality 
of God~ if there is a God, who exists metaphysically. We shall now 
endeavor to substantiate our interpretation of Professor Perry's position 
as just stated. It will be unnecessary to cover the ground again on which 
he accepts the doctrine of immortali·ty. That persons ·will live on after 
death is certain if Professor Perry's hopes and desires are fulfilled. 
But to the other consideration, namely, the personality of God, we must 
give our attention. Professor Perry says, "My conception of God contains 
an idea of my o'.'m interes·bs, an idea of the disposition of the universe 
toward my interest and some working plan for the reconciliation of these 
two terms."1 But in such a conception 
God cannot be either an entity or an ideal, but 
is always a relation of enti'by to ideal realit"Y re-
garded from the standpoint of its favorableness or 
unfavorableness to human life, and prescribing for 
the latter the propriety of a certain attitude. 2 
Neither is God considered as a universal ·will for he says, "The universal 
will may be taken to mean the formal iderrti'!;y of all wills----strictly 
1. Perry, Int. Jour. Ethics, 15(1904-5), 67. 
2. Ibid. Italics mine. 
================ 
speaking there is no such will. nl 
In addition to the above, Professor Perry also denies the general 
concept of personality to God for he says, 11 The demand that God shall 
be a person is only the last of the anthropomorphisms by which man has 
compromised God by the desire to worship him. n2 'l'o conceive God as a 
person is 11both to confuse the meaning of personality, and to deny God 
the right to be himself." 3 The above statements appear at the close of 
his great work on axiology, General The_?ry of Value, which gives us 
ground for concluding that his theory of axiology does not necessitate 
the positing of a Supreme Person as the f ountai n-head of value. 
'l'he above means that values are 11hom.eless. 11 They are not grounded 
anywhere nor in anyone. Yet, Professor Perry refers to the uni verse in 
personal terms in his discussion of i nunortality. What is it that gives 
purpose to the struggle of the person? Yfhy should the universe be 
friendly to the conser-vation of values? Vlhat difference does it make 
whe·cher persons or values survive if the universe is impersonal? The 
answer seems to be that it makes no difference. If the universe is im-
personal belief in objective value and the final triumph of the good 
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is only a fond hope and not a rational necessity. Yet Professor Perry is 
a meliorist believing in the possibility of making the world better and 
in the final triumph of the good. In his Paris address he said, 
1. Perry, Jour. Phil., 11(1914), 158 . 
2. Perry, GTV, 685. Italics mine. 
3 . Ibid., 686. 
Les applications religieuses du realisme anisi 
que ses applications politiques, d~rivent de son 
pluralisme fondamental. 
Le problema de la religion, dans le sens le 
plus large, c'est de reconciler les voleurs et les 
faits, les espoirs et les croyances. Il y a deux 
mani~res de la faire. On peut affirmer que la 
realite est deja bonne; ou bien on peut affirmer que, 
gr~ce a ses propres efforts, accrus par toutes les 
autres forces morales du monde, la realite deviendra 
bonne.l 
vifhat does he mean by 11toutes les autres forces morales du monde?" 
Evidently just other finite persons or organizations of persons. And 
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further, what does he mean, 11la rea.li te deviendra bonne? 11 Y'lhat reality? 
Persons or 11neutral entities? 11 As noted in the previous consideration of 
Professor Perry's concept of 11freedom, 11 he dema...11.ds freedom as a. necessary 
postulate of a pluralistic universe but denies the "person" possessing 
this 11 freedom11 metaphysical status. 
In conclusion, it doesn't seem consistent to refer to the world as 
interested in value if such a universe is impersonal. If value is relative 
to consciousness (Perry's position) and is also objective (also Perry's 
admitted contention earlier) there is need of a synthesis of these two 
extreme value theories in a Supreme Person who is the objectification of 
value and a.t the same ·bime value ·is relative to consciousness. 
CONCLUSION. 
In our consideration of Professor Perry's treatment of inunortality we 
have found that he desires ru1.d hopes for continued existence after physical 
death. Such a belief is rational because, (1) time is needed for the 
1. Perry, P~1~, 153. 
-----------======= 
completing and fulfilling of present interests; (2) annihilation means 
the destruction of "life's greatest good, 11 love; (3) of the great cost 
and supreme value of personality; and finally, (4) continued existence 
248 
is necessary for the balancing of the ledger of justice. The person ex-
isting beyond the grave is a 11 substantive 11 being, possessing 11 individu-
ali ty, 11 "consci ousness, 11 "freedom" and "worth. 11 We have found that these 
conclusions concerning the concept of personality vvith regard to 
immortality are out of harmony vil'i th Professor Perry's epistemology and 
metaphysics considered in earlier chapters. We have also established the 
fact that he denies personality to God and does not find it necessary to 
posit such a personal being as a correlary of his belief in immortality. 
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